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Abstract 
 
This dissertation examines the philosophical foundations of information ethics and their potential 
for application to contemporary problems in U.S. foreign intelligence surveillance. Questions 
concerning the limits of government intrusion on protected Fourth Amendment rights are 
addressed by analyzing the post-9/11 changes to the U.S. foreign intelligence surveillance law 
and policy in terms of the traditional ethical theories commonly used to support or discount these 
changes, namely utilitarian and contractarian ethical theories.  This research combines both 
theoretical elements, through its use of analytic philosophy, and qualitative research methods, 
through its use of legislation, court cases, news media, and scholarship surrounding U.S. foreign 
intelligence surveillance.   Using the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act (FISA) and the Terrorist Surveillance Program as case examples, the author develops and 
applies a normative ethical framework based on a legal proportionality test that can be applied to 
future cases involving U.S. foreign intelligence surveillance.   
 
The proportionality test developed in this research, which is based on a modified version of the 
Canadian Oakes Test, seeks to balance legitimate concerns about collective security against the 
rights of the individual.  As a new synthesis of utilitarian and contractarian ethical principles, the 
proportionality test laid out in this dissertation has potential for application beyond U.S. foreign 
intelligence surveillance.  It could act as a guide to future research in other applied areas in 
information policy research where there is a clear tension between individual civil liberties and 
the collective good of society.  Problems such as passenger screening, racial and ethnic profiling, 
data mining, and access to information could be examined using the framework developed in this 
study.         
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Résumé 
 
 
Cette thèse  porte sur les fondements philosophiques de l'éthique de l'information et sur leur 
potentiel d'application aux problèmes contemporains en matière de surveillance du 
renseignement étranger aux États-Unis. On aborde des questions relatives aux limites de 
l'intrusion du gouvernement sur les droits protégés par le quatrième amendement  en analysant 
les changements post-9/11 aux lois et aux politiques en matière de surveillance du renseignement 
étranger  en termes de théories éthiques traditionnelles couramment utilisées pour discuter de ces 
changements, à savoir l‘utilitarianisme et les théories de contractualisme. Cette étude combine à 
la fois des éléments théoriques, par son utilisation de la philosophie analytique, et les méthodes 
de recherche qualitative, à travers son utilisation de la législation, la jurisprudence, les médias et 
les recherches au sujet de la surveillance du renseignement étranger.  Utilisant comme exemples 
la U.S.A.  PATRIOT Act, la Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) et le Programme de 
surveillance des terroristes, l'auteur élabore et applique un cadre d` éthique normative fondé sur 
un test de proportionnalité, un cadre que l‘on peut appliquer à d‘autres cas impliquant la 
surveillance du renseignement étranger. 
 
Le test de proportionnalité développé dans cette recherche, qui est basé sur une version modifiée 
du célèbre Oakes test de la Cour suprême du Canada, cherche à contrebalancer les 
préoccupations légitimes concernant la sécurité collective et les droits individuels. Comme 
synthèse des principes utilitairistes et contractualistes, le test de proportionnalité énoncé dans la 
présente thèse a un potentiel d'application au-delà de la surveillance du renseignement étranger 
aux États-Unis. Il pourrait servir de guide pour des recherches dans d'autres domaines appliqués 
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où il y a une tension évidente entre les libertés individuelles et le bien collectif de la société. Des 
problèmes tels que le contrôle des passagers, le profilage racial et ethnique, l'exploration de 
données, et l'accès à l'information pourrait être examiné en utilisant le cadre élaboré dans cette 
étude. 
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Glossary of Terms 
 
 
Analytic Philosophy:  the broad philosophical tradition dominant in various regions, most 
notably Great Britain and the United States, since the early twentieth century,
1
 characterized by 
close argument aimed at achieving clarity, and respect for the natural sciences. 
 
Applied Ethics:  the application of ethical theories to particular practical domains such as 
medical ethics, business ethics, legal ethics, environmental ethics, computer ethics, and most 
recently, information ethics.   
 
Consequentialism:   moral theories which judge an action to be moral or immoral on the basis 
of its final consequences or outcome.  One who subscribes to such moral thinking would be 
referred to as a Consequentialist.   
 
Contractarianism:   a rights-based approach to morality and ethics that takes into account the 
differing types of rights, both positive and negative, and the roles and responsibilities of citizens 
and governments to uphold and protect those rights.  This relationship between citizens and their 
government takes the form of a social contract.   
 
Communitarianism:  a teleological approach to morality that attaches an ethical importance to 
community values and bonds, the importance of which has not been adequately captured by 
deontological theories, specifically those focused on social contract.  Communitarians argue that 
                                                          
1
 See Aaron Preston‘s definition for ‗Analytic Philosophy‘ provided in the Internet Encyclopaedia of Philosophy:  A 
Peer-Reviewed Academic Resource. March 25, 2006.  <http://www.iep.utm.edu/analytic/> for additional 
information on the historical roots of the tradition. 
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such contracts do not capture the full importance of the community, both in terms of tradition 
and cultural understanding.   
 
Ethics:  the philosophical study of morality: that is, of right conduct, obligation, responsibility, 
and social justice.   
 
Information Ethics:  the application of traditional ethical theories to issues regarding the 
collection, classification, and dissemination of information.  Information ethics includes 
standards of professional practice, codes of conduct, and aspects of information law and public 
policy. 
 
Meta-ethics:  the philosophical study of the nature of moral judgment and ethical norms.  It is 
concerned with foundational issues, such as the meaning of terms like ―right‖ and ―wrong,‖ or 
the objectivity (or lack thereof) of moral judgments.  Meta-ethical theories are in general purely 
descriptive and do not aim to have prescriptive implications for human action. 
 
Morality:  a code of right conduct.  This code may be the result of social or religious norms or 
the product of rational thought. 
 
Negative Rights: a negative right is the right to freedom from outside interference in a specified 
domain. The rights to intellectual freedom, freedom of speech, and of privacy are examples of 
negative rights, as they assert the right of the individual to think, speak and keep some part of her 
life outside the public realm without interference from forces that would try to subvert those 
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rights. 
 
Normative Ethics:  unlike meta-ethics which concerns itself with the nature of norms, 
normative ethical theories are prescriptive.  Normative ethics sets out norms or rules related to 
action.  Normative ethics have traditionally been broken down into two groups: teleological, 
which are theories of the good; and deontological theories, which are theories of duty  
 
Positive rights:  unlike a negative right, which set out a boundary protecting the individual 
against outside interference, a positive right is the right to a specified good considered necessary 
for individuals to fully express their freedom within the community. That is, a positive right 
establishes an obligation on the part of the community to provide that good, without which the 
individual could not be considered fully free. For example, the right to health care and the right 
to education would be positive rights.  
 
Proportionality test:  a judicial test for determining whether or not a constitutionally protected 
right can be reasonably limited under the law. 
 
Teleological Theories: from the Greek word ‗telos‘ meaning end, fulfillment, completion, goal 
or aim.  Teleological theories in normative ethics take a conception of the good to be primary; 
the theory is then framed in such a way as to lay out the means to be used in order to maximize 
the good.  The value of any particular action, policy of action, or even of a law, is judged by the 
degree to which it has maximized the good. 
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Deontological Theories: normative ethical theories which hold adherence to rules (laws, norms) 
to be primary, and consequences secondary in judging the morality of an action or policy. 
Typically, moral evaluations within such theories hold adherence to the moral law to be 
necessary but not sufficient; an action must be motivated by respect for the moral law (rather 
than to achieve some desired outcome) to count as moral.  Deontological theorists have based the 
high degree of respect due the moral law on, variously, the law's divine provenance, its 
rootedness in human nature, or the basis of the concept of morality in pure practical reason. 
 
Utilitarianism:  a form of consequentialism, first expounded by Jeremy Bentham that views 
pleasure as being unquestionably good and pain and suffering as unquestionably bad.  The 
rightness or wrongness of an action, law or policy depends upon its ability to maximize pleasure 
and/or minimize suffering. 
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PART I: 
 
 
 
 
 
INFORMATION ETHICS IN THE POST 9/11 PERIOD 
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Chapter 1: 
 
Overview of the Research Design 
 
Following the terrorist attacks on the Twin Towers and the Pentagon that took place on 
September 11, 2001, the U.S. Government under the Bush Administration took unprecedented 
measures in an effort to apprehend and punish the perpetrators of those attacks and to prevent 
future attempts against the American homeland.  Law enforcement agencies were given the right 
to access database information concerning individuals held by any U.S. based organization 
(including library patron information) through the use of National Security Letters (NSLs).  They 
were also given the right to intercept phone calls, and to engage in other forms of warrantless 
surveillance as deemed necessary in the ‗War on Terror.‘  Eventually, additional legislation was 
passed to ensure that such warrantless activities, if not initially legal, were at least retroactively 
so.  These new measures have had far-reaching political and ethical implications.  The aim of 
this study is to examine how the general implications of these new policies in the U.S. play out in 
the domain of information ethics.  Only time will tell whether or not the Obama Administration 
(or future administrations) will look to reverse the legislative and administrative policy trends set 
by the previous government.  In the meantime, studying the ethical impact of the decisions taken 
in the eight years of the Bush Administration may prove insightful to the study of information 
ethics, law and policy.  
 
As this research is an applied study in information ethics, it will be useful to lay out the terms of 
reference right from the start.  Ethics is the philosophical study of morality: that is, of right 
conduct, obligation, responsibility, and social justice.  Information ethics, narrowly construed, is 
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the application of traditional ethical theories, such as utilitarianism or contractarianism, to issues 
regarding the collection, classification, and dissemination of information.  More broadly 
construed, information ethics includes standards of professional practice, codes of conduct, and 
aspects of information law, public policy and so forth.  
 
In this research I set out a plan for first, exploring the philosophical foundations of information 
ethics, and second, combining this foundation with an applied study in information ethics with a 
focus on U. S. foreign intelligence surveillance.  My aim in this study is partly theoretical (or 
abstract), and partly practical (or concrete).  That is to say, that I am interested in both the 
development and application of a normative ethical framework that can be applied to cases 
involving U.S. foreign intelligence surveillance.  By seeking to combine foundational ethical 
theory in a way that is flexible enough to deal with real world problems (transforming ethical 
theory to ethical practice in the form of applied ethics) this research falls squarely in line with 
that of prominent recent work in social and political philosophy.  The American philosopher, 
Martha Nussbaum, for example, offers the following by way of a description of the central goals 
of her most recent book:  Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership: 
           
Theories of justice should be abstract.  They should, that is, have a generality    
and theoretical power that enables them to reach beyond the political conflicts of 
their time, even if they have their origins in such conflicts. [...]  On the other       
hand, theories of social justice must also be responsive to the world and its most 
urgent problems, and must be open to changes in their formulations and even in 
their structures in response to a new problem or to an old one that has been      
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culpably ignored.
2
    
 
Research Question 
The overarching question addressed in this dissertation is:  
 
What are the boundaries limiting government intrusion on privacy rights and how are such 
boundaries drawn?   
 
This is a more complex question than might be suggested by the simple response that freedom 
must be traded for security in a dangerous world.  Any such justification of the limitation of civil 
liberties turns on the nature and the severity of the threat posed by terrorism, and the 
effectiveness of the measures in question in countering that threat.  Even if it is granted, for the 
sake of argument, that legislative measures such as those provided by the U.S.A. Patriot Act, the 
Presidential authorization of the Terrorist Surveillance Program, and the recent changes to the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, do enhance public security in the face of a serious, 
ongoing threat, there remain deeper issues with respect to justifying the sacrifice of such rights 
for security.  The U.S. is a liberal democracy founded on a rights-based constitution.  The 
fundamental claim to legitimacy advanced by such a constitution is not the achievement of 
common goods through binding together in a community (e.g., the welfare of security of its 
citizens), but rather the preservation of the rights to which citizens are entitled and from which 
they derive their dignity as equal members of the community.  This dissertation seeks to address 
whether there can be a coherent justification for trading constitutionally protected civil liberties 
                                                          
2
    Nussbaum, Martha. Frontiers of Justice: Disability, Nationality, Species Membership. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2006, p. 1.  
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in exchange for security in insecure times. 
 
In order to address these questions I will analyze a variety of different sources: primary texts in 
philosophy; and primary and secondary sources related to government legislation, court 
decisions, committee reports, policy documents; position statements of government departments 
and non-governmental organizations.  If a justification emerges that coheres with the core 
principles of American democracy that underlie the U.S. Constitution, then new legislative and 
policy measures may be seen as just another step in the continuous evolution of the scope and 
limits of rights and liberties in that country.  If no such justification is forthcoming – that is if 
security and common good take precedence over civil liberties in any justification that can be 
offered – these new changes must be seen to represent an attempt at rethinking the fundamental 
principles upon which the most powerful liberal democracy in the world was founded.  If so, 
then ―everything‖ has indeed ―changed.‖         
 
Methodology 
To address in any concrete sense the question of where the boundaries on government intrusion 
upon privacy rights lie, the use of case examples is essential.  Although I am using real cases, 
that is to say that I am focused on actual historical events rather than purely hypothetical thought 
experiments, my approach is in many respects closer to one an analytic philosopher might use 
when testing out a theory or principle in humanities research.  In that sense my use of the term 
‗case‘ is different from how the term ‗case‘ might be used in much of the social sciences.  The 
cases I set out are descriptive, that is, they outline the events as they were portrayed in the media, 
through government reports, committee meetings, and debates, through various court challenges, 
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and in the relevant scholarly literature.  The benefit of using real cases when dealing with ethical 
questions is that they illustrate the need for critical ethical theory and research to address real 
world problems in the area of information ethics. 
 
My research is different from that of social scientists like Robert E. Stake, Robert K. Yin, 
Pamela Baxter and Susan Jack, among others, who use case studies as an instrument for 
developing a constructivist paradigm.  In this paradigm the claim is that ―truth is relative and that 
it is dependent on one‘s perspective.‖3  Case studies in this sense examine the social construction 
of reality through participant narratives.  The study of these narratives is what allows researchers 
the ability to gain a better understanding of a participant‘s actions.  My main concern with this 
work is not why individual actors behaved the way they did (which raises more complicated 
social and political questions related to the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks), but rather what the 
limitations on government should be with respect to privacy.  That is to say, I am concerned with 
the underlying ethical questions.  Given the nature of the questions I am addressing, and the 
philosophical tradition from which I am approaching them, the use of constructivist paradigm is 
problematic because it is inconsistent with the fundamental premise of analytic philosophy: that 
analytical reasoning can help us make more prudent ethical choices by establishing the 
implications and consequences of alternative ethical approaches.   If I were to point to a 
particular theorist who exemplifies the tradition in which I am working, I would most likely look 
to John Rawls who brought political philosophy back into the analytic tradition.  That being said, 
this is not a Rawlsian dissertation (I do not subscribe to a completely contractarian approach to 
                                                          
3
     Baxter, Pamela, and Susan Jack. ―Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for 
Novice Researchers.‖ The Qualitative Report 13.4 (2008): 544.  
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ethics), but the influence of this type of analytic reasoning will likely become apparent to the 
reader as the dissertation unfolds.  
 
The methodology used in this dissertation involves both an abstract or theoretical component as 
well as a concrete or applied component.  The former will amount to a conceptual 
exploration of foundational ethical issues – specifically an examination of the conceptual 
coherence and plausibility of central insights of ethical theories from a broadly ‗a priori‘ point of 
view.  The latter will involve the discovery and discussion of qualitative empirical data about 
information practices in the post 9/11 period through the use of case examples, which will 
highlight the concrete, practical issues to be evaluated in the light of the theoretical results. 
 
Initially my choice of subject matter was limited to my own personal interest in the ethical issues 
associated with the U.S.A.  PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act) as it was being covered in the press in 
2001, particularly the use of National Security Letters (NSLs) and their potential chilling effect 
on freedom of expression and intellectual freedom.  In the immediate aftermath of the September 
11
th
 attacks, the use (and possible misuse) of such letters provided researchers with the first 
glimpse of a possible shift in American information policy in the post 9/11 period.  Questions 
about whether or not the use of such letters was constitutional or a possible violation of the 
Fourth Amendment which protects against unlawful search and seizure, were to my mind not 
only of interest to strictly legal or political scholars but also of interest to those in philosophy and 
information studies because they represented an intersection between all four disciplines – that is 
to say, they raised legal, political, ethical and policy questions for all four disciplines.   
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As previously stated, my initial PhD proposal was to focus entirely on the Patriot Act, and was 
supposed to be a case study of this Act.  Over time, and with the revelations of warrantless 
surveillance by the U.S. Government, this research expanded to include two additional case 
studies: one on the Terrorist Surveillance Program, and the other on the subsequent amendments 
to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.  The reason I chose to expand the study was simple, 
I wanted to see if the ethical principles that arose from the examination of my overarching 
research question could equally be applied in my examination of all three cases given their 
similar national security concerns as related to foreign intelligence surveillance.  
 
The case examples used in this dissertation are specific to the post 9/11 period of the U.S. and 
are limited to the two terms of the George W. Bush presidency (2001 – 2009).  These case 
examples were selected on the basis of their moral justifications (something which came through 
clearly in the public accounts of each case through various media, court cases, government 
documents, etc.) and provide a modern example for testing more theoretical ethical approaches 
in an applied setting.   
 
Research Design 
Following an overview of my research approach and statement of my research questions 
provided in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 presents a review of the literature in the field.  Although there 
is a great deal that has been written about the constitutional issues associated with the reforms 
that were instituted in the post 9/11 period, the review demonstrates that there is a gap in the 
literature when examining deeper ethical questions related to issues which go beyond the purely 
legal or political consequences of these reforms – something this dissertation seeks to address. 
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Chapter 3 examines the ethical dimension of the U.S. Constitution and of American law making.  
Engaging in a discussion of ethical principles in light of the constitutional principles is itself 
loosely meta-ethical because it assumes that the rights a constitution protects exist prior to the 
constitution - they would have to if they are deemed inalienable.  The U.S. Constitution and the 
various legislative reforms discussed throughout the rest of the dissertation shape a discussion of 
meta-ethical, normative and applied ethics in the context of constitutionally protected rights, 
specifically Fourth Amendment rights.  As this chapter points out, the majority of the post 9/11 
legislative reforms and executive orders have looked to utilitarian arguments for support.  Less 
attention has been paid to the other, contrasting approach that has consumed much of recent 
American legal and political thought, that of rights-based ethics.  In this section, I examine both 
of these important branches of applied ethics and use them to analyze the development of moral 
values and ethical conflicts in the information field.  In assessing these ethical theories, I 
consider the extent to which they are compatible with the fundamental principles of the U.S. 
Constitution.  My objective is to formulate a third way forward that allows for a balance of both 
the right and the good.  Chapter 3 concludes with a discussion of the application that information 
ethics can and should have in any discussion involving the myriad events and trends which have 
arisen in post – 9/11 America.   
 
Chapters 4 – 6 examine various ethical issues with regard to privacy and access to information, 
in particular those relating to information collection, classification and dissemination, asking to 
what degree limitations in access to information may be justified in a liberal, democratic society.  
Chapter 4 begins with a discussion of the legislative response to the September 11
th
 attacks, 
namely, the implementation of the U.S.A. PATRIOT Act (Patriot Act).  This chapter also 
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provides an assessment of the tools now available to U.S. law enforcement in the ―War on 
Terror,‖ asking not only whether these measures are indeed effective, but also if they are 
compatible with the values put forth in the U.S. Constitution.  Chapter 5 examines the use of 
warrantless surveillance in the U.S. which was been deemed by the George W. Bush 
Administration to be a constitutionally sound practice and a logical extension of the President‘s 
war-time powers.  Chapter 6 concludes with a discussion of the liability for both the companies 
who complied with warrantless surveillance requests under the Terrorist Surveillance Program 
and the government officials who orchestrated the secret program.  This chapter examines a 
major shift in American law making as witnessed by the Protect America Act (PAA) and the 
FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA)’s immunity provisions, and the impact that such legislation 
will have on the future of American lawmaking. 
 
Chapter 7 discusses the prospects for privacy in post 9/11 America.  The work of authors such as 
Christopher Slobogin,
4
 K.A. Taipale,
5
 and Stephanie Cooper Blum
6
 inform the discussion of 
balancing liberty and security in terms of electronic surveillance.  This chapter attempts to 
provide a compromise between utilitarian and contractarian arguments through the use of tests 
which foster proportionality and minimization of harm to the right being infringed – that being, 
the Fourth Amendment.   The U.S. Terry Stop test and the Canadian Oakes test are discussed in 
this chapter, with the latter test forming the basis for a new standard in measuring proportionality 
that goes beyond that proposed by Slobogin, Taipale, and Cooper Blum.  By incorporating the 
                                                          
4
    Slobogin, Christopher. Privacy at Risk: The New Government Surveillance and the Fourth Amendment. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press., 2007.  
5
    Taipale, K. A. ―The Ear of Dionysus: Rethinking Foreign Intelligence Surveillance.‖  Yale Journal of Law and 
Technology 9 (2007): 128 
6
    Blum, Stephanie Cooper. "What really is at Stake with the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 and Ideas for Future 
Surveillance Reform." Boston University Public Interest Law Journal 18 (2008): 269. 
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underlying principles of the Canadian Oakes Test, a judicial test for determining whether or not a 
protected right can be limited under the Canadian Constitution, into the discussion surrounding 
the limitations of government intrusion upon privacy rights, it is possible to address the concerns 
for a third way forward that combines both the utilitarian and contractarian concerns raised in the 
'liberty versus security' debate.  Chapter 8 concludes with an examination of the tension between 
civil liberties and national security.  It focuses on the need for achieving a balance of these rights 
(Fourth Amendment rights in particular) and their corresponding responsibilities (the protection 
of national security) in the post 9/11 period. 
 
Overview of Main Research Findings 
This study involves highly political legislative and policy actions that took place during the Bush 
Administration in the post 9/11 period.  Although the case examples studied indicate the political 
nature of these actions, the final analysis of these events focuses on the ethical dimensions.  This 
research broadly examines the main ethical theories that were used to shape the ethical debate 
surrounding the issues: those being utilitarian and contractarian.  Analysis of the three case 
examples revealed that the main tensions inherent in each case were part of the public 'liberty 
versus security' debate.  This debate was framed by the Administration, civil liberties groups, 
politicians, and academics in largely utilitarian and contractarian terms.  This study finds that the 
traditional ethical theories of utilitarianism and contractarianism are not sufficient to the task of 
dealing with contemporary ethical problems as they relate to information ethics.  Rather than 
viewing utilitarian and contractarian approaches as being adversarial, this research looks to 
combine these approaches in the form of a proportionality test that Courts can apply to cases 
involving Fourth Amendment rights as related to foreign intelligence surveillance in the U.S.   
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By providing a model of proportionality that goes beyond the Terry Stop test, a court test for 
determining the limits of a lawful search and seizure, as presented in the American scholarly 
literature on the issue, this research is adding something new to the literature on this topic. 
 
Implications 
The events of 9/11 will no doubt be marked as a major turning point in American history, not 
only because of the event itself, but because of the dramatic shift in government policy they 
caused. The creation of far-reaching legislation such as the Patriot Act, the admission by the 
Administration that it had been conducting warrantless surveillance on Americans for four years 
(2001 – 2005) through the Terrorist Surveillance Program in an attempt to thwart terrorist 
efforts, and the subsequent passage of retroactive legislation to limit the legal liability for the 
telecom companies that cooperated with the Government‘s requests for information, have all 
raised questions as to what degree civil liberties, or human rights in general, can be set aside in 
the interest of national security.  This study will be of interest to those in Information Studies, 
Philosophy, Political Science and Legal Studies.     
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Chapter 2: 
 
Literature Review 
 
 
Introduction 
In the U.S. the discussion of rights and responsibilities has become largely a discussion about the 
balancing of individual rights with such things as the right to privacy against any government 
intrusions on such rights in the name of national security.  The September 11, 2001 terrorist 
attacks on the U.S. required action by the Federal Government in order to protect the security of 
the nation.  Issues related to the collection of specific types of personal information as well as 
barriers to information sharing among different government agencies were immediately 
highlighted as key problems in preventing the attacks.  The passage of the Uniting and 
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act
7
 (U.S.A.  PATRIOT Act or Patriot Act for short) was the initial legislative response 
to the events of September 11
th
.  This Act, in combination with the National Security Agency‘s 
(NSA) program of warrantless surveillance, and subsequent amendments to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA)
8
 through the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA),
9
 
and the FISA Amendments of 2008 (FAA),
10
 has been subject to a great deal of controversy 
among civil liberties groups who argue that such measures have served to reduce civil liberties in 
                                                          
7
     Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct 
Terrorism Act (USA PATRIOT) Act of 2001. Public Law 107-56, § 214(a)(1), 115 Stat. 272, 286 (Amending 50 
U.S.C. § 1842(a)(1) (2000)).  
8
     Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Public Law 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, 50 U.S.C. ch. 36 s. 1566. 
9
     Protect America Act of 2007, Public Law 110-55. 
10
   FISA Amendments Act of 2008, Public Law110-261. 
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America. 
 
Although one of the crucial responsibilities for any government is the provision of national 
security for its people, the potential for gross abuses of governmental power in instances where 
certain individual rights may be waived is something that requires further investigation.  The 
following literature review examines a broad selection of scholarly articles relating to three 
broad questions: 
 
What ethical, legal or political considerations should be taken into account with regard to the 
collection, classification, and dissemination of citizens’ personal information by government 
departments and agencies?   
 
Where do Fourth Amendment rights fit into foreign intelligence investigations? 
 
Are there exceptional circumstances under which the right to privacy can be waived in the 
interest of national security? 
 
In order to address these questions I have identified and synthesized a variety of scholarly 
articles.  The articles selected are multidisciplinary, drawing from Law, Political Science and 
Philosophy.  Specifically these articles look at the impact of the Patriot Act upon due process 
and judicial oversight, and the impact of the warrantless surveillance program conducted by the 
NSA and the retroactive immunity provisions added to FISA on Fourth Amendment rights, as 
well as a number of other civil liberties and human rights issues that have arisen in the post-
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September  11
th
 period. 
 
Broad Ethical, Legal and Political Considerations 
What ethical, legal or political considerations should be taken into account with regard to the 
collection, classification, and dissemination of citizens’ personal information by government 
departments and agencies?   
 
Information Gathering  
The Patriot Act was the initial legislative response to September 11
th
 2001.  The Act passed less 
than six weeks after the terrorist attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, amid 
pressures for government reaction to these horrific events.  The objectives of the Act, according 
to Christopher P. Banks, were as follows: 
  
1.  to improve information sharing between law enforcement and foreign intelligence 
agencies; 
2.  to gather anti-terrorism intelligence through the use of the flexible warrant 
requirement of the Foreign intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA); 
3.  to expand wiretap authority over electronic communication; 
4.  to seize funds  utilized  for terrorist activities; and  
5.  to impose mandatory detention and deportation of non-U.S. citizens suspected of 
having links to terrorist organizations
11
   
 
                                                          
11
    Banks, Christopher P. ―Protecting (Or Destroying) Freedom through Law.‖ American National Security and 
Civil Liberties in an Era of Terrorism. Ed. David B. Cohen and John W. Wells. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004, p. 30. 
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As a means for fulfilling these objectives a number of important pieces of legislation were 
modified including the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA), the Family Education 
Rights and Privacy Act (FERPA), the Right to Financial Privacy Act, the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act, the Cable Communications Policy Act, the Federal Wiretap 
Statute, the Federal Pen Register and Trap and Trace Statute, as well as many other statutes.
12
  
 
Effects of Legislative Changes on Information Collection 
The impact of the changes to the statutes identified by Banks, are reviewed sector-by-sector by 
Priscilla M. Regan in her article, ―Old Issues, New Context: Privacy, Information Collection, and 
Homeland Security.‖  Here Regan examines various sectors currently affected by a reduction in 
privacy protection as a result of the Patriot Act.  This act ―amends virtually every information 
privacy statute to facilitate access, increase data collection, and reduce the due process and 
privacy protections for record subjects.‖13  According to Regan, these changes represent a 
reduction in privacy protections across a variety of different sectors and are a clear expansion of 
government authority.  In particular, Regan examines how the financial, educational, library, 
internet communications and transportation sectors are being affected by these changes. 
 
Sector by Sector Impact  
I.  Financial 
One aim of the Patriot Act is to bolster federal efforts to combat money laundering.  It does so 
through the use of more stringent record keeping, disclosure and information sharing 
                                                          
12
    Statutes as cited in Jaeger, Paul T., et al. ―The USA PATRIOT Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 
and Information Policy Research in Libraries: Issues, Impacts and Questions for Libraries and Researchers.‖ Library 
Quarterly 74.2 (2004): 99, p. 100. 
13
    Regan, Priscilla M. ―Old Issues, New Context: Privacy, Information Collection, and Homeland Security.‖ 
Government Information Quarterly 21.4 (2004): 481. 
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requirements, and the imposition of new crimes and penalties.
14
  For the financial sector, being 
able to track the flow of money is seen as critical in helping to identify and prevent future 
terrorist attacks.  Changes to existing laws and practices have been implemented in an effort to 
make it easier for law enforcement and intelligence officials to access financial records.  
However, the changes have been an ―implementation nightmare‖ 15 requiring banks to move 
from a ―compliance focus to a more comprehensive, risk-based strategy to detect and report 
potential money laundering.‖16  These changes have created the need for a whole host of identity 
verification and data transaction analysis products and services for the financial service industry 
as companies try to meet these new requirements.  In a sense the ―banks have been deputized as 
federal law enforcement agencies.‖  In creating such an enormous mountain of financial 
information, the problem remains as to how the Government will be able to manage this 
information in a way that is sense-making, that will find the relevant items of information that 
may be carried along in the flood of reporting provided by financial institutions. 
 
II.  Educational Institutions  
Among the various acts amended by the Patriot Act stands the Family Educational Rights and 
Privacy Act (FERPA).  Previously this act (FERPA) required student consent for the release of 
academic records; however, as it now stands pursuant to a court order, educational institutions 
are required to disclose student records to federal law enforcement authorities in conjunction 
                                                          
14
    Banks, Christopher P. ―Protecting (Or Destroying) Freedom through Law.‖ American National Security and 
Civil Liberties in an Era of Terrorism. Ed. David B. Cohen and John W. Wells. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2004. 
15
    Regan, Priscilla M. ―Old Issues, New Context: Privacy, Information Collection, and Homeland Security.‖ 
Government Information Quarterly 21.4 (2004): 481, p. 485. 
16
    Ibid. p. 485. 
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with a terrorism investigation.
17
  In addition, the Immigration and Naturalization Service powers 
have been broadened with respect to the collection of information on foreign students.  Under the 
Patriot Act educational institutions are required to collect and maintain passport and visa 
information.  As Regan notes, ―part of the difficulty is that educational institutions now maintain 
a plethora of records on students, faculty, and staff from traditional academic and personnel 
records to purchases with ID-based accounts and communications transactions, including 
Internet and e-mail records.‖18  
 
III.  Libraries 
The library community has long protected the confidentiality of patrons‘ records.  Section 215 of 
the Patriot Act in its amendments to the FISA has broadened the access of law enforcement 
agencies to ―business records‖ and ―all tangible things.‖   In the library this could include access 
to patron library records and records of online activities. Patron records, until now, were only 
accessible with a warrant that was issued with probable cause; now law enforcement officials 
only require that foreign intelligence be a ―significant purpose‖ of the investigation.19  As Paul T. 
Jaeger, John Carlo Bertot, and Charles R. McClure note, librarians must face the fact that any of 
the records they keep on patrons could be covered by a FISA warrant
20
 issued by the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) – and such a warrant does not require probable cause.   
 
 
                                                          
17
    Ibid. p. 486. 
18
    Ibid. p. 486. 
19
    Ibid. p. 489. 
20
    Jaeger, Paul T., et al. "The USA PATRIOT Act, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, and Information 
Policy Research in Libraries: Issues, Impacts and Questions for Libraries and Researchers." Library Quarterly 74.2 
(2004): 99, p. 100. 
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IV.  Internet and Communications Companies  
A wide range of communications records have long been viewed as an integral part of any 
intelligence gathering investigations. These records can contain vast amounts of information on 
voice and data transactions such as the time that the communication took place, its length, the 
parties involved, as well as historical information on the frequency and patterns of 
communications.  Given the vast amount of information that can be gleaned from these records, 
policies to protect an individual‘s ―reasonable expectation of privacy‖ were incorporated in Title 
III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978, and the Electronic Communications Act of 1986.
21
  The Patriot Act has 
served to change many of these privacy expectations, particularly through the use of National 
Security Letters (NSLs).   
 
V.  Transportation 
Given the means used by terrorists in the September 11
th
 attacks, there should be little surprise 
that a great deal of attention has focused on airport security. The Department of Homeland 
Security has initiated several passenger screening systems as a way to ensure that the use of 
airplanes as weapons does not happen again.  That said, how these systems maintain the records 
that they keep on passengers and their effect on privacy is something that needs to be examined 
more closely. 
 
Following 9/11, the Government‘s use of the Computer-Assisted Passenger Prescreening System 
(CAPPS), resulted in a number of innocent Americans being unable to board their flights 
                                                          
21
    Regan, Priscilla M. "Old Issues, New Context: Privacy, Information Collection, and Homeland Security." 
Government Information Quarterly 21.4 (2004): 481, p. 487. 
  
33 
 
 
because the screening criteria in CAPPS had produced false positives – individuals being 
wrongly matched to names on terrorist watch lists.   Perhaps most famously, Senator Ted 
Kennedy was repeatedly subject to secondary screening because of criteria identified by 
CAPPS.
22
   
 
If the CAPPS results were controversial, the Transportation Security Administration‘s (TSA) 
slated replacement for CAPPS, CAPPS II, was even more so.  Under this new scheme, ―data, 
including name, phone number, itinerary, and method of payment‖23 was to be transmitted by the 
individual airlines to CAPPS II.  The system upon receiving this information would then request 
identity authentication from the airlines,
 
who in turn, would send CAPPS II an identity 
authentication score.
 24
  Using this score, the proposed CAPPS II would then ―use government 
databases, including classified and intelligence data, to conduct a risk assessment score, which 
would be transmitted to the check-in counter.” 25  
 
Civil liberties groups such as the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), among others were 
particularly concerned about the risk of false positives and they warned the public that:   
 
Based on your assigned color/score, you could be detained, interrogated or made subject 
to additional searches.  If you are tagged with the wrong color/score, you could be 
prohibited from flying.
26
 
                                                          
22 
   Henry, Ed and Ahlers, Mike.  ―Kennedy: Airline security risk? Senator tells of Screening Stops at Airport.‖   
CNN.  August 19, 2004. <http://www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/08/19/kennedy.airlines/index.html>. 
23
    Ibid. p. 487. 
24
    Ibid. p. 487. 
25
    Ibid. p. 487. 
26
    Electronic Frontier Foundation. ―CAPPS II: Government Surveillance via Passenger Profiling‖    
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After a wave of opposition from both civil liberties groups and a number of politicians (Kennedy 
among them) the proposed CAPPS II was soon replaced by a new screening program called 
Secure Flight.  According to the Department of Homeland Security, this new program: 
 
…shifts pre-departure watch list matching responsibilities from individual aircraft 
operators to the Transportation Security Administration (TSA) and carries out a key 
recommendation of the 9/11 Commission. By bringing watch list matching 
responsibilities in-house, TSA can better remedy possible misidentifications when a 
traveler's name is similar to one found on a watch list.
27
 
 
Despite this reassurance from the TSA, the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) remains 
concerned about the ―lack of adequate redress for individuals who are mistakenly matched to the 
secret government watch lists.‖ 28  
 
Purpose of the Information Collection 
Following 9/11 numerous statutory changes were implemented that resulted in a reduction in 
privacy protection for a variety of sectors including: the financial, educational, library, internet 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
<http://w2.eff.org/Privacy/cappsii/>. 
27
   Homeland Security Press Release.  ―TSA to Assume Watch List Vetting with Secure Flight Program‖ October 
22, 2008.  <http://www.dhs.gov/xnews/releases/pr_1224686539438.shtm>.    
28
   American Civil Liberties Union.  ―Secure Flight Re-Engineering Welcomed but Watchlist Problems Remain 
Unaddressed.‖  October 22, 2008.  <http://www.aclu.org/technology-and-liberty/secure-flight-re-engineering-
welcomed-watchlist-problems-remain-unaddressed>. 
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communications and transportation sectors.  One of the forces driving these changes, according 
to Barbara Ann Stolz, was ‗symbolic politics.‘  Symbolic politics is a theory which looks at the 
political actions of individuals or political actors as symbols aimed at influencing a particular 
audience.  Stolz uses this theory as a mechanism for explaining the actions of political actors in 
the post 9/11 period.  Stolz uses the following four functions:  reassurance, moral-educative, 
educative, and enhancement of Office-holder popularity as a guide to understanding symbolic 
politics.
 29
 
 
I.  Reassurance 
The first function in Stolz‘s model addresses the need to reassure the public through legislation 
that the Government was acting by giving law enforcement officials the tools they needed to 
prevent future terrorist attacks.  Certainly the passage of the Patriot Act six weeks after the 
September 11
th
 attacks was an attempt to reassure the public that the Government was acting and 
it was acting swiftly to prevent any future attacks.  However, as Stoltz acknowledges, the new 
legislation did not reassure all groups, particularly those afraid of civil liberties violations similar 
to those which occurred in the Watergate-era.
30
 
 
II.  Moral-Educative:  Line Drawing  
The second function, moral-educative, refers to the traditional line that is drawn between law-
abiding and non law-abiding citizen behaviour in the criminal justice system.  Criminal law 
punishes the law breakers and in effect praises the law abiders.
31
  In Stoltz‘s model, the changes 
                                                          
29
    Stolz, Barbara Ann. "The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978: The Role of Symbolic Politics."  Law 
& Policy 24.3 (2002): 269. 
30
    Ibid. p. 288. 
31
    Ibid. p. 271. 
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to FISA (which changed the intelligence gathering requirements for intelligence investigations 
from one of ―primary purpose‖ to ―significant purpose‖)32 involved a form of moral educative 
line drawing because it drew the line between the external enemy terrorist and the law abiding 
citizen.  The symbolic narrative of the new law according to Stoltz points to the future: it is a 
future in which there is a continued threat of terrorist attack by an evil enemy against a virtuous 
law-abiding nation, the United States.
33
   
 
III.  Educative Function: Simplification through Symbolization 
The third function, educative, in Stoltz‘s model, refers to the need for some public 
education with regards to FISA given the number of amendments to that Act by the Patriot Act; 
however, the approach was to simplify the response to these questions (i.e. ―by fixing the ‗gaps‘ 
in FISA, the threat of terrorism would be reduced, because the tools for ―combating the enemy‖ 
had been strengthened‖).34  The result is therefore a kind of oversimplification of the impact of 
these legislative changes.  A nervous public may feel so reassured by the simplified response that 
they don‘t question any potential negative impacts (say for example any impact upon civil 
liberties) of the new law.     
 
IV.  Enhancement of Office-holder Popularity 
And lastly, Stoltz‘s fourth function involves the enhancement of the Office-holder‘s popularity. 
Here the Office-holder‘s popularity is increased on the basis that he/she is seen to act. 
Questioning or not supporting a particular piece of legislation that is popular could be damaging 
                                                          
32
    Ibid. p. 289. 
33
    Ibid, p. 289. 
34
    Ibid, p. 290. 
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to the Office-holder‘s popularity and future career if they are viewed as not acting.  In this sense 
towing the line in order to maintain popularity is problematic not just in terms of the motivation  
of the individual‘s actions, but also in terms of the law and policy such action produces.     
 
The use of symbolic politics as a framework that may be used to study criminal justice 
policymaking is interesting, but even Stolz herself acknowledges that there are limitations.  The 
framework does not explain all aspects of the policymaking process or provision of a particular 
legislative proposal, nor does it consider other sociological influences on law and lawmaking 
such as class conflict or globalization.  The theoretical framework that she presents does not 
touch on normative issues (i.e. those associated with rights).  That said, the application of this 
framework to specific case studies does provide insight into the policymaking process underlying 
the legislation.  Factors such as the importance of public perception of the particular policies and 
the policymaking process do have an impact on the legislative process.  In addition, the ability to 
compare legislative proposals at different points in time (as she does with FISA, looking at 
various amendments over a period of more than twenty years) is insightful and contributes to our 
understanding of the criminal justice policymaking process.
35
 
 
Constitutional Considerations 
 
Where do Fourth Amendment rights fit in foreign intelligence investigations?   
 
The above question is one that all of the authors covered in this literature review acknowledge in 
                                                          
35
    Ibid, p. 296. 
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their work.  However, the degree to which each author felt that citizens should have access to the 
information collected about them by the Government varied significantly.  For authors such as 
Rebecca A. Copeland, in her article ―War on terrorism or war on constitutional rights? Blurring 
the lines of intelligence gathering in post-September 11 America,‖36 it is clear that recent 
legislative changes have had a negative impact on constitutional rights.  Copeland acknowledges 
the need of the Government to conduct secret electronic surveillance in order to prevent future 
terrorist attacks; however, she argues that this government power must not be used in such a way 
as to deprive citizens of their fundamental constitutional rights. 
 
Ava Barbour in her article ―Ready…aim…FOIA! A Survey of the Freedom of Information Act 
in the Post-9/11 United States,‖37 is also worried about the potential for the Government to use 
the increased powers that it has acquired as a result of post-September  11
th
 legislation, to ignore 
civil liberties.  In her article, Barbour looks to the Freedom of Information Act as essential to 
preventing potential abuses, the kind that can arise as a result of overreaching and excessive 
government secrecy.  Barbour points to the lessons of history, citing the Vietnam and Watergate 
eras that prompted the U.S. Congress to institute measures to strengthen the Freedom of 
Information Act.  As she notes, Vietnam and Watergate ―led to public distrust, and eventually 
apathy, with our government and our political system. Following the tragedy of September 11
th
, 
distrust and apathy are the last things America needs.‖38  Barbour suggests that in order to 
―defend our freedom and our security,‖39 the public must be vigilant about participating in the 
                                                          
36
    Copeland, Rebecca A. "War on Terrorism Or War on Constitutional Rights? Blurring the Lines of  Intelligence 
Gathering in Post-September 11 America." Texas Tech Law Review 35.1 (2004): 1. 
37
    Barbour, Ava. "Ready…aim…FOIA! A Survey of the Freedom of Information Act in the Post-9/11 United 
States." The Boston Public Interest Law Journal 13 (2004):  203. 
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    Ibid, p. 226.  
39
    Ibid, p. 226. 
  
39 
 
 
democratic process.  For Barbour it is clear that the Freedom of Information Act must be 
preserved intact in the post-September 11
th
 legislation, in order to ensure that government 
remains accountable to the people. 
 
For Michael V. Hayden, it is clear that there must be a balance between security and liberty.  The 
issue of privacy protection is one which even the 9/11 Commission has acknowledged requires 
effective oversight.
40 
   As Hayden argues, the application of set rules, along with an effective 
oversight structure that includes the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, would 
strengthen security without diminishing the constitutional liberties of the American people.
41 
  
Hayden points to the amendments to the FISA which have allowed for increased sharing of 
information between agencies and the FISC which provides a judicial safeguard as an example of 
both rules and effective oversight which serve to protect rights (both FISA and the FISC Court 
are described in more detail below).   
 
Although there is a judicial safeguard in place, the executive branch has not been immune from 
criticism from the Department of Justice's Office of the Solicitor General and Office of Legal 
Counsel, the principal constitutional interpreters for the executive branch when it comes to the 
Patriot Act.  One of the safeguards put in place by Congress to prevent potential abuses under the 
Patriot Act, according to Cornelia T.L. Pillard in her article, ―The unfulfilled promise of the 
Constitution in the Executive hands,‖42 was to include in the Act a provision charging the 
Inspector General in the Department of Justice to investigate and report on claims of civil rights 
                                                          
40
    Hayden, Michael V. "Balancing Security and Liberty: The Challenge of Sharing Foreign Signals Intelligence." 
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy 19 (2005): 247, p. 260. 
41
    Ibid, p. 260. 
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    Pillard, Cornelia T. L. "The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in the Executive Hands." Michigan Law 
Review 103 (2005): 676, p. 756. 
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or civil liberties violations by Department of Justice employees.  The Inspector General has filed 
semi-annual reports identifying over two thousand civil rights or civil liberties complaints.  Of 
these complaints the Inspector General deemed several dozen as credible after investigation.
43
  In 
a special report issued in June 2003, the Inspector General listed practices regarding 
classification of arrestees and detainees, information sharing among agencies, processing and 
clearing detainees, and treatment of detainees during their confinement, as being problem areas.  
The Inspector General used this opportunity to offer 21 recommendations for reforming 
Executive practices to minimize incursions on civil rights and civil liberties.  At that time the 
Executive had ―not announced refinements or elaborations of its relevant constitutional views on 
individual rights that respond to the range of problems‖ identified by the Inspector General.44  
This is something which Pillard says underscored the ―lack of more general, active constitutional 
self-monitoring and reflection‖ within the executive branch. 45   
 
Understanding FISA 
In order to understand the significance of the Patriot Act with regards to intelligence 
surveillance, Alison A. Bradley notes that you first need to have a good understanding of the 
history behind one of the key acts which it amends, the FISA.  In her article Bradley looks in 
depth at the events that led to the creation of FISA and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (FISC), and the various amendments which have facilitated an increase in surveillance for 
national security purposes up to the present.  The creation of both FISA and FISC, Bradley notes, 
are rooted in the political revelations of the Nixon administration.  During this administration 
electronic surveillance was used to monitor so-called ―subversive groups‖ – such groups were 
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domestic and therefore lacked the requisite foreign nexus.  Revelations that the administration 
had gone so far as to monitor the Democratic Party during the 1972 Presidential campaign were 
what led to the Watergate scandal and the eventual downfall of the Nixon administration.
46
   
 
At the time of the Nixon administration, the core legislation governing the use of wiretapping for 
criminal law enforcement purposes was contained in The Omnibus Crime Control and Safe 
Street Act which authorized the use of electronic surveillance for specific classes of crimes.  
Although the use of surveillance as outlined in this statute was subject to significant limitations, 
and required a court order on the basis of probable cause, nowhere was there a restriction on the 
administration‘s use of surveillance involving matters of national security.  The act thus 
confirmed presidential authority to conduct warrantless electronic surveillance.
47
 
 
The solution to this problem was deemed to be the creation of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act (FISA).  After ―six years of debate, compromise, and negotiation between the 
administration and federal agencies‖ FISA was enacted in 1978.48  As Bradley notes, the initial 
idea behind FISA was that it would provide a balance between protecting the constitutional rights 
of citizens while at the same time allowing the Administration to provide for national security. 
Under FISA, a separate court called The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) was 
established.  It is through this court that government agents are granted the ability to surveil 
targets if there is probable cause that the subject of the search is a foreign power or agent of a 
                                                          
46
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foreign power.
49
  This is contrary to the regular legal system that requires that there must be 
probable cause that a crime has been committed before a warrant will be issued.
50
  Under section 
215 of the Patriot Act, FISA was substantially altered by expanding the term ―record‖ to include 
―any tangible item that contains information.‖51  The result of this change was that it essentially 
opened up the use of FISA warrants as a means by which law enforcement agencies could 
conduct fishing expeditions through their collection of personal information from electronic 
communications, voice mail, and any physical or electronic record.   
 
Changes to FISA pre 2007 
Joseph G. Poluka, in his article ―The Patriot Act:  Indispensable tool against terror,‖52 on the 
other hand, argues that the criticisms directed at the Patriot Act are unfounded.  The primary 
purpose of the Act, he asserts, was to remove the barrier between traditional law enforcement 
officials and counterintelligence agents (whose duty it is to protect national security) in their 
sharing of information.  Prior to the passage of the Patriot Act, law enforcement officials 
could not share information with FBI counterintelligence agents, and vice versa.  The Patriot Act 
has amended FISA in order to allow the use of FISA whenever foreign intelligence is a 
―significant purpose,‖ rather than ―the purpose,‖ of an investigation.  This change has allowed 
law enforcement agents and prosecutors to ―determine if there is a basis for bringing criminal 
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charges against the targets of a foreign intelligence investigation.‖53  Here it is important to note 
that the individual must be a target of a foreign intelligence investigation.  Poluka is quick to 
dismiss worries about ordinary citizens having their rights violated through the use of FISA 
warrants since individuals are protected in three ways.  First, a FISA court order is required in 
order for the FBI agent to obtain records.  Second, section 215 can only be used for matters 
involving ―international terrorism and clandestine intelligence activities or to obtain foreign 
intelligence information not concerning a United States person‖ – it cannot be used to investigate 
domestic terrorism or ordinary crimes.  Third, it cannot be used be used to conduct investigations 
―solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment‖54 which protects freedom of 
religion, speech, press, assembly, and the right to petition the Government. 
 
In her article ―Privacy and Twenty-First Century Law Enforcement: Accountability for New 
Techniques,‖ Solveig Singleton suggests that the ―power grab‖ theory advanced by civil 
libertarians may be tempting but underestimates the possibility that there might actually be valid 
law enforcement arguments.
55
    Although it is true that the Patriot Act cannot be used to 
investigate domestic terrorism or ordinary crimes, there are times where it ―will often be 
difficult, if not impossible, for investigators just starting an investigation of some kind of odd or 
suspicious conduct to know in advance whether they are investigating terrorism or ‗ordinary‘ 
crime.‖56  The potential for errors in requesting a set of powers that is either ―too much‖ or ―too 
little,‖ Singleton argues could prove to be disastrous for an investigation.  She gives two 
examples of how this could play out:  in one the prosecutor is finally in a position to lay charges, 
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but the evidence has to be excluded (because the set of powers requested was ultimately 
determined to be ―too much‖); in the other, there is a mass disaster because the set of powers 
requested was ―not enough.‖57  It is clear from Singleton‘s article that questions concerning the 
potential for infringement of one‘s civil liberties have to be weighed and balanced against the 
national security concern.   
 
In a similar vein, Katherine Coolidge believes that the controversy concerning the potential 
violation of the rights of ordinary citizens by the Department of Justice is overblown.  Coolidge 
outlines the process for obtaining FISA warrants, and is of the opinion that this process has 
sufficient oversight.  As she notes, the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) consists of 
eleven federal district court judges who have been appointed to the FISC for a limited term 
(maximum seven years).  These judges have years of experience on the federal bench, and 
according to Coolidge, it would be an outrage to assume that once a judge has been appointed to 
the FISC that ―suddenly their standards of professional conduct and respect for the integrity of 
the legal profession dissipate.‖58 
 
For Poluka, Singleton and Coolidge the suggestion seems to be that, unless you are conducting 
activities related to terrorism, you need not worry as there are protections built into the 
legislation which will prevent its use against ordinary citizens.  However, for authors such as 
Paul T. Jaeger, John Carlo Bertot, and Charles R. McClure, concern over the amendments to the 
FISA by the Patriot Act should not be so quickly brushed aside.  The changes to FISA have, as 
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they say, dramatically altered the ability of the Government to collect and analyze personal 
information.  The authors state that the ―the ways in which the Patriot Act modifies FISA are 
clearer at this point than the impacts of these alterations over time.‖59  These changes have 
significantly modified the original scope and intent of FISA, which make their final impact on 
American information policy hard to discern given the level of secrecy surrounding the U.S.A.  
Patriot Act which amends it.  The problem that Jaeger and his colleagues acknowledge is that 
one is not in a position to adequately judge whether or not law enforcement agencies are 
respecting the constraints on the use of FISA because of the high level of secrecy surrounding 
how the Act is used, secrecy which the Government claims is essential to the proper functioning 
of the Act itself.
60
   
 
Oddly enough, the initial amendments to FISA under the Patriot Act were something which Nola 
K. Breglio took issue with as early as 2003, but for a very different reason than that of Jaeger, 
Bertot, and McClure.  Breglio then charged that the changes brought about by the Patriot Act had 
damaged the usefulness and the legitimacy of FISA and the FISC.  In her article ―Leaving FISA 
Behind: The Need to Return to Warrantless Foreign Intelligence Surveillance,‖ Breglio made a 
case for the abolition of FISA and argues that warrantless searches should be held as the standard 
in foreign intelligence cases.  As Breglio stated, her intention was not to give the Department of 
Justice a ―blank check to investigate anyone, anytime, anywhere; such a regime would cause the 
kind of backlash that prompted the passage of FISA in the first place.‖61  Rather, her intention 
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was for the creation of a system in which the executive and legislative branch would be subject 
to strict internal review procedures to ensure accountability and to prevent the kind of abuses that 
FISA was intended to prevent in the first place.   
 
Prosecutors in Breglio‘s model would have to give targets of warrantless operations notice at the 
conclusion of such investigations.  This would allow targets of such a surveillance operation to 
contest the surveillance in court.  This change, she argued, would benefit all parties involved as it 
would allow the Department of Justice greater flexibility in conducting investigations, ―as it 
would not have to procure judicial warrants and could act rapidly to investigate time-sensitive 
threats.‖  In addition, the level of openness about investigations at their close would increase as 
they would be removed from the ―super secret domain of the FISC.‖62  This change would make 
the Attorney General publicly accountable for his orders, and would allow persons subject to 
investigation an opportunity to challenge the basis of their investigation in court.  Here also, 
courts could investigate the constitutionality of such warrantless searches.  By the end of 
December 2005, it became widely known that the Government had actually been conducting 
warrantless surveillance outside the domain of FISA and the FISC, although unlike Breglio‘s 
suggestion here, no notice of past warrantless searches was ever communicated to the target of 
such a search.   
 
Still others, such as Jennifer L. Sullivan, in her legal note, ―From ‗the purpose‘ to ‗a significant 
purpose‘: Assessing the Constitutionality of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act Under the 
Fourth Amendment,‖ argue that the Government is justified in overriding individual liberties in 
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the interest of national security.
63
  Sullivan, in her commentary on the state of foreign 
intelligence surveillance for national security purposes in the post-September  11
th
 period, notes 
that September 11
th
 ―dramatically highlighted the startling inadequacies of prior legislation that 
had been enacted to address the problem of domestic and international terrorism.‖64  The recent 
changes to FISA have become a rallying cry for civil libertarians who argue that the new 
amendments allow law enforcement officials to bypass the traditional warrant requirements of 
the Fourth Amendment.  This claim, according to Sullivan, is unsubstantiated since the Patriot 
Act, via the language set forth in section 218 of the act, clearly satisfies both the Warrant Clause 
and the Reasonableness Clause of the Fourth Amendment.
65
  Although FISA warrants require a 
reduced probable cause standard than is required for other types of warrants, this is something 
that Sullivan notes has consistently been held to be within the bounds of the Constitution. 
 
National Security Considerations 
 
Are there exceptional circumstances under which the right to privacy can be waived in the 
interest of national security? 
 
Authors such as Laura Taylor Swain point out that a wartime context does transform the 
threshold question concerning civil liberties: 
 
The Constitution grants unique powers to the political branches with respect to the 
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conduct of war and foreign policy; the courts continue to have the responsibility to 
determine, in the context of particular cases of which they have jurisdiction, whether 
particular actions are within the scope of those powers and other relevant Constitutional 
limits as a legal and factual matter.
66
  
 
The courts, according to Swain, have a responsibility to discern whether the authority exercised 
by the executive has been outside the bounds of the Constitution.
67
  Liberty is not to be trampled 
on in an effort to protect national security interests here.  That said, it must be placed in proper 
balance so as to protect the rights of the individual and the public good.  
 
All of the articles covered in this literature review acknowledge that a fine balance must be 
struck so that national security needs can be met while at the same time respecting 
constitutionally protected civil liberties.  Whether or not the initial legislative changes that took 
place through the Patriot Act provide such a balance is open to debate.  For authors such as Jeff 
Breinholt and Michael F. Dowley, the Act does provide such a balance.  Breinholt, in his article 
―How About A Little Perspective: The U.S.A.  PATRIOT Act and the Uses and Abuses of 
History,‖68 points out that those who oppose the Patriot Act have tended to look to the lessons of 
history to base their objections to the Act – that is to say that they have looked to instances where 
civil liberties abuses have been carried out in the name of protecting national security only later 
be have been found excessive.  The argument put forth by those who object to the Act, according 
to Breinholt, is that the Act allows for similar excessive violations of civil liberties under the 
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guise of protecting national security.  What these critics fail to do, Breinholt argues, is 
acknowledge the series of massive reforms and limitations on law-enforcement operations that 
arose out of those excesses.
69
  To make the argument that the Patriot Act is part of a pattern of 
abuses is absurd, given the legal protections offered by past reforms – ones which the Patriot Act 
works in accordance with.  Breinholt goes further to say that even if it were possible that such 
violations could occur, the present laws provide the necessary additional check; thus there is no 
excuse to label this as part of an historical pattern given the existence of recourse through the 
courts.
70
  This last point is particularly interesting given the number of civil liberties groups 
currently pursuing court action in regards to this Act, which seems to suggest that they do not 
agree with Breinholt‘s summation of this Act, but are willing to take him up on the offer to test 
the checks and balances.  
 
Michael F. Dowley is in agreement with Jeff Breinholt that the Patriot Act strikes a reasonable 
balance, but he offers different reasons for this assessment.  Dowley, in his article, ―Government 
Surveillance Powers Under the U.S.A.  PATRIOT Act:  Is it Possible to Protect National Security 
and Privacy at the Same Time?  A Constitutional Tug-of-War,‖ notes that the ―drafters of the 
Constitution provided government with the necessary authority to protect this country during 
times of war and times of significant national security threats.‖71   The idea that ―in every 
conflict between liberty and governmental-imposed order concerning issues of national security, 
liberty should not always prevail‖72 is not particularly new, but the justification that Dowley 
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presents to support this position seems a bit misplaced.  He points to instances where the 
Government, in order to protect national security, has extinguished ―civil liberties without regard 
for constitutional constraints.‖73  His list of historical events includes the Alien and Sedition Acts 
in 1798, the Civil War suspension of the writ of habeas corpus, the curtailment of antiwar speech 
during World War I, the treatment of Japanese-Americans during World War II, and the Cold 
War persecution of communists.  According to Dowley, it was not until the 1960s and 1970s that 
Americans really began to witness greater protection of civil liberties.  During that time the 
Supreme Court took on a more active role in protecting these liberties.  Dowley seems to imply 
that this increase in protection was correlated to a lack of significant threats to America's national 
security.  Given the events of September 11
th
, he believes that the expectations regarding civil 
liberties have changed forever.   
 
Dowley acknowledges that: 
 
…[a]lthough provisions of the Act may inadvertently infringe on precious civil liberties 
vital to this nation's survival, its implementation may ensure America's continued 
existence by allowing government agents to keep pace with technological advancements 
and monitor elusive terror networks within this country's borders.  Future judicial review 
may more neatly tailor the Act to satisfy the Government's interests without infringing on 
civil liberties with such severity.
74
 
 
Dowley believes that, as enacted, the Patriot Act provides a reasonable and constitutional 
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balance between upholding civil liberties and protecting national security. 
On the contrary, authors such as Timothy Edgar, Witold Walczak, Emanuel Gross and Philip B. 
Heymann hold that this hardly seems an acceptable balance.  Edgar and Walczak in their article 
―Perspectives on the U.S.A.  PATRIOT Act:  We can be both Safe and Free:  How the 
PATRIOT Act Threatens Civil Liberties,‖ make the argument that the Patriot Act has placed 
civil liberties in a precarious position.
75 
  They see the Act as a direct threat to privacy rights and 
point to the newly expanded powers which have enabled the Government to increase its ability to 
monitor everything from an individual‘s internet use, to sensitive educational, banking, credit, 
consumer, communications and even library records through the use of National Security Letters 
(NSLs).
76
  As the authors state, such ―letters can be issued for any documents – or even whole 
databases – the FBI believes are relevant to an investigation to protect against terrorism‖ and do 
not require a court order.  This is a shift from previous requirement that such letters ―only be 
issued in cases where there exist ‗specific and articulable facts‘ that the records concern a 
terrorist, spy, or other foreign agent.‖77   
 
As Emanuel Gross has pointed out in his article, ―The Struggle of a Democracy Against 
Terrorism – Protection of Human Rights: The Right to Privacy Versus the National Interest - the 
Proper Balance,‖ the Patriot Act significantly expands the power of the FBI to demand ―not only 
records but also ―any tangible things,‖ from any body or person (such as a book shop or internet 
service provider), and not only in cases where there is reason to believe that the subject of the 
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information request is a foreign agent, but where any person is involved.‖78  Gross notes that 
once a body or person has handed over this information, they are prohibited from telling anyone 
that this handover took place by a gag order built into the law.
79
  This leaves open the potential 
for cases in which no security justification for secrecy exists but individual privacy rights are 
infringed.  Only the person or body contacted to give the information will know that the search 
took place, but they will not be able to challenge the legality of the search.  It is because of the 
removal of this prior restraint on the use of such letters to obtain such information that these 
authors, unlike Breinholt, see parallels between the civil liberties abuses by governments of the 
past and the potential for modern day abuses. 
 
Philip B. Heymann, in his article, ―Civil liberties and Human Rights in the Aftermath of 
September 11,‖80 claims that the risks to civil liberties will depend upon how the Government 
responds to the following three objectives:  prevention, consequence management, and 
punishment of terrorists.  As Heymann describes it, the issue at hand is not one of new 
legislation, but rather the discretion of the executive branch of government in its use of newly 
defined powers.  These issues involve ―matters of life or death, torture, detention without trial, 
trial without juries, and basic freedoms to dissent.‖81  How the executive branch chooses to come 
to terms with the threat of terrorism both within its borders and abroad will impact civil liberties 
within the country and could have potentially harmful consequences for human rights abroad.  If 
there is a perception of anything less than equal citizenship and equal protection under the law 
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for citizens – i.e. if the Government in its efforts to prevent terrorism chooses to focuses only on 
limited ethnic identities - then there is a high risk that innocent members of society may be 
subjected to investigation.  If these false positives are large enough in number, then there is the 
risk that those who belong to those groups but do not support terrorist activities might 
themselves become sympathetic to the organization if they feel themselves to be less than full 
citizens.   
 
With regards to consequence management, Heymann acknowledges the complexity of dealing 
with modern terrorist threats.  As he notes, at the heart of the problem of consequence 
management is preparation:  
 
…getting into place the committed physical and human resources, skills and advance 
training, plans, understandings as to cooperation across functional and jurisdictional 
lines, and legal authority that we would want if and when a plausible threat or actual use 
took place.
82
  
 
If the U.S. is to be prepared to deal with any possible threat of a major terrorist attack, according 
to Heymann, it will need to have the resources, training, and authority firmly in place to cope 
with a variety of different scenarios. 
 
Conclusion 
In compiling this literature review, I chose to draw upon articles which related to three central 
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research questions, namely:  
 
What ethical, legal or political considerations should be taken into account with regard to the 
collection, classification, and dissemination of citizens’ personal information by government 
departments and agencies?   
 
Where do Fourth Amendment rights fit into foreign intelligence investigations? 
 
Are there exceptional circumstances under which the right to privacy can be waived in the 
interest of national security? 
 
In synthesizing these articles, I found that the majority focused on issues regarding the 
encroachment upon civil liberties.  In addition, there has been a great deal of discussion about 
whether or not such limitations on civil liberties are reasonable given the new threat of terrorism 
in the U.S.  Although there is a vast amount of scholarship concerning the legal and political 
situation with regards to collection and use of information in the post-September 11
th
 
environment, I found it striking that there were relatively few articles which dealt with ethical 
constraints underlying limitations on the collection, classification and dissemination of 
information.  All of the articles looked at civil liberties from either a political or legal angle, but 
none explicitly addressed the nature of such liberties and why they are in and of themselves 
important.  Failing to address foundational issues makes it difficult to judge in a conclusive way 
when or if civil liberties may legitimately be curtailed.  In instances where civil liberties could 
arguably be traded off to purchase additional security, I think it is important that we address the 
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root issues.  
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PART II: 
 
 
 
 
 
TOWARDS AN ETHICAL FRAMEWORK 
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Chapter 3: 
Philosophic Approaches to Information Ethics 
 
Should Internet Service Providers be compelled to give out customer search and email records to 
government agencies? 
 
Should airlines be required to turn over all passenger data to the government?  
 
Should Library patron records, including online searches, downloads, and book records, be 
turned over to government agencies? 
 
Should data mining programs that search emails for use of terrorism-related keywords be used 
as part of the war on terror? 
 
Any attempt to answer questions such as the ones I have posed above will require that some sort 
of judgment be made regarding the acceptable level of government intrusion into the private 
sphere.  Responding to these kinds of questions will require a moral judgment – that is a 
judgment about what is the right course of action to be taken.  This chapter provides a brief 
introduction / overview to the branches of ethics (more generally), and then to some of the 
ethical theories (more specifically) which have had an influence on the shaping of legislation and 
policy in the U.S.  The chapter concludes with a discussion of whether or not the recent shifts in 
American lawmaking regarding security and privacy are the result of a greater underlying shift in 
the ethical preferences of lawmakers, one that possibly favours consequentialist arguments over 
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rights-based ones.  
 
Moral Reasoning 
Ethics is the philosophical study of morality, that is, of right conduct, obligation, responsibility, 
and social justice.  Philosophers who specialize in ethics attempt to provide general, systematic, 
reasoned theories of the right answers to moral questions, rather than merely describing the 
various answers individuals and societies have in fact given to such questions and explaining 
how they arrived at them.     
 
Ethics as a discipline can be broken down into the following three branches: 
 Meta-ethics 
 Normative Ethics 
 Applied Ethics 
 
Meta-ethics  
The first branch, meta-ethics, can be defined as the philosophical study of the nature of moral 
judgment.  As the name would suggest, meta-ethics is concerned with foundational issues, for 
instance, with the meaning of moral terms such as ―right‖ and ―wrong,‖ with the objectivity (or 
lack thereof) of moral judgments, and so forth.  Questions of this kind are in some sense 
logically prior to moral judgments themselves, but they are distinct from them, and most meta-
ethicists hold that they have little direct bearing on such judgments.  The fact that a rights-based 
constitution deems the rights within it to be inalienable is interesting from a meta-ethical point of 
view.  The principles which the constitution lays out themselves contain ethical principles – that 
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is they set out the rights which the constitution protects.  By doing so in this fashion, it assumes 
that the rights a constitution protects exist prior to the constitution - they would have to if they 
are deemed inalienable.  If we accept this as our starting point, then we can say that the 
constitution emerges from an ethical framework.  Although foundational issues of this kind are 
outside the scope of this study, the fact that inalienable rights would require some kind of meta-
ethical grounding within the constitution itself presents an interesting philosophical question 
about the foundation for any rights-based constitution. 
 
Normative Ethics 
Normative ethics, on the other hand, sets out norms or rules related to action.  Meta-ethics 
concerns itself with the nature of norms, while normative ethics aims to delineate norms and 
grounds of judgments themselves.  Normative ethics have traditionally been broken down into 
two groups: teleological, which are theories of the good; and deontological theories, which are 
theories of duty. This latter group is typically broken into two separate categories:  duty-based 
and rights-based ethics.  
 
Applied Ethics 
Applied ethics is, simply put, the application of ethical theories (i.e. utilitarianism, 
contractarianism, etc.) to particular practical domains.  Applied Ethics is varied in its areas of 
specialization, with each area having its own centres for research and teaching, specialized 
journals, and a rapidly growing literature.  The areas of specialization are vast and include 
medical ethics, business ethics, legal ethics, environmental ethics, computer ethics, and most 
recently, information ethics.   
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Information Ethics 
The focus of this dissertation is on these last two branches of ethics:  normative and applied 
ethics.  Exploration of the former will be necessary in order to apply ethical theory to and create 
a framework for the applied area of specialization: information ethics.  Questions concerning the 
development and resolution of ethical conflicts in the information field will be the primary focus 
of this work.  For the purposes of this dissertation, the term information ethics as narrowly 
construed is the application of normative ethical theories, to issues regarding information and it 
use.  More broadly construed, information ethics includes standards of professional practice, 
codes of conduct, and aspects of information law, public policy and so forth.  This definition of 
‗information ethics‘ should be distinguished from some of the existing uses of the phrase in 
information studies literature.  For example, Toni Samek‘s Librarianship and Human Rights 
stresses the importance of information ethics for those engaged in the information professions, 
but does so in a way that is resolutely intercultural and seen ―through the lens of individuals, 
institutions and societies.‖83  One of the key goals of this study is to establish a more stable 
definition and foundation for information ethics. 
 
From Theory to Practice:  Normative Theories and Applied Information Ethics 
Ethical theories come in many forms, each with their unique merits and shortcomings.  In this 
section I explore a few of the main normative approaches to ethics and discuss their potential 
application to information ethics broadly, but more specifically to the problems associated with 
government intrusion into the private sphere in insecure times.  This section examines two 
distinct types of normative ethics, namely, teleology and deontology, and the potential 
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application of such theories in our given context.  
 
Teleological Theories: Utilitarianism 
―Telos‖ is the ancient Greek term for an end, fulfillment, completion, goal or aim: it is the root of 
the modern word ―teleology.‖  As the name of the view would suggest, teleological theories in 
normative ethics begin with a conception of the good; the theory is then framed in such a way as 
to lay out the means to be used in order to maximize the good (or, as occurs in pluralist versions 
of this approach, the goods).  Hence, the value of any particular action, policy of action, or even 
of a law, is judged by the degree to which it has maximized the good. 
 
Although the teleological approach in ethics has a long history and has yielded many versions, 
the most prominent current version, utilitarianism, was first expounded by Jeremy Bentham (b. 
1748 – d.1832) in his work Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation. 84  
Bentham‘s original motivation in developing utilitarianism was largely legal.  His project was to 
render the legal domain – and by a straightforward and natural extension, the moral domain – 
more rational and more humane.  Bentham began with the assumption that pleasure is 
unquestionably good and pain is unquestionably bad.
 85
  The rightness or wrongness of a law, 
policy, or an act was then to be judged on whether it in fact had a tendency to maximize pleasure 
and/or minimize suffering.  Bentham supposed that judgments of this kind could be 
straightforwardly calculated, taking the pleasure and pain of each person affected by said law, 
policy, or act to count equally in the calculation.
86
  As critics were quick to point out, it is rather 
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less straightforward than Bentham supposed to apply such a calculus, as the practical problems 
involved in providing an objective quantitative measure of subjective, qualitative sensations such 
as pleasure and pain were (and remain) insurmountable.  
 
Nonetheless, the basic structure of utilitarianism survived Bentham with the ambitious notion of 
a calculus replaced with the more modest claim that the results of alternative courses of action 
could at least be compared.  The directly ―hedonistic‖ 87 tenor of Bentham‘s utilitarianism is also 
attenuated in the version of the theory advanced by the most renowned of his successors, John 
Stuart Mill (b. 1806 – d.1873).  According to Mill, 
 
The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, utility, or the greatest happiness 
principle, holds that all actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, 
wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness.
 88 
 
While Mill nominally accepts an identification of happiness with pleasure, in reality he seeks to 
enforce a qualitative distinction between ―a beast‘s pleasures‖ and the ―pleasures‖ associated 
with the employment of the ―more elevated‖ human faculties.  Whatever the merits of Mill‘s 
efforts at making such a distinction, the practical  effect on his and subsequent versions of 
utilitarianism is that the project of calculating the good quantitatively has been largely sidelined
89
 
in favour of qualitative comparison. 
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Two notable features of the utilitarianism espoused by Bentham, Mill, and their successors are: 
first, the premium these theories place on prudential reasoning, on the way we think about the 
means we can employ to reach a desirable end; and secondly, a refusal to accord any moral 
principle absolute, unquestioning respect.  The former feature of utilitarianism allows that 
whatever they may be, the most efficacious means of maximizing the good are legitimate.  
Disputes within utilitarianism tend to centre on alternative means; for example, whether a 
paternalist political order or a liberal one will better promote human happiness (Mill famously 
argued for liberty).  Evidently, the kinds of arguments employed in order to settle such disputes 
must depend on a viable account of how the world, and especially the human part of it, works – 
hence the tendency of utilitarians to see their view as hard-headed, empirical, and above all, 
practical. 
 
The second above-mentioned feature of utilitarianism also exhibits a certain hard-headedness.  
Any particular action, but more especially any claimant to the status of moral principle, must 
withstand scrutiny against the principle of utility.  The claimant that cannot be justified in terms 
of its tendency to maximize happiness is to be summarily rejected, however longstanding the 
principle may be, or how deeply it may be entrenched in the common understanding of morality.  
In fact, even those principles otherwise endorsable in accordance with the principle of utility 
may be trumped by the advantages of a course of action that violates the principle, where the 
advantages of doing so outweigh the costs of such a violation.  To think otherwise would not be 
consistent with the principle of utility, and would be, as one particularly hard-headed utilitarian 
puts it, ―a form of superstitious rule-worship.‖90 
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Teleological Theories: Communitariansim 
Communitarianism is a term that has been applied to thinkers such as Michael Sandel, Michael 
Walzer, and Amitai Etzioni among others.  The basic tenant of communitarian discourse is that 
there is an ethical importance to belonging to part of a community which matters in a way that 
has not been adequately captured by deontological theories, specifically those focused on social 
contract.  The argument is that such contracts do not capture the full importance of the 
community, both in terms of tradition and cultural understanding.   
 
In his work, Rights and the Common Good: The Communitarian Perspective, Amitai Etzioni, 
describes the communitarian agenda simply as being the rebuilding of communities.  Specifically 
Etzioni focuses on two core communitarian issues:  ―the balance between individual rights and 
social responsibilities, and the roles of social institutions that foster moral values within 
communities.‖91  Although the first of these agenda items could be easily taken up as part of a 
contract model – the second agenda item is a bit more complex because it looks to community 
values which might not always be compatible with a rights-based ethical model.  
 
In his later work, How Patriotic is the Patriot Act, Etzioni distinguishes the type of 
communitarian branch that he is a proponent of, that being responsive communitarianism:
  
 
A key tenet of responsive communitarianism is that a good society is based on a carefully 
crafted balance between liberty and social order, and a combination of particularistic 
(communal) and society wide values and bonds. This school stresses the responsibilities 
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that people have to their families, kin, communities, and societies. These exist above and 
beyond the universal rights that all individuals command, which is a main focus of 
liberalism.
 92
 
 
This later refinement of his original communitarian position makes it clear that this theory, 
although perhaps mindful of human rights, is not a slave to them.  For example, if the community 
values collective security over the individual rights of minorities, it would seem that a responsive 
communitarian model could collapse into a tyranny of the community in the same way that 
utilitarianism can collapse into a tyranny of the majority if sufficient checks are not built into the 
system.  The reason for this is that both theories favour the good over the right as their starting 
point and so the definition of the ultimate good will have an impact on individual rights.  Unless 
the ultimate good is seen as the protection of individual rights of minorities, it is hard to imagine 
that such a theory would protect these rights in times of emergency.   
 
Deontology:  Duty-based Ethics 
Whereas teleological theories take as their starting point some conception of the good, the 
starting point for deontological theories in normative ethics is some conception of obligation.  
That is to say, the guiding conception for moral behavior is not maximization of the good, but 
rather respect for moral obligations.  As it is sometimes put in deontological theories, right is 
prior to the good.  Hence, the moral evaluation of any action or policy to act in a certain way 
depends not on the result of that course of action, but rather on the basis of that action in a 
motive to respect (or disrespect) one‘s moral obligation. 
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The deontological approach also has a long and varied history, including for example, divine 
command accounts of moral obligation and accounts of moral obligation based in natural law.  
But in any account of duty-based ethics, the central figure should be Immanuel Kant (b. 1724 – 
d. 1804).  Kant‘s theory exhibits the logic of the deontological approach clearly and 
uncompromisingly. 
 
Against teleological approaches to morality Kant argues that nothing is unconditionally good 
except for a good will.
 93
  As Kant points out, even those ends that seem unquestionably good 
may, under certain circumstances, fall considerably short of deserving the title.  For example, 
Bentham‘s end in itself – pleasure – is only perversely described as good when it is the pleasure 
that a sadist takes in inflicting suffering.  By way of contrast, a good will is not the objective of 
an action or policy, but is rather a characteristic of human beings that is ordered in such a way as 
to respect the moral law. 
 
Kant accepts just as much as any utilitarian that human actions each have an end and that it is the 
role of practical reasoning to choose the means to arrive at that end.  As he puts it, practical 
reason yields hypothetical imperatives, counsels that reason gives itself regarding a policy to 
follow in order to achieve a given end – for example, if you want to be healthy, then eat right and 
exercise.  However, given that no objective of an action can be absolutely and unquestionably 
good, and that the ends pursued by individuals can vary quite radically, hypothetical imperatives 
cannot be genuinely moral imperatives.  Rather, practical reason should seek an imperative that 
is unconditional, that includes reference to no particular, subjective end – that is, a categorical 
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imperative. 
 
Kant claims that just such an imperative can be derived from the very notion of moral obligation; 
in fact, he manages to derive several formulations of what he maintains is one and the same 
principle.  The best known formulation is: 
 
Act only in accordance with that maxim through which you can at the same time will that 
it become a universal law.
 94
 
 
However, the most intuitively clear formulation is:  
 
Act so that you treat humanity, both in your own person and in that of another, always as 
an end and never merely as a means.
95
 
 
Note the reference to the ―maxim‖ of an action in the first formulation:  in Kant‘s view, for every 
action the will gives itself a rule (viz., maxim) and then behaves accordingly.  This may be a 
hypothetical imperative where there is an objective to be achieved.  But where the question of 
the rightness or wrongness of an action arises, the rule, or as it might be more colloquially put, 
the motive of that action is to be tested against the categorical imperative.  As Kant sees it, the 
good will, the will that seeks to do right, gives itself a rule for testing motives.  This rule for 
rules, the categorical imperative, is universal because it follows logically from the common 
concept of moral obligation that everyone pre-theoretically understands; it is binding as a rule the 
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rational mind imposes on itself, and it is absolute, in that no end, however apparently desirable, 
could justify violating it. 
 
While there have been doubts from the beginning about the logical underpinnings of Kant‘s 
derivation of the categorical imperative, it is undeniable that his theory introduces and strongly 
emphasizes notions that remain central to our conception of morality today.  For example, our 
fellow moral agents deserve respect just because they are, like us, moral agents; hence they must 
never be treated as mere means to achieving some objective of our own.  And our dignity as 
moral agents depends on our autonomy – that is, the fact that we are self governing, that the laws 
we are governed by are the laws we give ourselves, including the categorical imperative. 
 
The greatest source of discomfort for Kant‘s critics, however, is the absoluteness of his moral 
imperatives.  There seems to be no room at all for consideration of consequences in his theory.  
In Kant‘s life time, Benjamin Constant took him to task for his absolute prohibition on lying, 
asking what one was to do if a murderous, axe wielding madman were to come knocking on 
one‘s door, asking after the neighbor one is hiding in the house.  Constant‘s objection to Kantian 
absolutism remains a serious concern since a moral theory that entirely refuses to take 
consequences into account risks  permitting, or perhaps even committing, monstrosities in the 
name of morality.
96
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Deontology: Contractarian Ethics 
Rights-based ethics places an emphasis on actions that uphold an individual's human or legal 
rights.   Rights can be broken down into positive and negative rights.   Negative rights refer to 
freedom from outside interference.  For example, the right to intellectual freedom, freedom of 
speech, liberty and privacy, are negative rights because they represent freedom from forces that 
would try to subvert those rights.  Positive rights, on the other hand, represent rights that are 
necessary to the pursuit of freedom.  The right to health care, education and the like are examples 
of such rights.  
 
In its modern form, contractarianism is a rights-based approach to morality and ethics that takes 
into account these differing types of rights, both positive and negative, and the roles and 
responsibilities of citizens and governments to uphold and protect those rights.  This relationship 
between citizens and their government takes the form of a social contract.  The idea of a social 
contract is basically this:   
 
What makes some particular system of collectively enforced social arrangements 
legitimate is that it is the object of an agreement for the people who are subject to it.
97
  
 
Here contractarianism is not intended as an account of the historical origins of current social 
arrangements, but rather a framework for answering questions about legitimacy and obligation.  
 
Contractarianism refers to a type of morality that is based on the social contact between a 
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government and its citizens.  In this arrangement citizens have given their consent to be ruled by 
a government, which is said to possess legitimate authority.  But how was such consent 
obtained?  Here we need to discuss the very idea of consent.  In the context of government, John 
Locke argued that a government was legitimate only if its citizens had consented to it.  Where it 
is obvious that not everyone has consented to the government under which they live, Locke 
proposed the idea of tacit consent, claiming that anyone who accepts the benefits of a 
government has tacitly consented to the burdens that government imposes on them.  Thus, 
accepting the benefits of society imposes certain obligations on individuals.  Locke is quite clear 
on this point stating in Two Treatises of Government that: 
 
[E]very man, that hath any Possession, or Enjoyment, of any part of the Dominions of 
any Government, doth thereby give his tacit Consent, and is as far forth obliged to 
Obedience to the laws of that government, during such enjoyment, as any one under it.
98
   
 
Thus, if one receives benefits, one incurs obligations. 
 
In A Theory of Justice, John Rawls makes an argument that is similar to Locke‘s.  For Rawls the 
question is not simply whether or not one would consent to a government explicitly or tacitly, 
but whether or not the consent to this form of government would be from a fair, original position.  
The original position of equality is something that Rawls says corresponds to the state of nature 
in traditional social contract theory.  This condition is not an actual historical condition, but a 
primitive condition of culture.  In the original position, principles of justice are chosen behind a 
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veil of ignorance, which ―ensures that no one is advantaged or disadvantaged in the choice of 
principles.‖ 99  Rawls demonstrates through the original position the importance of fairness in 
consent theory and this is an important addition to our modern understanding of social contract 
theory.   
 
The restrictions that Rawls refers to as the ―constraints of the concept of right‖ 100 are restrictions 
that he says hold true for all ethical principles and not just those of justice.  According to Rawls‘ 
theory, an ethical principle must satisfy the following five requirements: 
 
1. The principle should be general; 
2. Principles are to be universal in application; 
3. Parties assume that they are choosing principles for a public conception of that 
principle; 
4. The conception of right must impose an ordering of conflicting claims;  
5. The parties are to assess the system of principles as the final court of appeal in 
practical reasoning.
 101
  
 
Rawls‘posits that:  
 
 
…[t]aken together, then, these conditions on conceptions of right come to this:  a 
conception of right is a set of principles general in form and universal in application, that is 
to be publicly recognized as a final court of appeal for ordering conflicting claims of moral 
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persons. 
102
 
 
 
Rawls‘ constraints of the concept of right provide us with a basis for the development of moral 
norms.  Of note in his theory is the fact that the conception of right must impose an ordering of 
conflicting claims.
103
  It is precisely this sort of problem that we see in Kant‘s moral imperative 
(the difficulty in dealing with competing claims), and in utilitarianism (the inherent desire to 
appeal to utility on a case by case basis). 
 
One of the main concerns with Rawl‘s theory is whether or not it can be applied in practice.  
That is to say, how would one apply such a contract?  How would it work among real people?  
There is much beauty in a contract that appeals to rational lexical application of the principles 
outlined above, but the problem seems to be that as a tool for civic engagement, it appears to be 
an unworkable thought experiment for the average citizen, let alone the average politician. 
 
Developing an Ethical Framework 
Policy development and constitutional interpretation are informed by ethical reasoning.  Much of 
the discourse regarding post-September 11
th 
legislative and administrative reforms, particularly 
the Patriot Act, the National Security Agency‘s Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), and the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Amendment Act of 2008 (FAA), have focused on the 
constitutionality of such reforms.  This study considers the constitutional and ethical issues 
surrounding these reforms; however I wish to address a shortcoming common to most work on 
the subject, namely that these discussions begin and end with the U.S. Constitution.  Although 
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there is much to be said for this document, it need not be the last word on these issues.  Nor in 
reality is it, as evidenced by frequent disputes over its interpretation at even the highest levels of 
American public life.  As previously stated, the U.S. Constitution can be viewed itself as meta-
ethical in that it sets out rights which it claims are in themselves inalienable.  To make such a 
claim would suggest that these rights themselves must exist prior to Constitution.  The purpose 
of the Constitution then is really to spell out the rights, which are particularly vulnerable to 
infringement, in such a way to make them legally enforceable.  The reason we can engage in an 
ethical discussion about constitutional principles is because these principles themselves emerge 
from a prior ethical framework.  That said, this dissertation does not set out to construct a meta-
ethical framework for the U.S. Constitution (although presumably such a framework would be 
influenced by philosophers like John Locke among others
104
).  What it does set out to do is 
provide a normative framework that can be used in an applied sense to real world political and 
legal problems involving foreign intelligence surveillance in the U.S.  My guiding thought 
throughout this study will be that if one is going to make political and legal decisions one should 
have some moral basis for doing so. 
 
This chapter has sought to provide a brief introduction to some of the main ethical theories which 
have informed the ethical debate over legislative measures like the Patriot Act, and the 
subsequent changes to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA).  For the most part this 
chapter has emphasized the utilitarian arguments and the contractarian arguments since these are 
the ethical arguments which have largely informed this debate.   
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Chapters 4 - 6 of this dissertation provide the basis for this applied study in information ethics.  
By examining the Patriot Act, the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), and the recent 
amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) through the various ethical 
lenses described above, the following chapters take into consideration the utilitarian teleology of 
the good (as informed by the tradition of Bentham and Mill) and the contractarian rights-based 
deontology (as informed by the tradition of Rawls) which have been most commonly used to 
interpret these changes in an ethical context.  It is my argument that these traditional utilitarian 
and contractarian frameworks are insufficient for dealing with contemporary problems 
surrounding foreign intelligence surveillance.  Rather than viewing these two ethical theories as 
competing or conflicting frameworks, Chapter 7 seeks to blend these two normative theories so 
that they might best be applied in a practical sense to the contemporary problems of foreign 
intelligence surveillance in the U.S. 
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Chapter 4. 
 
U.S.A. PATRIOT Act:  A Necessary Tool in the War on Terror? 
 
Backgrounder:  The U.S.A.  PATRIOT Act of 2001 
The Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept 
and Obstruct Terrorism Act (U.S.A.  PATRIOT Act or Patriot Act for short)
105
 was the legislative 
response to September 11, 2001.
106
  The first of the Act‘s objectives, as described by Banks, was 
the improvement of information sharing. Shortly after September 11
th
, both the U.S. Congress 
and Administration saw the lack of shared information as a one of the major failures in being 
able to prevent the September 11
th
 attacks.  The difficulties in accessing key information within 
the intelligence community meant that pertinent information, which was available shortly before 
the attacks, was not shared between the various agencies that had national security 
responsibility.
107
  The terrorist attacks acted as an impetus for cooperation between law 
enforcement and intelligence agencies, as is reflected in the Patriot Act.  According to the 
Department of Justice (DOJ), shortly after the passage of the Patriot Act, the Act had worked to 
increase the ability of law enforcement to share information in the following ways: 
 
1.  it establishe[d] secure information-sharing systems to enhance the ability of agencies 
to investigate or prosecute multi-jurisdiction terrorist activities; 
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2.  and it allow[ed] law-enforcement personnel to share grand-jury and wiretap 
information regarding foreign intelligence with various other federal officers without first 
obtaining a court order: facilitating the sharing of information from criminal 
investigations.
108
 
 
In order to streamline bureaucratic reaction time, many of the judicial controls were removed by 
the Patriot Act.  The idea was that a reduction in legal barriers would enhance the Federal 
Government‘s ―potential to monitor, track, and capture messages exchanged between hostile 
forces in the United States and elsewhere.‖109  
 
The second objective of the Act, which called for the use of flexible warrants under FISA, 
provided the Government with an increase in surveillance opportunities from which to gather 
anti-terrorism intelligence.  These flexible warrants could be obtained through the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), as mandated by FISA.  Under a FISA warrant, 
government agents have the ability to surveil targets if there is probable cause that the subject of 
the search is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power. As such, FISA warrants are contrary to 
the regular court system which requires that there must be probable cause that a crime has been 
committed before a warrant will be issued.  Federal law enforcement agencies under FISA could 
collect personal information from electronic communications, voice mail, and any physical or 
electronic record, the term ‗record‘ having now been expanded by the Patriot Act to include ―any 
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tangible item that contains information‖.110  With such an all encompassing definition, the worry 
by many was that FISA warrants could easily be used to conduct ―fishing expeditions‖.    
 
Section 215 and Section 505 of the Patriot Act, among the most controversial provisions, were 
the focus of several important legal challenges.  Under Section 215 of the Act, the FBI could 
obtain a Section 215 order (FISA warrant) which allowed it to gain unprecedented access to 
certain business records held by a third party (i.e. medical, library, internet and other private 
records) without a subpoena or a warrant based on probable cause.
 111
  A gag order in the law 
prevented anyone served with a Section 215 order (i.e. an Internet Service Provider, medical 
professional, librarian) from telling anyone else that the FBI demanded information.  Equally 
controversial, Section 505 of the Act allowed the FBI to use National Security Letters (NSLs) to 
request telephone toll and transactional records.  Like a Section 215 order, NSLs were also 
subject to non-disclosure provisions that prevented a recipient from disclosing to anyone that 
they had been served with an NSL.   In order to issue an NSL the FBI needed only to ―certify - 
without court review - that the records [were] ―relevant‖ to an intelligence or terrorism 
investigation.‖112  In response to these provisions, several lawsuits were launched against the 
Government.  In particular, the case of Doe v. Ashcroft garnered a great deal of attention with 
regards to the constitutionality of NSLs.  This case will be discussed later in the chapter on page 
84.   
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The third objective of the Patriot Act, the expansion of wiretap authority over electronic 
communication, was met through amendments to FISA which allow for the use of roving 
wiretaps (which have unlimited jurisdiction), pen registers, and trap and trace devices without 
probable cause of a crime having been committed.  The Government, in such instances, needed 
only to certify that the information that was likely to be obtained through the use of the device 
was: 
 
foreign intelligence information concerning a U.S. person or [was] relevant to an ongoing 
investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine activities, provided 
that such an investigation of a U.S. person [was] not conducted solely upon the basis of 
activities protected by the First Amendment of the Constitution.
113
    
 
That said, the trap and trace provision under Section 214 of the Act expanded an exception to the 
Fourth Amendment (which protects against unreasonable searches and seizures), in order to 
―collect ‗addressing‘ information about the origin and destination of communications, as 
opposed to the content.‖114 
 
The fourth objective, the seizing of funds utilized by terrorist activities, signaled the recognition 
by the Government of the overall influence that money played in the material operation of 
terrorism.  The Patriot Act bolstered Federal efforts to combat money laundering through 
regulations, international cooperation, criminal sanctions, and forfeiture, through the use of more 
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stringent record keeping, disclosure and information sharing requirements, and the imposition of 
new crimes and penalties.  Prior to the Patriot Act, financial institutions were required to file a 
variety of reports detailing the particulars behind transactions exceeding certain amounts with the 
Department of the Treasury and the Internal Revenue Service (IRS), and to establish anti-money 
laundering programs.  The Patriot Act thus expanded reporting and disclosure of information, 
previously limited to the Treasury Department or the IRS, to all relevant actors involved in 
national security and foreign intelligence. 
 
In addition, the President now had the power to designate any organization or individual a 
terrorist and thereby freeze all their assets and criminalize all transactions with them.  It was this 
power that the President used to shut down three of the largest Muslim charities in the country.   
The assets of two Chicago-based Muslim charities, the Global Relief Foundation and 
Benevolence International Foundation, were frozen pending a government investigation of their 
potential terrorist links.  The third, the Holy Land Foundation, was designated a terrorist 
organization on the charge that it was connected to Hamas. According to David Cole, this charity 
―was given no notice or hearing prior to its designation, and when it filed suit after the fact, the 
district court denied it any opportunity to produce evidence supporting its innocence.‖115  
 
The fifth and final objective of the Patriot Act called for mandatory detention and deportation of 
non-U.S. citizens suspected of having links to terrorist organizations.  Here Section 412 of the 
Act allowed the Attorney General to detain any non-citizen suspected of terrorism for up to 
seven days.  Under Section 412, the Attorney General had to certify that he had reasonable 
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grounds to believe that the suspect was either engaged in ―conduct [that] threatens the national 
security of the United States or [was] inadmissible or deportable on grounds of terrorism, 
espionage, sabotage, or sedition.‖116  Within that seven day period the Attorney General had to 
initiate removal, criminal proceedings or release the alien.  In the event that the suspect was held, 
the determination had to be ―reexamined every six months to confirm that the alien's release 
would threaten national security or endanger some individual or the general public.‖ 117   
By advancing the argument that non-citizens are not entitled to the same rights (due process, 
equal protection and the freedoms of speech and association) as citizens in the war on terror, by 
extension one could argue that citizens should be allowed to trade the liberties of non-citizens for 
additional security.
118 
   This is a very difficult position to defend as a constitutional matter, given 
that basic rights are not limited to citizens but apply to all ―persons‖ within the U.S. or subject to 
U.S. authority.  ―These are human rights, not privileges of citizenship.‖119 
 
Here I think the following statement by Human Rights Watch captures nicely why Section 412 is 
such a controversial provision in the Patriot Act: 
 
A fundamental corollary of the right to liberty is the right not to be held without charge. 
Article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states, ―anyone who 
is arrested shall be informed, at the time of the arrest, of the reasons for his arrest and 
shall be promptly informed of any charges against him.‖ U.S. constitutional law similarly 
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recognizes that detention without charge violates the right to liberty protected by the due 
process clause of the fifth and fourteenth amendments.
120
  
 
In liberal democratic societies, there is a need to talk not only of individual rights, but also of the 
common good.  In the U.S. the discussion of rights and responsibilities is becoming largely a 
discussion about the balancing of individual rights to such things as access to information and 
the right to privacy, against the collective good, national security.   
 
Patriot Act Reauthorizations 
One of the features of the several provisions of the Patriot Act was the use of built in sunset 
clauses.  Given the controversial nature of these provisions, the insertion of a four-year sunset 
clause was viewed as a compromise to ensure the Act‘s passage.  With the most controversial 
sections of the original Patriot Act, Section 215 among them, set to expire on December 31, 
2005, the Administration needed to persuade Congress that the Act could be amended in such a 
way that it would live up to its claim that it not only made America safer, but was indeed 
constitutional.   
 
Section 215, by broadening the term ―record‖ to include ―all tangible things‖, was heavily 
criticized for being overbroad.  Claims that this provision of the Patriot Act was being abused 
were vehemently denied by the Administration.  In an online Op Ed. Piece for the Washington 
Post on December 14, 2005, Attorney General Alberto Gonzales (John Ashcroft‘s successor in 
February 2005), answered public questions regarding the Patriot Act.  Gonzales wrote in his 
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response to questions from the public about the great deal of misinformation about the Patriot 
Act, stating in one real time response: 
 
The Patriot Act incorporates important safeguards, including judicial review, 
congressional oversight, and audits by the Inspector General. You mention wiretaps. All 
wiretaps must be authorized by a federal judge. In addition, investigators must show 
probable cause and comply with other requirements before the court may authorize the 
wiretap. This has always been the case, and the Patriot Act did nothing to diminish these 
safeguards.
121
 
 
These comments would soon prove false in the windstorm that followed only a couple of days 
later with the December 16, 2005 revelation in the New York Times that the FISC was in many 
instances being by-passed entirely through a program of warrantless surveillance which had been 
in operation under a secret presidential order signed in 2002.
122
   
 
Despite all of the bad press, the Administration was able to get the necessary extensions to 
amend the legislation, sections 215 and 505 in particular.  The U.S.A. PATRIOT Improvement 
and Reauthorization Act of 2005(Patriot Reauthorization Act) was finally approved in the Senate 
on March 2, 2006 and in the House on March 7, 2006.
123
  Although the reauthorized section 215 
now required agents to present the FISC with data ―proving how the evidence sought will apply 
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to the relevant investigation and affords greater protections for library, medical, and educational 
records,‖124 it did little to address the problem of warrantless surveillance.  Indeed the Bush 
Administration further attempted to legitimize the NSA program through its use of wartime 
presidential power arguments.  To provide additional legitimacy, the program was brought under 
the purview of the FISA law through the passage of the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA).
125
  
This new law which was passed August 5, 2007 permitted ―intelligence professionals to more 
effectively collect foreign intelligence information on targets in foreign lands, without first 
receiving court approval.‖ 126  In addition, it protected third parties who provided information to 
the Government, such as internet service providers or telephone companies, from being subject 
to private lawsuits.
127
  Given the class action suits which were filed against such companies 
alleging their participation in the NSA program, the six-month sunset attached to this act was not 
sufficient to quash those suits, but it did make it possible for the legislation to be amended and 
reinstituted – which is what happened with the passage of the FISA Amendment Act of 2008 
(FAA).
128
 
 
Like section 215, section 505, which provides for the expanded use of NSLs, has been criticized 
as being a tool with the potential for gross abuse.  In the key case on the subject, Doe v. 
Ashcroft,
129
 an unnamed Internet Service Provider (ISP) and the American Civil Liberties Union 
challenged the constitutionality of Section 505 of the Patriot Act which allows for the use of 
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NSLs.
130
  On September 28, 2004 the United States District Court, Southern District of New 
York, ruled that the provision granting the use of NSLs was unconstitutional.  Judge Victor 
Marrero struck down the section on the grounds that it violated ―free speech rights under the 
First Amendment as well as the right to be free from unreasonable searches under the Fourth 
Amendment.‖131  The Government appealed this decision only to have the appeal declared moot 
and the case returned to the original district court for reconsideration in light of the recent 
revisions to the Patriot Act.
132
  For a second time Marrero struck down the controversial NSL 
provision on September 6, 2007
133
 declaring it unconstitutional despite so called assurances that 
the new legislation had corrected the lack of congressional oversight in the original.
134
  As with 
his previous ruling, Justice Marrero stayed the ruling for ninety days pending government 
appeal.  The Government did follow up with another appeal, but by the time of the next appeal 
they had withdrawn their original NSL from the ISP in question.  As the NSL had been 
withdrawn, the only issue at hand was whether or not the ISP was still bound by the prohibition 
on disclosing receipt of the NSL.   
 
Under the Patriot Reauthorization Act the non-disclosure obligations on NSL recipients were 
modified.
135
  NSL recipients were still bound by non-disclosure obligations in cases where the 
                                                          
130
    Due to improper redacting of Court documents, the media first deduced that the ISP consisted of four librarians 
of the Library Connection, a consortium of libraries in Connecticut.  Although the librarians were part of the suit, 
the original ISP, Calyx Internet Access, remained bound by a partial gag order and was not identified until August of 
2010 when U.S. District Judge Victor Marrero partially removed the gag order on its President, Nicolas Merrill.  
See:  Zetter, Kim.  ―‗John Doe‘ Who Fought FBI Spying Freed From Gag Order After 6 Years‖ in Wired.  August 
10, 2010.  <http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/08/nsl-gag-order-lifted/#ixzz0wcPM40Dg >. 
131
    American Civil Liberties Union ―In ACLU Case, Federal Court Strikes Down PATRIOT Act Surveillance 
Power As Unconstitutional." September 29, 2004. <http://www.aclu.org/safefree/spying/18589prs20040929.html>. 
132
    Patriot Act Reauthorization had just been passed when this decision was rendered. 
133
    Doe v. Gonzales 500 F. Supp. 2d 379 (2007). 
134
    Eggen, Dan. "Judge Invalidates PATRIOT Act Provisions: FBI Is Told to Halt Warrantless Tactic." The 
Washington Post. September 7, 2006. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/09/06/AR2007090601438.html>.   
135
    Department of Justice.  Office of the Inspector General.  Special Report.  A Review of the Federal Bureau of 
  
86 
 
 
FBI Director or his designee had certified that harm might arise in an investigation if a disclosure 
occurred.    Section 116 of the Patriot Reauthorization Act amended Section 505 Patriot Act to 
allow recipients of NSLs to obtain legal advice from an attorney
136
 (something which they had 
not been able to do under the original provision) on the condition that they inform the FBI 
Director or his designee of the disclosure, and reveal the identities of the individuals to whom 
they disclosed the existence of the NSL.
137
   
 
On December 15, 2008 the U.S. Court of Appeals (Second Circuit) decision
138
 upheld the 
Marrero‘s decision, in part finding that ―portions of the statute violated the First Amendment; 
specifically the sections that wrongly placed the burden on NSL recipients to challenge gag 
orders.‖139  In addition, the Court was concerned about the absence of any time limits placed 
upon the gag order (as it stood the gag orders were indefinite), as well as the absence of any 
judicial review requiring the Government to demonstrate the burden of proof for maintaining the 
gag order.  These concerns lead to the case being sent back to the U.S. District Court for the 
Southern District of New York, forcing the Government to justify the constitutionality of the gag 
order imposed.
140
 
 
The Patriot Reauthorization Act now requires the Inspector General of the Department of Justice 
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to review and report on the FBI‘s use of NSLs.141  The Inspector General‘s 2007 report found 
that the FBI, which issued almost 200,000 NSLs between 2003 and 2006, had in many instances, 
abused its authority and misused NSLs.
142
 
 
Ethical Concerns 
 
Those who criticize the Patriot Act must listen to those folks on the front line of 
defending America. The Patriot Act defends our liberty, is what it does, under the 
Constitution of the United States. (Applause).
143
  
 -President George W. Bush 
 
…the essential act of the Party is to use conscious deception while retaining the firmness 
of purpose that goes with complete honesty.
144
 
 -George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-four 
 
Defenders of the original Patriot Act (before its sunset provisions were reauthorized) used 
utilitarian arguments to frame the debate concerning individual rights and the collective good 
(national security).  Limitations to individual liberties, so the argument went, were justified if 
they served to protect the ultimate collective greater good, that being national security.  Through 
use of Mill‘s liberty principle, these defenders cited the ―prevention of harm‖ as the prima facie 
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justification for the Act.  Mill‘s principle states:  
 
… the sole end for which mankind are warranted, individually or collectively, in 
interfering with the liberty of action of any of their number, is self-protection.  That the 
only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized 
community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others… 145 
 
The pro-Patriot Act response seemed to be that the only way to ensure the security of the 
majority was to curtail the freedom of some, or perhaps even all of the members of the 
community.  That said, it was also possible to use the liberty principle against the Act, using a 
form of proportionality test.  For example, if the outcomes of the Act resulted in (a) an excessive 
curtailment of liberty, relative to the threat it responded to, or (b) the curtailments of freedom 
involved in the Act were ineffective in protecting the community from genuine danger, one 
could use Mill‘s liberty principle to argue that the harms of the Act outweighed the (potential) 
benefits. 
 
The utilitarian case, pro or con the original Patriot Act, was bound to be a frustrating exercise for 
the outsider, given the nature of the Act itself.  With such a tight lid being kept on information 
about any actions taken under the Act, indeed, in accordance with the Act, it was almost 
impossible to make an informed judgment one way or another on these issues.  Of course, the 
secrecy provisions of the Act were justified by its defenders as essential to its effectiveness.  Not 
that this moved insiders to excessive scruples over appealing to ―secret information‖ about 
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terrorist threats interdicted, which unfortunately could not be shared, in defense of the Act and its 
provisions.  Those opposed to the Act might have suspected that it was doing more harm than 
good, but they were prevented by the Act itself from putting together the evidence that this was 
so.   
 
The case of the original Act demonstrated two problems with the utilitarian grounding of justice, 
the first a matter of principle, the other a matter of practice.  The first problem is the often raised 
point that rights and freedoms are merely provisional if justified by utilitarian arguments.  The 
ultimate utilitarian test for any policy is its effectiveness, whether or not the policy produces the 
greatest happiness of the greatest number.  Mill‘s liberty principle was framed in response to the 
threat to freedom of thought and action posed by the state, and especially social paternalism.  
The argument of On Liberty is that, in the long run, freedom of thought and action are conducive 
to the greatest happiness of the greatest number.   Implicit in the original Act, however, is the 
opposing view that freedom of thought, at least of some kinds, is not conducive to the greatest 
happiness of the greatest number.  The issue between Mill and those who took this latter view 
was ultimately an empirical matter, to be tested by experience.  For the consequentialist, there 
was no obstacle in principle to those who took this latter view.  
 
This leads to the second problem, which is a particularly acute example of the epistemological 
problems with consequentialism.  For the consequentialist, the rightness or wrongness of every 
action and every policy is judged on the basis of the contribution it makes to the general welfare.  
But every action and every policy is undertaken with limited knowledge of the consequences that 
will ensue.  The world is a complicated place, and we are limited beings; however well-armed 
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with knowledge we may be, we cannot foretell with very great assurance what the outcome of 
any course of action we undertake might be.  The secrecy involved in the case of the Patriot Act 
only exacerbates the epistemological problems already inherent in forming a judgment as to the 
potential effectiveness of any given policy.  Using consequentialist arguments to defend the 
actions and policies of the Government becomes rather difficult, and our abilities to predict the 
long term consequences of legislation such as the Patriot Act falls more than a little short of 
perfection.  Where relevant information, necessary for any serious analysis of the Act‘s 
consequences, potential or actual, is deliberately restricted, the problem is compounded. 
 
The only really secure consequentialist judgments of the Patriot Act would have to be 
retrospective, made only when all the information becomes available.  This is not to say that, as 
policy, the provisions of the Patriot Act were not justified from a utilitarian point of view.  As 
the Act was framed, that was something for insiders to know, and the expectation was that 
citizens would simply have to accept their judgment on this matter.  As a result, the Patriot Act 
presented an unsightly combination of a paternalism Mill would have deplored, founded in the 
very consequentialism he promulgated.  Looking back at the remarks made in 2001 in defense of 
the original Act, by then Attorney General John Ashcroft, the term paternalism seems a fitting 
word, since there was no room left to even question the Act: 
   
To those who scare peace-loving people with phantoms of lost liberty, my message is 
this: your tactics only aid terrorists, for they erode our national unity and diminish our  
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resolve. They give ammunition to America's enemies, and pause to America's friends. 
- John Ashcroft
146
 
With the patriotism of those who questioned the Act‘s most controversial provisions being 
maligned, attempts to engage in any meaningful debate on the subject proved difficult.  The most 
effective arguments against the Patriot Act were those based on a differently conceived 
conception of the foundations of rights and liberty.  These arguments conceived the rights 
protected under the U.S. Constitution as human rights -- rights that were not beholden to the 
standard of utility.  In contrast to utilitarianism, with its focus on the greater good, these 
contractarian arguments provided a means for examining a right-based critique of the Act.  Even 
so, the contractarian approach was not so simple.  Despite attempts to discredit those concerned 
about the impact that the legislation would have on civil liberties, in the manner of John Ashcroft 
above, a true social contract discussion would have to involve some discussion of rights and 
corresponding obligations (John Locke).  It was not that Contractarians saw the rights infringed 
as necessarily absolute and uncompromising (although that was often the way they were 
portrayed in the debate), but rather that even for a Contractarian any attempt to establish some 
sort of ordering of competing rights claims in the ‗liberty versus security‘ debate was equally 
frustrated by the lack of information needed in order to properly assess the true impact on the 
rights infringed.  If the Patriot Act provided measurable benefits to security which outweighed 
any adverse effects on liberty, then there would be a reasonable expectation that the law was 
justifiable.  Again though, given the veil of secrecy surrounding the Act, it was simply not 
possible to assess the actual trade-offs involved for the most controversial provisions.         
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The fact that the very operation of the original Patriot Act depended on a high level of secret 
information outside of the normal checks and balances – made the act, I would argue, one of the 
most controversial pieces of legislation in American history.  In its original state, the Patriot Act 
possessed no clear judicial oversight, and due to its nature, no public accountability (since that 
would have required public access to the information needed in order to question the 
effectiveness of the law under which it was governed – which it did not).  This secrecy made it 
difficult to properly assess the Act from either a utilitarian or contractarian stance.  These 
concerns led to considerable discussion in the U.S. regarding whether or not the Act‘s sunset 
provisions should be allowed to expire, or if saved somehow reformed to increase both judicial 
oversight and public accountability. 
 
Despite the many legal setbacks facing the Bush Administration regarding reauthorization, the 
Administration was steadfast in its defence of the Patriot Act and its other Anti-terrorist 
measures.  This defence was palpably utilitarian.  Given the importance of the objective – 
protecting the U.S. against terrorism - the means necessary to achieve it were claimed to be 
legitimate.  Seen in this light the Bush Administration‘s tendency to treat the Constitution as an 
impediment, rather than a genuine guide to action, becomes more comprehensible.  However, 
there are multiple possible ways to dispute the Bush Administration‘s rationale on ethical 
grounds.  For example a utilitarian might argue that the Administration had not chosen the 
optimal means to achieve its ends.  Deeper criticism might proceed from the failure to respect the 
autonomy of U.S. citizens by that Administration.  In the chapters that follow these issues will be 
explored in more depth with an aim of tying together a consistent ethical approach to dealing 
with such issues. 
  
93 
 
 
Chapter 5. 
 
Warrantless Surveillance:  An Extension of War Time Powers? 
 
Backgrounder:  The Terrorist Surveillance Program 
James Risen and Eric Lichtblau broke the news of the National Security Agency (NSA)‘s 
warrantless surveillance program on December 16
th
 2005 in the New York Times.
147
  The 
program, which was later called the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) by the Administration, 
allowed NSA to intercept ―communications between individuals on American soil and 
individuals abroad, without judicial approval.‖148  The ‗program‘ was authorized by President 
Bush in October of 2001, through use of a secret presidential order, but would not become 
publicly known for another four years. 
 
As Eric Lichtblau recounts in his book, Bush‘s Law: The Remaking of American Justice, the 
decision for the New York Times to go public with the news, was one the paper struggled with.  
The New York Times delayed publication for more than a year after intense lobbying by the 
White House on the grounds that publication of the story would jeopardize national security.  
Despite having a draft of the story in hand in 2004, the paper went to the Administration and 
heard out the White House‘s objections to its publication.  According to Licthblau in an 
interview with Democracy Now, the fact that they were debating this before the election was a 
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―matter of happenstance.‖149  Although the publication continued to be delayed, it was clear to 
the reporters involved that there were fierce anxieties about the legality of the program amongst 
a select few persons who were ‗read into‘ or briefed about the program.   
 
Immediately after the election, the paper continued to withhold publication of the story, but as 
time passed, it became clearer to the investigative reporters and their editors that many of the 
assertions made by the White House in defense of the continued secrecy surrounding the 
program were simply untrue.  The legal safeguards which they had been assured were in place, 
and the insistence that there was no difference of opinion within the Department of Justice (DOJ) 
regarding the legality of the program by White House officials, became increasingly suspect.  In 
particular, the repeated insistence by Attorney General Alberto Gonzales that there were no legal 
concerns about the program within the Administration and the DOJ were ultimately debunked by 
Lichtblau and Risen‘s investigation into the program. 
 
Despite the White House‘s continued attempts to convince the paper to back off on publishing 
the story, it became clear that the story simply was not going to die.  News of the secret program 
was likely to emerge in the book that Risen was working on, and the New York Times knew it.  
At this point it seemed really a matter of how and when the story would break.  The paper 
received a tip that the Administration was considering using a legal court injunction to stop the 
paper from publishing, as had been the case with the Pentagon Papers in 1971 (a historical case 
of censorship where the Nixon Administration tried unsuccessfully to block the paper from 
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publishing the secret history of the Vietnam War).
150
  With the threat of a possible injunction 
looming, the New York Times made the decision to post the story online before such an 
injunction could stop it. 
 
As the time approached for the reauthorization of the Patriot Act’s sunset provisions, the story 
was a bombshell and certainly generated widespread debate in Congress.  The Administration 
went into immediate damage control mode, trying to contain and explain the new revelations 
about the super secret program.  The following day President Bush, in his weekly radio address, 
admitted that he had authorized the program but contended that NSA‘s actions were ―consistent 
with U.S. law and the Constitution,‖ and that the surveillance was intended only ―to intercept the 
international communications of people with known links to Al Qaeda and related terrorist 
organizations.‖151  
 
Rather than responding immediately to the new revelations about warrantless surveillance in his 
radio address, Bush used the opportunity to first stress the need for the Senate to reauthorize the 
soon to expire sunset provisions of the Patriot Act – emphasizing that America‘s law 
enforcement personnel had used this:  
 
…critical law to prosecute terrorist operatives and supporters and to break up terrorist 
cells in New York, Oregon, Virginia, California, Texas, and Ohio.
152
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He began his address by focusing on the Patriot Act.  This was legislation passed in a time of 
crisis with almost unanimous consent – passing by a ninety-eight to one bipartisan majority in 
the Senate.  In doing so, he was able to seize the opportunity to chastise those Senators who were 
currently filibustering over reauthorization as undermining the safety of the country, since the 
U.S. could ―not afford to be without this law for a single moment.‖ 153 
 
By placing the emphasis on the Patriot Act, President Bush was attempting to mitigate rising 
concerns in the media over the program of warrantless surveillance operating under his 
authorization.  His speech writers clearly sought to shape his remarks in such a way as to make 
any covert actions seem completely understandable, if not excusable.  Appealing to the authority 
vested in him by the Congress through the Joint Authorization for Use of Military Force 
(AUMF), in combination with his powers as Commander in Chief, President Bush was asserting 
a claim (one that he would continue to stand by for the rest of his presidency) that he had acted 
within the bounds of the Constitution and the law.  President Bush summed up his address with a 
short reference to the breaking controversy, stating simply that he had: 
 
…authorized the National Security Agency, consistent with U.S. law and the 
Constitution, to intercept the international communications of people with known links to 
al Qaeda and related terrorist organizations.
 154
 
 
The claim that ‗only persons with known links to Al Qaeda‘ were the targets of such surveillance 
is one that was widely contested in the press.  What is known is that shortly after 9/11 the 
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President ordered the NSA to secretly wiretap the ―international telephone calls and email 
messages of Americans without obtaining warrants.‖155  This secret wiretapping was made 
possible through a public-private partnership between the NSA and various telecommunications 
companies – the source of the data. 
 
As for the nature of the program, that was ―highly classified.‖  The purpose however, was not 
inconsistent with other post 9/11 initiatives, in that its main objective was to detect and prevent 
terrorist attacks against the U.S.  The media, according to the President, had now endangered 
Americans by leaking the existence of this program.  The possible chilling effect on free speech 
was also clear as President Bush stated flatly that:   
 
As a result, our enemies have learned information they should not have, and the 
unauthorized disclosure of this effort damages our national security and puts our citizens 
at risk. Revealing classified information is illegal, alerts our enemies, and endangers our 
country.
156
 
 
Pointing to the example of the two terrorist hijackers who flew a jet into the Pentagon, Nawaf al 
Hamzi and Khalid al Mihdhar, President Bush noted that had their communications to members 
of Al Qaida overseas been intercepted, that tragedy might have been avoided.  By authorizing the 
secret NSA program, President Bush claimed his actions were fully consistent with his 
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―constitutional responsibilities and authorities,‖ 157 and would increase the likelihood that 
―killers‖ such as those involved in the 9/11 hijackings would be identified and located in time. 158  
President Bush went even further in his defense of the program by stating that since its 
authorization, the program had helped to both detect and prevent possible terrorist attacks at 
home and abroad.
 159
 
 
In terms of oversight, the President was quick to point out that he had been reviewing the 
program‘s activities approximately every 45 days in consultation with the DOJ, and top legal 
officials within NSA, including the Attorney General and the Counsel to the President, as well as 
―leaders in Congress‖ who had apparently been briefed more than a dozen times.  160   It would 
later be revealed that the leaders the President referred to were the ―gang of eight‖ a subset of the 
leaders within Congress which included the speakers and the minority leaders from both the 
House and the Senate and the chairs and ranking members of the House and Senate intelligence 
committees – which itself was controversial because the full membership of the intelligence 
committees had not been briefed on the program.
 161
  As a result of these consultations, the 
President announced in his address that he had thus far reauthorized the program more than 30 
times since the September the 11
th
 attacks, and would continue to do so as long as the country 
faced threats from Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups, 
   
This authorization is a vital tool in our war against the terrorists. It is critical to saving 
American lives. The American people expect me to do everything in my power under our 
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laws and Constitution to protect them and their civil liberties. And that is exactly what I 
will continue to do, so long as I'm the President of the United States.
 162
 
 
Presidential Power and the TSP 
 
The Bush Administration‘s position on the matter was clear – that the President had acted within 
his authority in authorizing the Terrorist Surveillance Program.  At the start of February 2006 the 
Senate Judiciary Committee began its hearings.
163
  The committee‘s chairman, Senator Arlen 
Specter, opened them by stating that his committee would be: 
 
…examining the Administration's contention that, notwithstanding the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act, there is statutory authority for what the president has done 
by virtue of the resolution of Congress authorizing the use of force against the 
terrorists.
164
  
 
In reference to the President‘s assertion that he was acting in accordance with the powers given 
to him in the emergency resolution passed by Congress shortly after 9/11, not all lawmakers 
shared the President‘s position on the matter.  As Senator Leahy commented, Democrats and 
Republicans did not give the President the authority to ―go around the FISA law to wiretap 
Americans illegally.‖  Rather, the authorization in question, according to Leahy, was simply the 
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means necessary to give the President the go ahead to: 
 
…to capture or kill Osama bin Laden and to use the American military to do that. It did 
not authorize domestic surveillance of American citizens.
 165
 
 
Questions concerning whether or not the President had the original authority to implement a 
program such as the TSP (given FISA‘s intent – not least of which is to curb executive abuses of 
such powers) were at the heart of the Committee‘s concerns.  Even on the chance that the 
President was correct in authorizing such a program, there was still the issue of oversight and 
where that oversight might belong (i.e. with Congressional Intelligence Committee or with the 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC)).  On March 28, 2006 the Committee heard the 
testimony of five former FISC judges.  It was their opinion that the FISC should be given the 
formal oversight role over the TSP.
166
 
 
The Role of the Telecoms 
 
Whether the President had acted in accordance with the law was certainly debatable, but even if 
the President had acted within proper bounds, questions concerning the role of the telecom 
companies within the program and their potential legal liability were now being raised.  Clearly, 
the program could not have existed without their cooperation; however, their ability to refuse to 
participate, as well as the scope of the presidential order in question, was not fully understood at 
the outset.  As Don J. Michaels notes: 
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…intelligence agencies depend greatly on private actors for information gathering. 
Second, the Executive is institutionally predisposed to act decisively and unilaterally 
during times of crisis, even if that means bypassing legal restrictions, skirting 
congressional and judicial oversight, and encroaching on civil liberties. Third, to the 
extent corporations currently are (or can be made to be) willing partners, the Executive 
may choose to conduct intelligence policy through informal collaborations, 
notwithstanding the legal, political, and structural collateral harms these inscrutable 
bargains may generate.
167
 
 
More than a month after the news broke about the TSP, the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF) 
filed a class action lawsuit against telecom giant AT&T on January 31, 2006.
168
  The EFF 
lawsuit alleged that AT&T violated the Stored Communications Act, Title II of the Electronic 
Communications Privacy Act (ECPA); the Wiretap Act, Title I of the ECPA; and the Pen 
Register Statute, Title III of the ECPA.
 169
  With the media frenzy underway, and Senate 
Judiciary Hearings set to begin, any hopes that the Bush Administration may have had that the 
issue would simply blow over seemed to have been dashed.  
 
Indeed with papers like USA Today reporting that AT&T, Sprint and MCI were all participating 
in the program of warrantless surveillance, the number of possible partners within the TSP 
appeared to be growing, as was interest in the story both in the media and within the Government 
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itself.  The spring of 2006 gave way to increasingly negative press reports and mounting public 
concern over the scope of the program.  Newsweek reported that the NSA had apparently 
revealed the names of more than 10,000 U.S. citizens that it had monitored.
170
  In addition, the 
scope of the participation by the telecom companies in the TSP made further headlines on May 
11, 2006 when USA Today reported that NSA had constructed a ―massive database of 
Americans‘ phone calls.‖171  The call records of perhaps tens of millions of Americans, the paper 
alleged, had been provided to NSA using data provided by AT&T, Verizon and BellSouth.  The 
collection of these call records, according to reporter Seymour Hersh, initially began with the 
tracking of chains of phone numbers connected to phones that had called high-risk regions.
172
  
Basically, the way it worked according to Hersh‘s reporting, is that programmed computers were 
used to: 
 
…map the connections between telephone numbers in the United States and suspect 
numbers abroad, sometimes focussing on a geographic area, rather than on a specific 
person—for example, a region of Pakistan. Such calls often triggered a process, known as 
―chaining,‖ in which subsequent calls to and from the American number were monitored 
and linked.
 173
 
 
Inevitably, as the telephone chains grew longer, more and more American calls were being swept 
into the monitoring. 
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With more and more telecoms being implicated, several were quick to proclaim their non 
involvement with the TSP.  Companies like Qwest, although never named in the original press 
reports, announced publicly that  it had not participated in the program (it later became known 
that  its lawyers were more than skeptical about any potential legal liability that compliance 
would bring and advised the company not to participate).
174
  This was soon followed by 
pronouncements from BellSouth and Verizon that they were never involved in the program – 
forcing USA Today to amend its original claim that these companies had participated in the 
program.
175
  That said, AT&T neither confirmed nor denied assisting the NSA – with the media 
and legal storm around that company‘s involvement continuing as new revelations about its 
involvement in the NSA program were coming out in the press.
176
 
 
As details emerged about the program through documents and interviews with the whistle blower 
at the centre of the EFF class action suit, Mark Klein, it appeared that AT&T had provided NSA 
with access to phone and internet traffic passing through its San Francisco switching center, 
which it could then sift using data mining software.
177
  If this could be happening at AT&T, the 
question on the minds of those in the media and civil liberties groups was where else could this 
be happening?  Piecing together the investigative reporting of numerous journalists, and the 
details emerging from the EFF case, as well as the Administration‘s account of the program, a 
particular picture began to take shape as to just how the program was operating.  As Richard A. 
Posner describes it, the TSP‘s main operation was one of interception, data mining, and human 
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search of intercepted messages.  Once a communication was intercepted it could then be filtered 
through computer data mining techniques and eventually, if there was reason to believe that the 
communication was of interest, it could be passed through a human filter.
 178
 
 
Legal Troubles Ahead 
The Administration‘s legal woes with regard to the program were just beginning, and certainly 
District Court Judge Anna Diggs Taylor‘s decision on August 17th 2006 in the case of ACLU v. 
NSA,
179
 was to be a serious setback for the President.  According to Justice Taylor‘s ruling, the 
President did not have the power to authorize the NSA‘s domestic spying program under either 
the Iraq War resolution or the Constitution.  Her 44 page opinion was viewed as a judicial check 
on executive power – a biting reminder to the President that his powers were not without their 
limits: 
 
It was never the intent of the Framers to give the President such unfettered control, 
particularly where his actions blatantly disregard the parameters clearly enumerated in 
the Bill of Rights.
180
  
 
Taylor, knowing full well that the Government would appeal the decision, stayed her ruling 
pending appeal.
181
  In October 2006, a three judge panel of the Sixth U.S. Circuit Appeals Court 
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ruled that the NSA‘s TSP program could continue through the appeal process.182  The program 
was not dead, but for the moment it was on life support.   
 
As the ACLU v. NSA case was working its way through the courts in 2006-2007, Attorney 
General Gonzales was doing his best to assure the public that there was sufficient legal oversight 
in place and that there was a unified legal opinion amongst DOJ and Administration officials that 
the program itself was constitutional.
183
  Still the court of public opinion did not seem convinced 
– and in a surprising reversal, the Attorney General announced on January 17th 2007 that: 
 
…any electronic surveillance that was occurring as part of the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program will now be conducted subject to the approval of the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court….184 
 
The announcement came in the form of a letter addressed to the Chairman of the Senate 
Judiciary Committee, Patrick Leahy, and Ranking Minority Member, Arlen Spector concerning 
the NSA program.  As the Attorney General noted, by bringing the TSP under the supervision of 
the FISC, the President would no longer have to authorize the program as he has been doing 
(every 45 days or so).
 185
  Despite the willingness of the Administration to bring the program 
under the purview of the courts, they were very much still in hot water over a program which had 
authorized warrantless surveillance of American citizens. 
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In the months that followed, the Attorney General‘s testimony before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee was long and labored.  The issue of the TSP had not disappeared from the public 
radar, and along with the recent firing of eight U.S. Attorneys, it had proved to be yet another 
scandal for the Administration.  Due to the inherent secrecy of the TSP, Attorney General 
Gonzales was not at liberty to answer some of the questions for national security reasons.  This 
resulted in gaps, inconsistencies and conflicting accounts in his testimony.  The differing 
accounts of Gonzales and the former Deputy Attorney General, James Comey over a March 
2004 hospital visit to a very sick Attorney General John Ashcroft (Gonzales‘ predecessor), 186 
received a lot of media attention.   Gonzales, then serving as White House Counsel, along with 
Andy Card, the President‘s Chief of Staff, according to Comey, were upset with his (Comey's) 
decision not to reauthorize the program due to DOJ concerns that the program was illegal.  In an 
attempt to bypass Comey, the two men attempted to persuade Ashcroft to reauthorize Bush's 
domestic surveillance program.
187
 
 
Comey‘s testimony was particularly damning in that it cast Gonzales and Card as trying to take 
advantage of a sick man in an attempt to get the DOJ‘s blessing for continued authorization of 
the TSP program.  Despite their best efforts John Ashcroft told the two men that that he was not 
the Attorney General (those powers had been transferred to Comey), and that he would not sign 
the authorization.
 188
  The testimony was a stark contrast to the claims being made by the 
Administration that there was no question among Administration and DOJ officials as to the 
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legality of the TSP program.
189
   With dozens of class action lawsuits being filed across the 
country against both the Government and the telecom companies for their participation in the 
TSP program, it appeared that this problem was not going away any time soon. 
 
Change in the Legal and Political Tide 
Despite all the media attention and conflicting testimonies before the Senate Judiciary 
Committee, a curious thing happened in July 2007.  The ACLU‘s victory in the ACLU v. NSA 
case was overturned on appeal marking a change in the legal tide.  The Appeals Court did not 
address any of the legality issues surrounding the program, but rather only the issue of whether 
the plaintiffs lacked standing.
190
  In order to prove that they had legal standing, the plaintiffs 
would have had to demonstrate that their rights had actually been infringed, and given the secret 
nature of the program, finding the evidence to prove such violation would have been close to, if 
not, impossible.  The end result, a 2 – 1 ruling, found the plaintiffs lacking such standing, and 
therefore the case was overturned.
191
 
 
With a change in the legal tide there was a corresponding shift in the political tide.  With the 
original ruling now struck down, the question of constitutionality of the program was, for the 
moment at least, moot.  The Administration had its program (Justice Taylor‘s tongue lashing no 
longer applied) and it had already addressed the issue of its operating outside of the courts by 
bringing it under the watchful eye of the FISC.  That said, there still remained the pesky problem 
of lawsuits against the telecoms – the providers of the very data required to run the TSP -  as well 
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as the need, more importantly to protect the Administration and its agencies and departments 
against any further lawsuits in the event that any future plaintiffs could prove their legal standing 
in court.    
 
Addressing the Remaining Legal Concerns 
Several legal questions remained, not least of which was whether authorization of the program 
was within the President‘s powers.  Even if it were, the constitutional questions as to whether 
NSA‘s data collection methods were in violation of Fourth Amendment rights also had to be 
taken into account.  In his book, In the Common Defence:  National Security Law for Perilous 
Times, military judge James E. Baker sets out a number of legal arguments facing the President 
and his legal advisors in response to both sides of the argument for and against Presidential 
authority in authorizing the TSP. 
 
In his arguments for the program, Judge Baker looks at the constitutional framework which 
established the President‘s powers as Commander-in-Chief.  The courts have recognized that this 
power is not subject to legislative interference when acting in this capacity.  In times of war, it is 
well agreed upon that: 
 
…the president has no higher constitutional responsibility than to protect the United 
States from attack.
 192
  
 
Taking into account the fact that Congress cannot legislatively interfere with the President‘s war 
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time powers, FISA would in this sense be acting unconstitutionally if it acted in such a way as to 
impede the President‘s ability to carry out his constitutional duties as Commander in Chief.  
Judge Baker best sums up these arguments as follows: 
 
Based on the president‘s broad constitutional authority in the area of national security, 
including his authority to collect the intelligence necessary to effectively execute those 
duties, the president may lawfully authorize the TSP.  This argument is enhanced to the 
extent the president determines the FISA requirements are impractical in application and 
prevent the president from undertaking his core security functions.
193
 
 
In presenting arguments against the President‘s authority, Judge Baker examines the 
constitutional framework as laid out by the Fourth Amendment which provides a guarantee 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.  As a matter of law, FISA requires that judicial 
approval for a warrant be obtained in order to conduct electronic surveillance within the U.S.  To 
argue that FISA would be unconstitutional in impeding the President‘s ability to conduct 
warrantless surveillance would ignore the fact that the statute allows him to conduct such 
surveillance in periods of declared war and in periods of emergency, where obtaining such a 
warrant may not be possible given the time constraints involved.  In those cases the warrant can 
be applied for after the fact.  Baker sums up his arguments against as follows: 
 
Absent a compelling demonstration that the surveillances falls outside the FISA’s 
parameters…presidential authorization of warrantless surveillance at best places the 
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president at a low ebb of his authority.  The better view, in light of the specificity of the 
statute, and the longstanding acquiescence of the executive in the Act‘s constitutionality, 
is that FISA did not leave the president at a low ebb in exercising residual inherent 
authority, but extinguished that authority.
 194
 
  
In examining these arguments it is clear that there are merits on both sides, if the President is 
truly acting within his capacity as Commander-in-Chief.  Assuming that he is acting within his 
capacity, the arguments on the side of the President seem strongest if FISA is actually impeding 
his ability to carry out those duties.  What is not clear, though, is why FISA would actually be 
doing so.  If it is possible to obtain such warrants without prior judicial approval (assuming that 
these can be easily gotten retroactively) then the argument for presidential authority begins to 
weaken.  Of more concern then become the Fourth Amendment arguments: 
  
The issue of whether the TSP violates the Fourth Amendment entails a reasonableness 
analysis that strikes a balance between governmental and individual interests.
195
 
 
In examining this issue, Richard Henry Seamon presents the original three-part test as laid out by 
Justice Jackson in Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer.  In this case, President Truman 
tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to take over the steel mills in order to ensure that they would produce 
enough steel for the Korean War effort.  In this instance the Court rejected the President‘s 
Commander-in-Chief arguments on the grounds that although the President is Commander-in-
Chief he is not Commander of the Country.  That test puts in place a framework that, according 
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to Justice Jackson, ―reflects the interdependence of the President and Congress in certain matters, 
including war.‖ 196  The test lays out three scenarios that rank presidential power against that of 
Congress in descending order of legitimacy and works as follows: 
 
1.  President acts with express or implied authority from Congress 
 This is presidential power at its maximum  
2.  President acts with neither congressional approval nor denial  
 President must rely upon his own independent powers 
3.  President acts in defiance of congressional orders 
 This is presidential power at its ―lowest ebb‖ 197 
 
By Seamon‘s analysis, the application of the same test in Youngstown to the TSP provides an 
interesting juxtaposition.  As Seamon states: 
 
Justice Jackson's framework makes it important to determine whether the TSP is 
authorized by - or is instead inconsistent with - the express or implied will of Congress. 
The President argues that the TSP was authorized at its inception by the AUMF, but this 
argument lacks merit. Without the AUMF to support it, the TSP violates FISA and so 
presents Justice Jackson's third situation. Accordingly, the surveillance can fall within the 
President's power, despite violating FISA, only to the extent that Congress is 
constitutionally ―disabled‖ from curbing the President's power. 198 
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Although the Court in Youngstown did not find President Truman‘s actions to fall within the 
scope of the President‘s Commander-in-Chief powers as such actions were not authorized by any 
statute or any extra-statutory power under the Constitution,
 199
 assume for argument‘s sake that 
this did not apply in the TSP case.  Even if this were a genuine situation whereby war time power 
applies, the question of the Fourth Amendment still requires consideration, since it would only 
seem sensible that whatever course of action the President took, his advisors should be 
advocating measures which would impair those rights as minimally as possible.   
 
Ethical Concerns 
The response to the disclosure of the TSP, both pro and con, has, in much the same way as the 
Patriot Act, taken the form of competing utilitarian and contractarian ethical arguments.  Those 
supporters of the Administration‘s decision to work outside of FISA have cited the ―prevention 
of harm‖ – in this case the protection of national security interests – as the grounds for keeping 
the program secret.
200
  For many of these supporters, the idea that the New York Times would 
disclose the program is tantamount to treason because it had the potential to place the country in 
harm‘s way by revealing to the enemy the methods being used to collect information on terrorist 
activities – perhaps tipping off the enemy to use alternative means of communication in order to 
avoid detection.     That being said, given the nature of the program – which is secret – the only 
way to justify its existence on utilitarian grounds is to take the word of those officials who are 
party to the program.  The consequentialist approach would seem to require lexically that: 1.  it 
has in some demonstrable way prevented terrorist attacks, and 2. that the overall good it has 
achieved in meeting this goal, has outweighed any harmful effect that has resulted in a reduction 
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of civil liberties for those whose communications have been caught up in the sweep of the 
program. 
 
In contrast, to the utilitarian arguments, those who have expressed their concern that the program 
violated not only FISA but also protected Fourth Amendment rights under the U.S. Constitution, 
have appealed largely to contractarian / rights-based arguments.
201
  Similar to the arguments 
expressed in the previous chapter on the Patriot Act, the fact that the TSP operated under such a 
high level of secrecy, that it lay outside of the normal checks and balances, disregarding FISA as 
set out by Congress and operating outside the normal judicial oversight of the FISC, makes it 
difficult, although not impossible to defend on contractarian grounds.  The caveat here is that to 
defend it on such grounds, requires that the Commander-in-Chief arguments must be held above 
all others in the ordering of conflicting constitutional claims.  In terms of wartime presidential 
power, this argument would certainly hold sway and would, I think be justified under a Rawlsian 
approach; however, as we have seen above, this argument is harder to defend in a perpetual war 
on terror where the threat level is increasingly difficult to measure and relies on a paternalistic, 
‗trust us,‘ approach to information sharing.       
 
In addition to the ethical concerns generated by the program‘s mere existence, the TSP program 
also raises a number of important ethical questions at an operational level concerning how the 
data were obtained, the ways in which the data can be used and ultimately the trade offs 
involved, that is to say, what the true impact on civil liberties has been.  Given the secret nature 
of the program and its intended purpose, which is to act as one of the many tools at the 
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Government‘s disposal to guard against future terrorist attacks, it becomes hard to evaluate the 
program in the absence of specifics.  Although those in the media have suggested what they 
think is going on through a number of confidential sources / whistle blowers,
202
 the program 
remains highly guarded and thus it is not clear how the program is actually operating.   
 
Like many of the post 9/11 ethical debates, the TSP has been framed in a utilitarian light, one 
which requires that the citizen trust the few members of the executive, and now legislative and 
judicial branches who have been involved in the program, to protect the greater good of their 
national security.  Prior to the December 2005 disclosure of the program, the simple fact that the 
program was operating outside of the purview of the courts and was even hidden from members 
of the House Intelligence Committee, was perhaps most disturbing because the potential for the 
abuse of unchecked power was at its greatest.  In light of the recent changes to the TSP, which 
occurred as a result of the public revelations of the program‘s existence, some of the early ethical 
concerns have undoubtedly been mitigated.  That said, there are still issues about the program 
which require further examination. 
  
First is the issue of how corporations are used in the operation of the program.  In order to gather 
the data from which the NSA may mine for possible terrorist threats, the co-operation of 
telecommunications corporations is required.  As was seen in the example of Qwest, the inability 
of the company to publicly challenge the legality of the Government request, due to the secret 
nature of the program, was problematic.  Qwest alleged that it lost government contracts as a 
result of its unwillingness to co-operate with a program that its legal counsel thought was illegal.  
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If corporations are pressured into co-operation for fear of lost business or other reprisals, the 
Government‘s position begins to lose some of that moral high ground luster.  Although the 
program has now been acknowledged, the alleged action of the Government in the Qwest case 
could prove problematic given the number of ‗other programs‘ operating under high level 
secrecy about which the public has not been made aware (President Bush in his radio address on 
December 17
th
 alluded, as did former Attorney General Gonzales in his Senate Judiciary 
testimony that there were other programs).
 203
 
 
Second, there remains the overarching concern about right to privacy as constitutionally 
guaranteed.  Richard A. Posner asserts that in the chain of events (interception, data mining and 
human searches) it is only the last event which raises constitutional and legal concern.  His 
argument is that computer generated searches are not actual impairments to an individual‘s 
privacy rights, but is this actually the case?  The potential for targets being deemed of interest or 
appearing on watch lists before human searches are able to rule them out as false positives would 
arguably be just as damaging, if not more.  To assert, as he does, that ―[c]omputer searches do 
not invade privacy because search programs are not sentient beings,‖ 204 appears disingenuous. 
 
The concerns that the TSP raises within the debate over privacy rights during times of insecurity 
have the potential to shape future legislation and to influence policy decisions at the highest 
levels.  What is crucial here is the ability to maintain some kind of balance between the security 
concerns that the TSP was set up to address and the civil liberties concerns that any infringement 
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of protected Fourth Amendment rights entails.  The changes to FISA as outlined in the following 
chapter provide an interesting window into the Bush Administration‘s response to the media 
storm surrounding the TSP and its attempts to minimize the legal and political fallout that 
occurred as a result of the program‘s disclosure.     
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Chapter 6. 
 
FISA Modernization:  Mitigating Legal Liability 
 
Numerous changes were made to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) in the post 
9/11 period, with many having been incorporated into the Patriot Act itself.  Regardless of these 
changes, and the potential that existed for further changes in the period immediately following 
the September 11
th
 attacks, the Administration did not press Congress to legislate additional 
measures that would surely have avoided the legal questions that arose after the public disclosure 
of the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP).  Rather, prior to that disclosure, the executive 
branch merely chose to ignore the law, thereby avoiding any of the legislative details that might 
have thrown a kink in the operation of the TSP itself.  Then came the New York Times story, 
and with it came the claim by the Government that FISA lacked the ability to keep up with the 
pace of technological change.  Where the TSP had managed to tip toe around the legislation for 
the previous four years, it seemed that this was no longer the case.  Bringing the program under 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) in January of 2007 provided additional 
legitimacy to the program now that there was judicial oversight.  That said, the original rationale 
for keeping the program outside the FISA had not disappeared and hence the push for 
modernization was just beginning.  If the executive branch had to work with FISA, then it might 
as well be on its terms.   
 
The claim by the Administration was clear: FISA was out of date and in desperate need of 
modernization.  As a justification for circumventing the Act all together, the argument was pretty 
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weak, but given the potential legal liability of telecommunications companies and government 
officials – the need for revising the Act became a matter of urgency. 
 
Backgrounder:  The Protect America Act of 2007 
On August 5
th
 2007, President Bush signed into law the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA),
205
 
effectively broadening and legitimizing the activities which NSA‘s TSP was already engaged in 
– that being warrantless surveillance of the phone and electronic communications of Americans 
with the aim of routing out potential terrorist threats.  In early August, Senators Mitch Connell 
and Christopher Bond sponsored legislation to amend FISA.   In speaking to the legislation, 
which was eventually to become the Protect America Act (PAA), Senator McConnell stressed the 
urgency that accompanied the bill.  This was a bill that had garnered support from the Director of 
National Intelligence, Admiral Mike McConnell.  Admiral McConnell, having had a chance to 
examine the bill himself, had ―certified [to its drafters and to the Senate in a prepared statement 
that it] would give him and [the] intelligence community the ability to protect the homeland.‖206 
 
Senator McConnell‘s co-sponsor, Senator Christopher Bond, echoed these sentiments.  In his 
opening remarks in support of the bill, he emphasized the sheer necessity of the bill‘s passage, 
stating: 
 
It is absolutely critical for our national security that we change the law which currently, 
by its application, is denying our intelligence community a very significant portion of the 
signals intelligence they could collect on al-Qaida and other terrorist sources who may 
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well be planning another 9/11 attack on the United States.
207
 
 
Among the changes proposed, this new legislation would allow the Director of National 
Intelligence and the Attorney General to authorize collection of information concerning persons 
outside the U.S. without warrants, the warrants being replaced by a series of notifications to the 
FISC that proper procedures had been followed.
208
  The change was a major departure from 
traditional procedures under FISA and represented a major shift in the role of the FISC as a 
means for judicial oversight.  Knowing full well the magnitude of this shift, the Senate had a six-
month sunset provision written into the legislation.
209
  With the sunset clause in place, the 
message the Senate sent out to Congress was clear: this was temporary legislation, meant only to 
fill the stop gap.  
 
With the passage of this new law, the TSP program had a framework from which it could now 
legally operate.  Although the President had, up until the passage of this act, been asserting his 
authority in authorizing the TSP under his Commander-in-Chief‘s powers, Congress, by passing 
the act, had now legitimized the program and by default the actions of the President.  In essence, 
through this action, Congress had now enabled the President to act with maximum power.  
According to James Risen, by enacting the legislation, the White House was in effect responding 
to:   
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…a still classified ruling earlier [that] year by the special intelligence court, [that] said 
the government needed to seek court-approved warrants to monitor those international 
calls going through American switches.
210
  
 
The new legislation, which was ―largely drafted by the White House and received no committee 
hearing,‖211 provided a legislative exemption from obtaining warrants under FISA for persons 
reasonably believed to be outside the U.S.  Under the new law, the old system of warrants was 
now replaced with a system of court notifications whereby the Government would notify the 
Court that the surveillance had occurred, and the Court‘s role would be to ensure that the 
Government had followed proper procedures in filing the notification.   
 
In reporting on the program the day after the legislation was passed, Charlie Savage of The 
Boston Globe rightly noted that the PAA had in essence broadened the Government‘s powers to 
conduct warrantless surveillance.  The first way it did this was through its requirement that 
telecommunications companies make their facilities available for government wiretaps.  Since 
companies no longer had the ability to ‗opt out,‘ the new statute contained a provision that 
shielded companies from lawsuits.  This ‗immunity provision‘ was viewed as a necessary 
precondition in order to ensure compliance with the law.  The second way in which it broadened 
power was through its removal of the original requirement of the TSP that surveillance be 
restricted to calls and e-mails involving a suspected terrorist - the new law makes no such 
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distinction.
 212
  Rather than allowing oversight to remain with FISC, as had been granted by 
Attorney General Gonzales in early 2007, the new law gave the Attorney General and the 
Director of National Intelligence ―the power to approve the international surveillance, rather than 
the special intelligence court.‖ 213   The conversion of the Court‘s role to merely procedural, 
rather than substantive, oversight meant that the Court would no longer be involved in 
scrutinizing the cases of individuals targeted for surveillance.  Instead, under the new law, the 
Court would only concern itself with questions surrounding whether or not the Government had 
―applied proper procedures used in the surveillance after it has been conducted.‖ 214  Given the 
sweeping nature of the reforms that the PAA made to FISA, its passage was made conditional on 
there being a sunset provision built into the legislation that would allow Congress to revisit the 
changes in six months time, when it could decide to make the legislation permanent, further 
amend it, or repeal it.   
 
Expired on Sunset:  Filling the gap left by the lost legislation 
In a speech delivered before a large banner that read ―Threat Operations Centre‖ at the NSA, 
President Bush urged Congress to make permanent the provisions of the PAA.  Playing on the 
fears and emotions of a country not quite recovered from the September 11
th
 terrorist attacks, the 
President thanked intelligence, law enforcement and homeland security professionals who 
worked tirelessly against a ruthless enemy ―determined to murder innocent people.‖  Without 
pause, he informed Congress that it was their duty to ―give the professionals the tools they need 
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to do their work as effectively as possible.‖215 
 
In a speech that emphasized tools, there was of course no mention of the controversial  
TSP - the tool in question.  Instead, the President focused on the need to amend the FISA.  For 
those who had been following the story, this was an attempt by the Administration to address the 
constitutional questions that remained in terms of that program‘s legality in the face of multiple 
class action lawsuits that were brewing.  By portraying the FISA as ―dangerously out of date,‖ 
the President implied that anyone who questioned the Administration‘s proposed amendments to 
FISA was endangering national security.  The President‘s message was clear on this point when 
he stated that: 
 
Unfortunately, some in Congress now want to restrict the tools. These restrictions would 
impede the flow of information that helps us protect our people. These restrictions would 
reopen gaps in our intelligence that we had just closed… The question I'm going to ask is, 
do our professionals have the tools necessary to do the job to protect the American people 
from further attack?
 216
 
 
The Administration‘s claim that FISA had not kept pace with technological developments like 
the disposable cell phone and the Internet skirted around the real issue - not whether FISA was 
technologically up to date, but rather whether or not the Government‘s reliance on private 
infrastructure to conduct its intelligence operations left the telecoms vulnerable to lawsuits, and 
in turn left the Government‘s warrantless surveillance operations open to further public scrutiny.  
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If the telecoms were not immunized from such lawsuits, it would be impossible for the 
Government to compel them to co-operate in its spying operations; likewise, the potential for 
disclosure of evidence in such telecom cases had, in the Government‘s view, the potential to 
place national security operations at risk.  On this point the President was clear: 
 
It's particularly important for Congress to provide meaningful liability protection to those 
companies now facing multi-billion dollar lawsuits only because they are believed to 
have assisted in efforts to defend our nation following the 9/11 attacks. Additionally, 
without this protection, state secrets could be revealed in connection with those lawsuits -
- and our ability to protect our people would be weakened.
 217
  
 
Of course, if the telecoms required immunity from class action suits for breaking the law, the 
obvious question was: is the program legal to begin with? 
 
Arguments for Modernization 
According to David S. Kris, there are three main arguments for modernizing FISA.  The first 
argument is that FISA must be modernized because the statute‘s regulatory reach has been 
artificially expanded by the transition from satellite to fiber optic cable for carriage of 
transoceanic communications.  FISA, as passed in 1978, did not regulate satellite 
communications because they involved the use of radio waves to carry international calls, but the 
language did regulate surveillance of international wire or cable communications.  The 
Government claim was that surveillance of international communications that used to be 
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conducted outside of FISA was now subject to the statute because of changing technology. 
According to Kris this claim has proven to be exaggerated ―since the transition from satellite to 
cable was neither as dramatic, nor as unanticipated, as the Government argues.‖218 
 
The second argument is that FISA does regulate surveillance of international wire or cable 
communications, to or from the U.S., when conducted inside this country.  As long as no 
particular American in the U.S. is being targeted, FISA does not regulate surveillance of those 
same communications, on those same wires or cables, when conducted on a portion of the wire 
or cable located outside this country.  If the Government wants or needs to conduct such 
surveillance inside the U.S., (which it would if relying on the infrastructure of private 
telecommunications companies) it would bring that surveillance under FISA.  One of the key 
issues in the debate about FISA modernization is whether that change in the location of the 
surveillance should continue to trigger the statute‘s application. 219   
 
And finally Kris‘ third argument is that FISA‘s regulation of email communications is 
problematic.  While FISA does not regulate surveillance of a foreign-to-foreign telephone call 
(even if monitored from within the U.S.), it does regulate surveillance of a foreign-to-foreign e-
mail messages if acquired from electronic storage inside the U.S.  Part of the problem of email is 
that you cannot always determine ―consistently, reliably, and in real time‖ the location of parties 
to an e-mail communication.  In the absence of a requirement to verify the location of the email 
communications (to and from) the ―exemption may be too broad, potentially embracing domestic 
e-mail, which even the Director of National Intelligence has said should remain subject to 
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traditional FISA. This is one of the main problems that has bedeviled efforts at FISA 
modernization.‖220  
 
Of these three arguments, Kris notes that only the first argument was advanced publicly by the 
Bush Administration: that FISA must be modernized because the statute‘s regulatory reach has 
been artificially expanded by the transition from satellite to fiber optic cable for carriage of 
transoceanic communications.  In drafting the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) these three 
main arguments were taken into account, but were hardly the main grounds for pushing 
modernization; and certainly of these issues, as Kris notes, only the first was even publicly 
discussed.  The real issue at hand was still addressing the legal liability that had arisen out of the 
operation of the TSP. 
 
Retroactive Immunity and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 
With the PAA set to expire, pressure from the Administration was building.  For the 
Administration, the act became a symbol of their ‗tough on terror‘ stance, and any reluctance to 
pass it was merely playing into the hands of those terrorists who were bent on harming 
Americans.  With an election looming, the tough on terror approach no doubt played its part in 
securing the passage of the Act, which was now being touted as a bipartisan bill.  In an unusual 
move, the House held a secret session before the legislation was even tabled to discuss the issues 
at stake before moving on to the specifics of the new bill.  With C-span cameras halted for one 
hour
221
 and representatives having taken an oath not to disclose the nature of the proceedings, the 
details of that meeting are out of the public record, but one can only speculate that the meeting, 
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in combination with the political sensitivities faced by Democrats in an arena of ‗tough on terror‘ 
politics, may have had an impact on the final outcome of the bill. 
 
In commenting on the FAA the night before the House was set to vote on it, the bill‘s sponsor, 
Democratic Congressman Silvestre Reyes, the Chairman of the House Permanent Select 
Committee on Intelligence, referred to the FAA as a bipartisan compromise.  By repealing the 
PAA and replacing it with this new ―vital national security legislation,‖ Silvestre asserted that the 
change would both modernize and strengthen FISA while at the same time ―protecting 
Americans‘ constitutional rights.‖222  Reyes defended the amendments in the new legislation as 
necessary for intelligence agencies to conduct lawful surveillance of: 
 
…foreign terrorists or other foreign agents overseas whose electronic communications 
may pass through the United States.
223
 
 
In recognizing that intelligence is the first line of defense in preventing terrorist attacks, Reyes 
noted the importance of the bipartisan bill as it related to national security; however, he was 
quick to point out that the legislation served another ―vital function‖ in that it strengthened the 
constitutional rights of Americans by protecting them from ―unlawful surveillance.‖  Here Reyes 
was taking direct aim at President Bush‘s claim of executive power to conduct warrantless 
surveillance of Americans.
 224
   By bringing the TSP and all other such surveillance programs 
authorized by the President under the scope of FISA and FISC, Reyes was implying that the new 
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law had the necessary judicial oversight that had been absent at the time of the TSP‘s disclosure. 
 
Reyes‘ press release did not give any details regarding the scope of FISC‘s powers as they would 
now be constituted under the new legislation.  His co-sponsor, Republican Congressman Peter 
Hoekstra, was much more forthcoming in his description of the Court‘s role in a speech he gave 
on the House floor the day the bill was passed.  In describing the role of the Court, Hoekstra 
explained that the authority of the Court was an issue of great debate during the drafting of the 
new legislation.  What is striking though, given the remarks made by the bill‘s sponsor regarding 
limiting presidential power, is Hoekstra‘s comment that the law as amended would: 
 
…statutorily insert the FISA court in a limited way into the Executive's Constitutional 
authority to collect foreign intelligence information targeting foreign persons in foreign 
countries.
225
 
 
Hoekstra‘s point is crystal clear – the President was within his rights in authorizing the TSP or 
any other such program.  Although the President, it can be inferred from Hoekstra‘s comments, 
was acting within the scope of his powers as Commander-in-Chief as delineated under the U.S. 
Constitution, the purpose of this compromise bill was to allow the Court to: 
 
…provide some sort of additional check to ensure that the IC [Intelligence Community] 
is properly using its procedures to target a foreigner abroad and to minimize U.S. person 
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information that may be incidentally obtained.
 226
  
 
Hoekstra explains that unlike traditional FISA applications, there is no mechanism included in 
the amending legislation that would require that the Government demonstrate probable cause in 
its notification to the Court.  This would be a major break with past practice for FISA 
applications.  The new law would merely prescribe a method for FISC to verify that the 
intelligence community had followed proper procedures when surveilling targets – the Court‘s 
oversight role in determining the existence of probable cause having effectively been 
removed.
227
  
 
The lack of a probable cause requirement was something that Congressman Bobby Scott, 
chairman of the House Crime Subcommittee, took issue with.  Scott opposed the bill on the 
grounds that it provided for ―widespread acquisition of private conversations without meaningful 
court review.‖228  As Scott noted, the only court review in the whole process was a ―check on 
whether or not the Government certifies that the process has been followed.‖ 229  Scott also noted 
his concern over the Government‘s collection procedures with regards to the Court.  In terms of 
data collection under the new legislation, the Government could now surveil a target for up to 7 
days without court approval, a change from 48 hours under the old FISA.  The FAA’s emergency 
provisions would allow for data collection to continue even if the Court rejected the 
Government‘s certification on procedural grounds - this collection could continue for a period of 
60 days pending appeal.  In terms of the immunity provisions, Scott argued that this was an area 
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that ―should be reviewed by the courts, not decided here in Congress.‖   The lack of meaningful 
court review, in Scott‘s view, was reason enough to defeat the bill. 
 
Scott‘s sentiments were certainly shared by other congressmen and women.  Congresswoman 
Zoe Lofgren rose in opposition to this bill, stating that she could not support the legislation's 
―deeply flawed provisions relating to the issue of immunity for telecommunications 
companies.‖230 Under the current legislation, Lofgren argued, the role of the Court would be 
relegated to that of a rubber stamp for the Administration.  The review process provided in the 
bill, according to Lofgren was really just window dressing:  
 
…an empty formality that will lead to a preordained conclusion, dismissing all cases with 
no examination on their merits.   Under this bill, the courts are not allowed to ask whether 
the conduct of the corporations who assisted was in fact legal. They may only note that 
the administration says that it was legal. In other words, the decision on the ultimate 
question of legality, a decision the Constitution dedicates to the judiciary, will instead be 
made by the executive branch with the judiciary acting as a rubber stamp.
 231
    
 
Despite the objections raised by Lofgren, Scott and others, concerning the lack of judicial 
oversight and the immunity provisions, the supporters of the act ultimately prevailed.  For them, 
the legislative compromise, as it was being touted, although imperfect, at least garnered some 
oversight by the courts.  The immunity provisions would secure the participation of the 
telecommunications companies.  Even though their participation was required by law, the 
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chances of a company suing the Government on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional 
seemed slight at the time.  On June 20
th
 2008 the amendments to FISA passed the House of 
Representatives by a vote of 293 to 129.
232
   
 
Having just passed in the House of Representatives, the legislation now proceeded to the Senate 
for approval.  Speaking in support of the bill, Senator Kyl presented the FAA as being ―a law that 
our Nation needs.‖ According to Kyl, the new bill would allow ―immediate and real-time 
surveillance of overseas targets as soon as they become apparent in the course of a foreign- 
intelligence investigation.‖  Noting a 2007 FISC decision that interpreted FISA to apply to 
foreign-to-foreign communications routed through the U.S., Kyl stated that the new legislation 
would correct this problem.   Although the problem which Kyl cites is an obvious one, which 
would no doubt require amendment, he seems to question the Court‘s competence in being able 
to make certain judgements regarding intelligence collection.  Kyl notes that the Court would 
provide the procedural oversight, but in terms of the new legislation‘s removal of probable cause 
determinations, Kyl believes that the Court should: 
 
…not be second-guessing intelligence judgments, and should not be imposing procedures 
or making demands that will consume intelligence resources and divert agents from their 
primary mission. This limited role should also allow the FISA Court to decide these cases 
very quickly, minimizing the burden on both the intelligence community and on those 
judges who are assigned to the FISA Court.
233
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In making this statement, Kyl would seem to be confirming Congressman Lofgren‘s concern 
about the Court being turned into the rubber stamp for the Administration.  Whatever the 
oversight function Kyl envisioned for the Court, it would appear to be minimal at best. 
 
Senator Jay Rockefeller, speaking in favor of the bill from the Senate floor on July 8, 2008, was 
quick to point out that:  
 
…the President made the very misguided decision to create a secret surveillance program 
that circumvented the judicial review process and authorization required by FISA and was 
kept from the full congressional oversight committees.
 234
 
 
For Rockefeller it was understandable that many congressmen and women would be upset by the 
President's ‗go it alone‘ approach.  That being said, the business now before the Senate required 
immediate action.  According to Rockefeller, the new legislation would accomplish three 
important goals with respect to the President's warrantless program: 
 
1. Provides a means for learning the truth about the President's program as it requires the 
relevant Inspectors General of the various elements of the intelligence community to 
submit an unclassified report; 
2. Tightens the exclusivity of the FISA law, making it improbable for any future President to 
argue that acting outside of FISA is lawful; 
3. Addresses the problems the President's decision has caused for the telecommunications 
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companies that were told their cooperation was both legal and necessary to prevent 
another terrorist attack.
235
  
 
Whether or not the legislation would actually go far enough in terms of meeting these goals was 
debatable, and there were certainly a number of senators who took issue with the bill.  Among 
them, Senator Patrick Leahy proved to be a vocal opponent.  In his remarks on the Senate floor, 
Leahy made his discontent known.  The idea that there would be no accountability for either the 
Administration or the telecoms who participated in the warrantless surveillance program was 
disconcerting for Leahy because it would no doubt result in the dismissal of ongoing cases.  If 
the lawsuits were unable to proceed, then it would be certain that no court would ever be in a 
position to review whether the program itself was legal.  According to Leahy:  
  
…the bill would have the affect of ensuring that this administration is never called to 
answer for its actions – never held accountable in a court of law.236 
 
By violating the provisions of FISA, Leahy argued that the President, consistent with 
Youngstown, had sought to act in an area in which Congress had already acted and exercised its 
authority, thereby reducing presidential power to the ‗lowest ebb.‘   If a court had an opportunity 
to review the legality of the TSP in light of the President‘s decision to bypass FISA, Leahy did 
not believe that the President‘s action would be upheld on the basis of his Commander-in-Chief 
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powers.
 237
 
 
Leahy expressed his frustration over the Administration‘s efforts to ensure that Congress ―could 
not effectively review the legality of the program.‖ 238  He also noted that, in attempting to 
investigate the TSP, the Judiciary Committee‘s efforts to obtain the necessary information to 
evaluate the administration‘s legal arguments were stonewalled.  His comment concerning the 
attempts to issue subpoenas is telling:   
 
Indeed, Senator Specter, when he was chairman of the Judiciary Committee, prepared 
subpoenas for the telecommunications carriers to obtain information, simply because the 
administration would not tell us directly what it had done.  But those subpoenas were never 
issued; Vice President Cheney intervened to undercut Senator Specter and prevent the 
Committee from voting on them.
239
   
 
Senator Russ Feingold similarly was concerned about the impact that this legislation would have.  
Referring to his role on the Intelligence and Judiciary Committees, Feingold felt that he was in a 
good position to comment on the changes being proposed to FISA as one of the few members of 
the Senate who had been fully briefed on the TSP.  Because of the classified nature of the 
program, Feingold was not in a position to publicly discuss the details of the program, but he did 
warn his colleagues that if more ―information was declassified that members of the Senate would 
regret their having passed this legislation.‖240 
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Publicly, all I can say is that I have serious concerns about how those activities may have 
impacted the civil liberties of Americans. If we grant these new powers to the 
government and the effects become known to the American people, we will realize what 
a mistake it was, of that I am sure.
241
 
 
Several attempts were made by individual senators to modify the legislation.  Senator Arlen 
Specter proposed limiting retroactive immunity for telecoms to cases where a Federal court had 
determined such assistance as being constitutional.  Senator Bingaman proposed that the 
Congress legislate that the courts stay any pending cases against certain telecommunications 
companies until the final report of the Inspector General on the President's Surveillance Program 
is submitted to Congress.  And finally, Senators Dodd, Feingold, and Leahy jointly proposed an 
amendment to remove the immunity provisions from the act altogether.  These amendments were 
rejected by the White House which issued a press release stating that the President would veto 
any such amendments to the bill as passed by the House.
242
  With the threat of a veto looming, 
and the pre-election jitters on the part of some Democrats who were afraid of appearing weak on 
national security issues, it is little wonder that the bill passed with a vote of 69 – 28 in the Senate 
on July 9
th
 2008, receiving the President‘s signature the next day.243  The only saving grace left 
for those who opposed the bill was that it too would sunset, like much of the other controversial 
legislation of the post 9/11 period, in 2012.  This would allow time for the next Administration to 
review the legislation, and to decide if it was indeed effective, let alone constitutional.   
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Legislative Provisions 
With the passage of the FAA, the Administration‘s concerns over legal liability for the telecoms 
were now addressed.  With the immunity protections for the telecoms secured, the potential for 
the class action lawsuits then before the courts to proceed (assuming that the courts found the 
law itself to be consistent with the constitution) was slight.  Although the press coverage focused 
largely on the issue of telecom immunity, the new law entrenched the role of FISC as laid out in 
the PAA, a role which had more to do with seeing that the procedures inherent in the use of FISA 
certifications were followed than it had to do with the substantive nature of the certifications 
themselves. 
 
With the oversight role of the FISC having been greatly diminished, it seemed only fitting that 
the new law require some sort of additional check on the President‘s Surveillance Program.  That 
check was a provision in the legislation requiring an annual review by the ―head of each element 
of the intelligence community,‖ a reference to the Inspectors General of the Department of 
Justice, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, the National Security Agency (NSA), 
the Department of Defense (DOD), and any other element that participated in the President's 
Surveillance Program.  The provision required these officers to: 
 
1. conduct a review of, among other things, the establishment, implementation, product, and 
use of the product of the Program; and 
2. provide an interim and final review report to the intelligence and judiciary committees
244
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With the issuance of such a report a year away at that point, the Bush Administration could 
celebrate for the moment.  As the President professed at the signing of the FAA: 
 
Today I'm pleased to sign landmark legislation that is vital to the security of our 
people. The bill will allow our intelligence professionals to quickly and effectively 
monitor the communications of terrorists abroad while respecting the liberties of 
Americans here at home.
245
 
 
For President Bush, the passage of this legislation was confirmation that his surveillance 
programs (the TSP being one such program) now had the official blessing of Congress.  
Although the programs had previously been operating outside of FISA, the passage of the new 
law brought the programs within the scope of the act while maintaining a minimal level of 
oversight by the FISC.    
 
Legal Outcomes: Ruling of the FISA Court   
In a most unusual move in January 2009, the Foreign Intelligence Review Court (the appeal 
court of FISC) released its August 2008 ruling that telecommunications companies must comply 
with government requests to monitor the electronic communications of individuals in terrorism-
related investigations.
246
  The ruling was in response to an unidentified company's 2007 
challenge of the PAA on Fourth Amendment grounds.  In that case the company refused to 
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cooperate with government demands for information in the absence of a warrant under the 
PAA.
247
  
 
According to the New York Times: 
 
The company was forced to comply, under threat of contempt, while it challenged the law 
in the FISA court, the opinion noted. The company argued that the law violated the 
constitutional rights of its customers and that the act placed too much power and discretion 
in the hands of the executive branch. It also raised specific privacy problems, which the 
court ruling did not identify, that could occur under the surveillance directives it had 
received from the government. 
248
 
 
Although the ruling was released after the legislation in question had been replaced with the 
FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA), its finding that the Fourth Amendment's requirement for 
warrants is not applicable to foreign collection of intelligence involving Americans is the first of 
its kind.
249
 
 
As a result of the privacy safeguards that the Administration had put in place, the Court rejected 
the claim that the Act violated the Fourth Amendment.  Although the ruling was narrowly 
focused on the application of the new legislation, and did not comment on the President‘s 
constitutional powers in ordering domestic wiretapping without warrants, the New York Times 
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quoted Peter Hoekstra, the ranking Republican on the House Intelligence Committee, as saying 
that the ruling ―reinforces the significant, bipartisan political consensus‖ in favor of the 
president's broad assertions of wiretapping powers.
250
 
 
Dismissal of the Class Action Lawsuits 
In addition to the Foreign Intelligence Review Court‘s decision, the changes to FISA law have 
also had an impact on the multiple class action lawsuits facing the telecoms that participated 
in the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP).  The wrangling over the legality of those 
telecoms participation in the TSP, at least for the moment while pending appeal, has ended in 
some three dozen class action suits being thrown out in June 2009.  Despite the fact that 
―consumer and privacy groups raised important constitutional issues in their claims,‖ Chief 
Judge Vaughn R. Walker of the Federal District Court in Northern California, ruled ―that 
Congress had left no doubt about its ‗unequivocal intention‘ when it passed a measure last 
summer giving immunity to phone carriers in the wiretapping program.‖ 251  Indeed the FAA 
has achieved its primary purpose: the granting of retroactive immunity. 
 
Ethical Concerns 
Although the Act may have achieved its primary purpose (the granting of retroactive immunity), 
many ethical questions remain concerning whether or not the President acted within his 
constitutional authority, or indeed overstepped his bounds.
 252
  By passing the FAA in its current 
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form, Congress effectively removed any ability of the courts to rule on this constitutional issue 
because the new legislation clarified Congress‘s intention which was to legitimize the President‘s 
actions through the granting of retroactive immunity to the telecommunications companies who 
participated in the program. 
 
Had Congress not passed this legislation, the courts would have been able to assess the legality 
of the President‘s actions according to the legal framework laid out by James E. Baker in the 
previous chapter, that is, to assess whether or not the President was acting within the bounds of 
his Commander-in-Chief powers.  The passage of this legislation has meant that a definitive 
answer as to whether or not the courts would have deemed such actions constitutional will never 
be forthcoming. 
 
The utilitarian defense that continued cooperation on the part of the telecoms required the 
passage of the FAA, faces the same problems as the utilitarian arguments for the original Patriot 
Act or for the operation of the President‘s Surveillance Program (PSP) prior to their disclosure.  
The actual benefits of the FAA cannot be assessed if the information required to do so is secret.  
Therefore, it is impossible to really assess these measures in any meaningful sense because the 
knowledge required to do so (in order to formulate any kind of actual utilitarian calculus) is 
unavailable. These examples only work to illustrate why public debate about ‗trade offs‘ in the 
national security v. civil liberties is so frustrating as an intellectual exercise. 
 
From a contractarian view, the PSPs might have been saved if, as James E. Baker notes, the 
courts found such programs to have been justified under the President‘s Commander-in-Chief 
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powers.  The passage of the PAA and the subsequent FAA has made any attempt to answer this 
question in a meaningful way a moot point. Although the public will never have an answer to 
this question from the courts, the ethical questions concerning potential abuse of presidential 
power remain.  The impact that this episode in American history will have on arguments 
concerning the limits of this power for future presidencies is yet to be tested. 
 
In all three of the case studies examined in this paper, questions of proportionality are of central 
importance if there is ever to be any meaningful discussion of achieving a balance in the debate 
over liberty versus security.  Although much of the debate has been framed using utilitarian and 
contractarian / rights-based arguments, these two ethical theories are often viewed as 
incompatible or competing theories.  In my next chapter I take an alternative view, one that sees 
both theories as contributing to an applied ethical framework through the use of practical 
proportionality tests which can be applied by the courts in their decision making.   
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Part IV: 
 
 
 
 
 
THE FUTURE OF PRIVACY IN POST 9/11 AMERICA 
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Chapter 7 
 
Privacy Rights and Limits of Government Intrusion 
 
The concept of the right to privacy was first articulated in the American legal literature over a 
century ago by Samuel Warren and Louis D. Brandeis.
253
  Concern over how technology was 
being used to capture private information necessitated, in their view, an examination of the ways 
in which technological advances could allow intrusions into an individual‘s private realm, and 
the ways in which the law could be used to prevent such intrusions by upholding the right to 
privacy.  Today we live in an age where technological change is rapid and ever advancing.   As 
stated in the preceding chapters, the ability of the Government to collect huge swaths of data 
through domestic legislation such as the Patriot Act, and foreign intelligence information 
through FISA, the PAA and the subsequent FAA raises numerous privacy questions for 
Americans. 
 
The future of privacy for post 9/11 America is largely dependent upon there being some 
mechanism for government accountability and oversight in areas where data collection and 
surveillance are conducted.  This is not simply a matter of protecting the ‗right to privacy;‘ it is 
also a matter of respecting the rule of law.  If there is agreement that Government should be open 
and accountable to the people, the question remains, how may such openness and accountability 
be achieved in an age of terrorism?  Furthermore, what are the boundaries limiting government 
intrusion on privacy rights in times of heightened security concerns?  
The simple solution seems to be that the Government cannot be above the law – that it should be 
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held accountable in a court of law.  That said, as we saw in the last chapter, Congress, by passing 
the FAA, effectively stripped the Court of any ability to rule on the legality of the President‘s 
Surveillance Program (PSP) because it legalized the President‘s activity prior to any court ruling 
on such activity.  Retroactive legislation which prevents a court from ruling on constitutional 
matters seems to flout the very idea of the rule of law and the supremacy of the courts in 
interpreting the Constitution.  The only saving grace that we may have here is that Congress, 
through its secret session, may have had very good security reasons for protecting the PSPs so 
that their details would never become known.  
 
The Path Forward 
In writing about the post 9/11 period one needs to remain mindful that the attacks which took 
place on September 11
th
, 2001 have no doubt left an indelible mark on the American psyche.  In 
order to advance a means for moving forward there is no simple calculus for how to balance 
liberty and security since both are equally important.  That does not mean that there is no way 
forward, or that the discussion of the two will not bear fruit; it is merely to say that this 
dissertation does not provide a calculus.  What it aims to do is to advocate a test for achieving 
some kind of proportionality that is compatible with protecting the security of Americans while 
at the same time respecting their rights to privacy. 
 
The potential for catastrophic consequences from acts of terrorism has reached a new peak, on 
par with acts of war perpetrated by individual states.  As was seen on 9/11, the need for some 
sort of pre-emptive surveillance is crucial in order to prevent such attacks.  That said, the need 
for oversight and accountability to ensure that such pre-emptive collection of data is within the 
  
144 
 
 
scope of the law is paramount.  Several authors have advanced the idea of incorporating the 
proportionality of a Terry stop into electronic surveillance investigations where Fourth 
Amendment rights may be infringed.  In this chapter I seek to build upon their ideas with a 
proposal that the courts use a more rigorous form of proportionality standard than that which the 
Terry stop currently provides.  The proportionality model which I advocate is one that seeks to 
address both the contractarian and utilitarian concerns that have shaped the ‗liberty versus 
security‘ debate.  Rather than inventing a new legal test, I look to the two pronged test as laid out 
in the Canadian case of R. v. Oakes
254
 which seeks to do precisely that: balance the competing 
ethical concerns in cases where an individuals' rights may be limited under the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
255
  The resulting new proportionality model that I am 
advocating, although based on Canadian rather than American jurisprudence, is one that I believe 
it still applicable as it is merely an ethical test to be used in the balancing of competing 
contractarian and utilitarian claims.  Although I have opted to use the Canadian proportionality 
test, it should be noted that there is an overwhelming mass of legal doctrine supporting the 
principle of proportionality from various foreign jurisdictions.
256
 
 
Terry v. Ohio:
257
 Proportionality 
In the seminal case of Terry v. Ohio (1968),
258
 the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Fourth 
Amendment prohibition on unreasonable searches and seizures had not been violated in a case of 
a stop and frisk where a police officer had reasonable suspicion that a crime was about to be 
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committed.  In Terry, a plain clothes police officer observed two men who he believed were 
―casing‖ a store front with the intention of committing an armed robbery of the store.  Upon a pat 
down
259
 of the two men‘s clothing weapons were discovered and seized.    The court ruled that 
such searches could be conducted without probable cause, so long as the officer had a reasonable 
suspicion that a crime had been, was being, or was about to be committed.  Reasonable suspicion 
in such cases could not be based on mere intuition or a hunch, but rather had to be based on 
―specific and articulable facts.‖ 260  In its ruling the Court found that ―there is ‗no ready test for 
determining reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search (or seize) against the 
invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.‘‖261   
 
The idea of incorporating the reasonableness of a search and seizure into the discussion of 
balancing liberty and security concerns is one that authors such as Christopher Slobogin, K.A. 
Taipale, and Stephanie Cooper Blum have advocated.  Slobogin in his work, Privacy at Risk, sets 
out a framework for proportionality that is built on two propositions.  The first proposition is that 
the interest that the Fourth Amendment protects is security from unjustified government 
infringement on individuals‘ property, autonomy (in the sense of ability to control one‘s 
movements), and privacy.  The second proposition is that the greater the threat to that security, 
the greater justification the Government should have to show.
 262
    
 
Starting with these two propositions Slobogin seeks to use Terry v. Ohio as a case for 
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proportionality that is compatible with any limitation on Fourth Amendment rights, one that is 
not just limited to a brief stop and frisk but one that might be applicable to various forms of 
government surveillance.  His first proposition suggests that we need to protect against 
unjustified intrusions upon the right – but does not suggest that no intrusion would ever be 
permissible.  His second proposition suggests that any relaxation of the Fourth Amendment in 
the name of national security should not be automatic.  That is to say, the Government requires 
legal justification for any intrusion upon the right in question.  To go back to the Court‘s 
decision, that would mean that the Government would still need to demonstrate that it had in its 
possession ‗specific and articulable‘ facts before it could place any limitation on a Fourth 
Amendment right. 
For Taipale, the use of a reasonable suspicion standard as found in Terry would combine the 
statutory mechanism for congressional authorization and oversight with an explicit statutory 
basis for judicial orders and review.
 263
  What is interesting here is that Taipale‘s proposal also 
incorporates the idea that ―legitimate foreign intelligence requirements can be met without 
resorting to unilateral secret executive branch approvals or by shoehorning ‗innovative‘ solutions 
not explicitly anticipated under FISA.‖264  The idea of placing the ability to determine 
reasonableness, in this case balancing the need to search (or seize) against the intrusion that such 
a search presents for Fourth Amendment rights, back in the hands of the court is a promising 
one. 
 
The analogy of using a traditional Terry stop, when trying to decide whether a warrantless search 
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is justified, is one that Cooper Blum believes could be useful in any future amendment of FISA.  
According to Blum, ―Congress should amend FISA to require probable cause that a terrorist (not 
just a foreign national as the FAA currently requires) has had contact with a U.S. person.‖265 
Cooper Blum incorporates Taipale's Terry stop suggestion, as a means for continued surveillance 
for a given period on the U.S. person to determine if he is a terrorist.  The use of a Terry stop in 
the conducting of electronic surveillance, under these circumstances, would allow an authorized 
period for additional monitoring or initial investigation to determine whether the 
communications have any intelligence value.
266
 As Cooper Blum notes, ―if this follow-up 
surveillance revealed that the U.S. person was an agent of a foreign power, then a traditional 
FISA warrant could be obtained based on probable cause.‖267  The end result would allow that 
―probable cause could still be the predicate standard for FISC ex ante review-but it would apply 
to a very different inquiry than is currently required under FISA and the FAA.‖ 268  
 
As Slobogin, Taipale, and Cooper Blum note, that the idea of a Terry stop equivalent for 
electronic surveillance provides a useful analogy for potential FISA and FAA modification in 
instances involving U.S. persons (since these persons‘ communications would be outside the 
scope of FISA) . If applied to cases involving electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence 
purposes, the flexibility that this new standard would allow – that is a shift from probable cause 
to reasonable suspicion - would enable the Government to engage in electronic surveillance for 
the purposes of identifying whether a U.S. person was actually engaged in the planning, and / or 
commission of, or had already committed a terrorist act. 
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A More Rigorous Proportionality:  Oakes Test 
The Court in Terry v. Ohio found that there is no ready test for determining reasonableness other 
than balancing the need to search (or seize) against the infringement of the right in question.  The 
court, in its ruling, has clarified that there must be proportionality in terms of the Government‘s 
need to protect public safety and security against any infringement of an individual‘s Fourth 
Amendment rights. The need to balance these competing interests is evident in the Court‘s 
decision; however the balancing mechanism used in Terry could be further clarified by 
incorporating another balancing mechanism used by the Canadian judiciary to ascertain when a 
protected Charter right may be subject to limitation.   
 
In the Canadian context the use of the Oakes Test for determining when a Charter right
269
 may be 
subject to limitation, is compatible with the need for proportionality as demonstrated in Terry.  In 
the case of R. v. Oakes,
270
 David Edwin Oakes was arrested by police officers who found eight 
one-gram vials of hash oil in his possession.  At that time Section 8 of the Narcotics Act 
stipulated that once the court has determined that an individual was in possession of illegal 
narcotics, the burden of proof was on the individual to demonstrate that he or she was not in 
possession of them for the purposes of trafficking (a much more serious crime).  Oakes 
challenged that the reverse onus of proof was contrary to Section 11 (d) of the Canadian Charter 
of Rights and Freedoms, which guarantees the right to be ―presumed innocent until proven 
guilty.‖ 271   In addressing the Charter challenge, the Supreme Court of Canada had to consider 
whether Section 8 of the Narcotics Act could be saved under Section 1 of the Charter which 
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states that: 
 
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in 
it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in 
a free and democratic society.
272
  
 
In addressing this concern the Court developed what has come to be known as the Oakes Test 
which is a test that is used to determine the constitutionality of legal limitations on Charter 
Rights as a whole (although this case dealt with a search and seizure, the test is applicable to all 
Charter rights).  This test is the model used in Canada to determine if a limitation by the 
Government on a protected Charter right is a reasonable limitation of the right being infringed.  
The Court found that the Crown must be able to demonstrate, on the balance of probabilities, the 
following: 
 
1. Purpose or Objective of the Law 
The law must be a response to a “pressing and substantial” problem in order to consider 
overriding a Charter Right  
 
2.   Proportionality  
In order to arrive at a calculation of the suitability of the means used to pursue the Law‘s 
objective, the following three questions must be answered: 
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(a) Are the means rational and non arbitrary? 
(b)  Is there minimal impairment to the right?  
(c)  Is the good that will be achieved by these means sufficient to outweigh the negative effects 
caused by the infringement of the right in question?  
 
Since the test is really an ethical test that seeks to balance the contractarian concerns (upholding 
the right itself) against the utilitarian concerns (protecting the greater good), its application I 
would argue should not be simply limited to the Canadian context.  Indeed the Court's ruling in 
Terry v. Ohio, which called for balancing the need to search (or seize) against the invasion which 
the search or seizure entails, demonstrates that the Court knew it needed to address both concerns 
making it compatible with the proportionality test as laid out in the Oakes Test. 
 
When applying the Oakes Test to the Fourth Amendment cases, the following two objectives 
must be satisfied in order to override the right in question:  (1) the law must be a response to a 
pressing and substantial concern; (2) the law must be proportional, that is, that the good that will 
be achieved by the law in question must outweigh the negative effects caused by the law.   
Proportionality is further determined by a three pronged proportionality test (outlined above).  
The first prong of this test requires that the limit on the right be rationally connected to the 
legislative objective of the law.  Second, the Government must demonstrate that the limit on the 
right in question represents the least restrictive means of achieving this objective. And lastly, the 
third prong examines whether the collective benefits to society as a whole outweigh its 
individual costs.
273
  The Oakes test combines both contractarian (2.a & b) and utilitarian 
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elements (2.c) in its assessment of the overall proportionality of any legislation which impinges 
on a protected right.     
 
The Oakes test has been applied to Canadian cases ranging from commercial expression (Irwin 
Toy Ltd. V. Quebec
274
), to hate speech (R. v. Keegstra
275
), to obscenity (R. v. Butler
276
), and 
child pornography (R. v. Sharpe
277
), among others. In each of these Charter cases, the purpose or 
objective of the law in Part 1 of the Oakes test was not the driving issue, rather it was the 
proportionality tests as laid out in Part 2 which concerned the court. 
 
The case of Ford v. Quebec,
278
 is a prime example of a Charter case
279
 where the purpose or 
objective of the law was insupportable when applying the proportionality test as laid out in 
Oakes.  In that case, the Supreme Court of Canada found that Quebec‘s objective of protecting 
the French language was sound, but the means with which it attempted to do so did not meet the 
criteria laid out in the proportionality test in Oakes.  Although there was a rational connection to 
the law‘s objective, the preservation of the French language, there was no evidence that the 
exclusive use of French-language signage was the only means available to achieve that purpose.  
By contrast, the predominant display of the French language in addition to other languages 
(perhaps in smaller font) would be sufficient to achieving that purpose.  A total ban on the use of 
other languages could not be viewed as a minimal impairment on the right to freedom of 
expression.  Furthermore, the province‘s outright ban on the use of English signage 
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disproportionately disadvantaged the English minority in the province. 
Slobogin, Taipale, and Cooper Blum point to the need for a proportionality standard in 
conducting electronic surveillance; however the level of proportionality afforded by Terry, I 
would argue, is insufficient to this task.  If we examine the circumstances in Terry and apply 
them against the Oakes Test criteria, this becomes clearer.  In terms of the purpose or objective 
of the law (Part 1. of the Oakes Test),  Terry allows for a reduction of the probable cause 
standard to one of reasonable suspicion in order to allow law enforcement officials to apply 
investigative techniques in situations where they believe  a crime has, is, or will be committed by 
a potentially armed suspect.  The case could be made that combating this type of crime is a 
―pressing and substantial‖ concern for society as a whole and thus requires a relaxation in the 
standard so that law enforcement officials have an additional tool at their disposal to best address 
the problem.  In terms of the proportionality aspect (Part 2.) Terry only really addresses the last 
prong of the proportionality test (2.c), that is the utilitarian aspect of the test.   
 
Applying Terry to the proportionality test in Part 2 of the Oakes test is revealing.  In responding 
to each of the questions posed in Part 2, I found the following: 
 
2. (a)  Are the means rational and non arbitrary? 
The stop and frisk for weapons is connected to protecting the safety of the officers investigating 
a person who they believe has, is, or is about to commit a crime.  The lowered standard from one 
of probable cause to reasonable suspicion is deemed necessary for the protection of the officers.  
The reduced standard also ensures that the exclusionary rule
280
 is not applicable on the grounds 
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of unlawful search and seizure.  The Court has specified that the only restriction on this reduced 
standard is that the officers must be able to demonstrate ―specific and articulable facts‖281 - this 
reasonableness criterion is one which the court has said there is ―no ready test for determining 
reasonableness other than by balancing the need to search [or seize] against the invasion which 
the search [or seizure] entails.‖282  What would have otherwise been a contractarian test in Oakes 
would now seem to rest on a utilitarian calculus as a result of this last criterion, which is slightly 
problematic because the ‗right‘ is now subject to a weighing of harms rather than having the 
emphasis remain on whether or not the right has actually been infringed in any absolute sense.  
 
2. (b)   Is there minimal impairment to the right?  
The Court in Terry has pointed to the need to balance the ‗search (or seize) against the invasion 
which the search (or seizure) entails‘283 suggesting that minimal impairment to the right is key to 
the successful application of the Terry stop standard; however the court does not enter into a 
discussion of possible alternatives that might take the place of a Terry stop.   
 
2. (c)    Is the good that will be achieved by these means sufficient to outweigh the negative 
effects caused by the infringement of the right in question? 
The implication in Terry is that the answer is yes - that a stop and frisk which results in 
apprehension of an individual who has, is, or is about to commit a crime and is believed to be 
armed with a weapon outweighs the negative effects so long as it is based on reasonable 
suspicion rather than a mere hunch.    
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A simple application of the grounds laid out in Oakes, would demonstrate the utilitarian nature of 
the original decision in Terry.  The real strength in Oakes is that it combines both the 
contractarian and utilitarian tests in order to provide a better overall protection for rights against 
purely utilitarian reasoning.  Oakes provides a test which is easily generalizable and transferable, 
making application of the test by subsequent courts consistent - unlike the American decisions 
that have cited Terry in their rationale.  These courts have worked to expand the definition of a 
Terry stop by extrapolation rather than through the application of a clearly defined test like the 
one laid out in Oakes.
284
   
 
In the Canadian context the Oakes test is used to test limitations on all Canadian Charter rights, 
not just those involving search and seizure, which would require that the principles laid out in the 
test could be applied to all such protected rights.  The reasoning implied in the Terry stop is 
utilitarian in nature; combining it with the contractarian principles in the Oakes test would yield 
better protections for the Fourth Amendment rights in a way that is generalizable enough to 
easily encompass electronic surveillance under FISA.  A modified Oakes test could take the 
following form:   
 
1. Purpose or Objective of the Law 
The law must be a response to a “pressing and substantial” problem in order to reduce the 
standard of probable cause to one of reasonable suspicion under the Fourth Amendment.  
 
 
                                                          
284
    The Supreme Court used the precedent set in Terry v. Ohio as the grounds for its ruling in Michigan v. Long, 
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2. Proportionality  
In order to determine the suitability of this lowered standard, the infringing statute must: 
(a)  be rational and non arbitrary 
(b)  result in minimal impairment to the right  
(c)  demonstrate that the good that will be achieved by such infringement sufficiently 
outweighs any deleterious effect on the Fourth Amendment.  
 
This modified version of the Oakes test, unlike the Terry stop advocated by Slobogin and others, 
would provide the courts with a more rigorous tool for calculating the proportionality of any 
proposed limitation on Fourth Amendment rights under FISA regarding the standard accorded to 
electronic surveillance: reasonable suspicion v. probable cause.  If the proposed amendments 
were able to prevail overt what is essentially a combination of contractarian and utilitarian tests 
the court would be in a better position to actually determine the reasonableness of a search or 
seizure rather than simply having to appeal to a utilitarian calculus for ―balancing the need to 
search (or seize) against the invasion which the search (or seizure) entails.‖285   
                                                          
285
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Chapter 8 
 
The Future of Privacy in Post 9/11 America:  Conclusion 
 
What are the boundaries limiting government intrusion on privacy rights and how are such 
boundaries drawn?   
 
As a central research question, this is a complicated and difficult question to attempt to answer.  
Regardless, it is a question that needs to be asked.  In conducting my research, I focused on three 
case studies in point:  the Patriot Act; The Terrorist Surveillance Program (and subsequent 
President‘s Surveillance Program); and the amendments to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Act that resulted from the revelation by the New York Times that such warrantless surveillance 
programs existed.  In each of my case studies I examined the above research question in a way 
that was narrowly focused on the Government‘s use of electronic surveillance and its impact on 
protected Fourth Amendment rights.   
    
The ethical, legal and political considerations with regard to the collection, classification, and 
dissemination of intelligence information are many.  Clearly the Government has a duty to 
protect the national security of its citizens, but that duty must also be balanced against a 
competing duty to uphold the Constitution.  In the American context, the place of Fourth 
Amendment rights in foreign intelligence investigations has been vigorously debated in the post 
9/11 period.  The need to balance competing rights claims is not simply an academic exercise; it 
is of practical concern at a time in which heightened security concerns have indeed resulted in an 
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encroachment on civil liberties. 
   
Initially 9/11 provided the exceptional circumstances that seemed to justify a reduction in 
privacy rights in the interest of national security.  However, with the passage of time, and the 
December 2005 revelation in the New York Times that the Government had been conducting 
warrantless surveillance on American citizens, those same privacy rights have been brought to 
the forefront.  The need for a public discussion about the reasonableness of such limitations on 
civil liberties, particularly Fourth Amendment rights in the face of terrorist threats, is of the 
utmost importance because without it we cannot determine the boundaries beyond which such 
encroachments cease to be reasonable.   
 
Academics from a variety of disciplines have contributed to this public discussion with the vast 
amount of resulting scholarship focusing on the legal and political concerns inherent in this 
debate.  This dissertation has sought to build upon this literature, examining not only the 
discussion of the legal and political, but also the ethical constraints that arise from the 
Government‘s use of electronic surveillance in gathering its intelligence information.  That is to 
say, rather than simply looking for a constitutional basis for any discussion of legislative or 
policy reforms affecting such surveillance, that we also should be looking for a moral basis in 
any discussion of a reduction in privacy rights.   
 
Developing an Ethical Framework 
As an applied study in information ethics, this dissertation has sought to provide an ethical 
framework that incorporates the individual rights-based (contractarian) concerns along with the 
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collective consequentialist (utilitarian) concerns that arise from any threat to national security.  
This is not to suggest that other ethical theories could not have been used to address this 
question, for example, Kantian and Communitarian ethical theories could be used to address the 
same questions as is evidenced by Chapter 3 of this dissertation.  The underlying rationale for 
trying to incorporate the utilitarian and contractarian approaches was based largely on the fact 
that these two ethical approaches have been used at cross purposes with no ground for 
compromise.  If the choices are framed as civil liberties versus national security, there clearly 
will be no room for compromise.   
 
 The Bush Administration‘s defense of its various legislative and other anti-terrorist measures 
was visibly consequentialist.  With its constant juxtaposition of liberty versus security, the Bush 
Administration frequently demonstrated its tendency to treat the Constitution as an impediment 
rather than a guide.  With seemingly unchecked presidential wartime powers in a  perpetual state 
of ‗War on Terrorism,‘ there was little attempt by the Bush Administration to reconcile these two 
ethical frameworks except to pay lip service to the idea that somehow rights still mattered.   
 
As the case studies examined in this dissertation demonstrate, the utilitarian ‗prevention of harm‘ 
formed the cornerstone of that Administration‘s ethical arguments, be it in the form of perpetual 
gag order provisions under the Patriot Act, the rationale for the Terrorist Surveillance Program 
(among other secret Presidential Surveillance Programs (PSPs)) operating outside the purview of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC), or the resulting changes to the Foreign 
Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) to make any potentially illegal actions on the part of the 
Administration legal, at least retroactively. 
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Do the utilitarian arguments suffice?  As has been discussed throughout the dissertation, part of 
the problem in assessing whether or not the means used to prevent such harm to national security 
is justified is the fact that much of the information  required to make such a calculation is secret 
and therefore beyond the bounds of discussion.  That is not to diminish the Administration‘s 
need for secret information – clearly there is a need for that – but what  is most worrying, 
especially in light of the President‘s creation of a warrantless surveillance program, was the way 
in which the  Bush Administration chose to completely by-pass Congress and the courts in its 
pursuit of such intelligence gathering methods.  The lack of congressional and judicial oversight 
which would hold the Administration accountable for its actions is an issue that should cause 
concern, because it paves the road for potential abuses. 
 
Need for Checks and Balances 
 
What are the boundaries limiting government intrusion on privacy rights and how are such 
boundaries drawn?   
 
From a legal and political point of view, this research question implies that there should be some 
sort of check on government power.  The fundamental means by which the U.S. Constitution 
establishes such a check is through a division of powers.  By establishing a system of 
government with three distinct branches – executive, legislative and judicial – the founding 
fathers were clear in their intention to build a system that possessed the necessary checks and 
balances.  Thus any discussion on the limitation of government powers should also involve a 
discussion of all three branches and their ability to keep each other in check.  That is to say, that 
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except for any true instances of Presidential wartime powers, of the sort which James E. Baker 
describes, the executive does not have a monopoly on determining the limitation of Fourth 
Amendment rights in times of increased threats to the national security. 
 
All three branches of government need to be involved in the discussion of civil liberties in a time 
of heightened threats to national security.  The need for reasonableness in any attempt to override 
a constitutionally protected right, such as the Fourth Amendment, should be of the highest 
concern for each of these branches.  Building upon the suggestions put forth by authors such as 
Christopher Slobogin, K.A. Taipale, and Stephanie Cooper Blum, to incorporate the equivalent 
of a Terry stop for determining the reasonableness of electronic surveillance under FISA where 
American persons are involved, this dissertation has outlined the limitations of Terry and instead 
advocated the use of the Canadian Oakes test as a model for achieving a more rigorous form of 
proportionality test.   
 
The modified Oakes test as presented in Chapter 7 balances the contractarian concerns – that is 
the importance of the right being infringed, against the utilitarian concerns – that is the 
Government‘s need for limitation of the right in instances where a lack of limitation has the 
potential for great harm.  If the courts were to apply such a test in cases involving Fourth 
Amendment concerns in the area of electronic surveillance, I am quite certain that the application 
would be instructive to both the executive and legislative branches in their lawmaking.  Indeed, it 
would be desirable not least of all because it would permit them to engage in a balancing of 
public security and private rights that is not simply utilitarian.  The application of such a test 
works best if it is applied at the point where lawmakers are actually engaged in the drafting of 
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legislation.  At this stage, lawmakers can test to see if their legislation is indeed proportional 
before it reaches a stage where the courts are asked do so for them in a constitutional legal 
challenge.  The potential for this kind of proportionality test is of course not limited to FISA 
alone.  Although such a standard would no doubt have been useful in the early Patriot Act 
challenges, the introduction of such a standard at the present time would provide all three 
branches with a tool for assessing whether any potential override or limitation upon protected a 
right is indeed permissible under the Constitution and ethically based. 
 
Contribution to the Information Studies Literature 
With the introduction of the Patriot Act, there was a great deal of concern amongst library and 
information professionals regarding the impact that this legislation would have on privacy rights 
in America.  Professional associations like the American Library Association were quick to link 
the potential threat the act posed to patron privacy with new threats to intellectual freedom, 
freedom to read, and freedom of expression.
286
  These concerns were echoed in the scholarly 
information studies literature from an information policy perspective.
287
  One of the gaps that 
was apparent in the literature (both professional and scholarly) was any discussion of the ethical 
issues involved.  In conducting the literature review for this dissertation it became clear to me 
that the bulk of the literature (both in information studies and in other disciplines) focused on the 
debate surrounding liberty versus security from either a political or legal angle.  Work written 
from the political angle reflected a simple utilitarian calculus that paid insufficient attention to 
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the question of rights.  Work written from the legal angle paid insufficient attention to the 
common good.  In answering my research question concerning limits of government intrusion 
upon privacy rights, it was important to find some way of balancing Fourth Amendment rights 
against legitimate national security concerns in a manner that respects both utilitarian and 
contractarian  (rights-based) ethical concerns.   
 
Challenges and Limitations of Information Ethics Research 
There are many challenges in conducting research in the field of information ethics.  In selecting 
to conduct this research on U.S. foreign intelligence surveillance, it became evident that this 
issue could be examined through the different branches of ethics:  meta-ethical, normative and 
applied; and that within each of these branches it could be examined using a variety of different 
ethical approaches.  This research is focused on the combination of two specific normative 
ethical approaches because of their common application to U.S. foreign intelligence surveillance, 
but that is not to say that other approaches, such as Etzioni‘s Communitarian approach or a 
Kantian rules based approach, among others, could not have been used to conduct the same 
study.  However, as stated in Chapter 3, these approaches seemed insufficient to the task of 
trying to reconcile what appeared to be competing interests in the ‗liberty versus security‘ debate 
surrounding U.S. foreign intelligence surveillance.  That said, the decision to focus on utilitarian 
and contractarian approaches in this research was not arbitrary.  Given the way in which this 
debate was framed in the media, and the arguments being presented by the Government, special 
interest groups and scholars, it was important to try to acknowledge these competing claims.   
The idea of a proportionality test as a means for addressing the reasonableness of U.S. foreign 
intelligence surveillance is very appealing; however the test offered by the decision in Terry v. 
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Ohio is not without its limitations.  Upon closer examination this test does not adequately 
address the contractarian ethical concerns as laid out in Chapter 7.  In seeking to address both the 
utilitarian and contractarian concerns I opted to use the Canadian Oakes test because of my own 
familiarity with it as a Canadian.  That is not suggest that there are no other jurisdictions outside 
Canada that have proportionality tests which address both concerns - the Oakes test itself was 
inspired by German legal doctrine.
 288
  
 
In choosing to focus my attention in the dissertation on three case studies (The Patriot Act, the 
Terrorist Surveillance Program, and the amendments to FISA that resulted from the Protect 
America Act of 2007 and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008) there is also the potential challenge 
that the results of my study may be limited in their applicability to other case studies or to other 
jurisdictions.  Although I concede that the details of these American examples are unique to that 
country and came about as a result of the September 11
th
 attacks on that country, the use of a 
proportionality test which combines utilitarian and contractarian principles, such as the Oakes 
test (a Canadian legal test), is one which I believe has application beyond the case studies 
examined for this dissertation.   
 
Lastly, in writing about the post 9/11 period, I am well aware that my research area is highly 
political.  Throughout my study I have tried to be mindful of the fact that the legal, political and 
ethical criticisms I raise in my case examples could be viewed as being the product of bias.  I 
have tried throughout my research to mitigate this through the development of an ethical 
framework that is based on a proportionality test that takes into account both the contractarian 
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and utilitarian ethical concerns which shaped the ‗liberty versus security‘ debate.  It is my hope 
that this approach has resulted in a balanced examination of the ethical issues involved in the 
three case examples studied. 
 
Directions for Future Research 
The ethical framework used in this dissertation could act as a guide to future research for a host 
of applied issues in information policy where there is a clear tension between individual civil 
liberties and the collective good of society.   Contemporary issues regarding U.S. airport 
passenger screening, would be a natural extension of this research given the similar tensions 
between individual civil liberties and the need for protecting national security.  The Transport 
Security Agency‘s (TSA) introduction of full body imaging scanners, which show images of 
bodies through their clothes to reveal any hidden objects that might pose a threat to security, has 
alarmed civil liberties groups and resulted in a wave of complaints from air travelers, sparking a 
public debate over whether the measures have gone too far in their attempts to thwart potential 
terrorist attacks.
289
  
 
Additional areas of application could include, but are not limited to: racial and ethnic profiling 
(particularly of individuals of middle eastern origin) since September 11
th
; the use of data mining 
to determine patterns of behaviour through purchase and other transaction records in an effort to 
combat terrorism;
290
 and access to government information (especially in light of  information 
that has been reclassified and is no longer publicly available due to security concerns),
291
 to 
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name but a few areas where individual rights and national security interests have come into 
conflict. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
http://www.ala.org/ala/alonline/currentnews/newsarchive/2006abc/march2006ab/narahearing.cfm 
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APPENDICES 
 
 
The following appendices are a compilation of the actual Congressional Research Service 
Legislative Summaries provided to Congress.  For lengthier legislative summaries, only selected 
sections have been included where the text of the legislation is specifically relevant to the issues 
discussed in this dissertation.  The Case Summaries provided have been obtained through the 
Canadian Legal Information Institute (CanLII) and the Legal Information Institute (LII) 
databases.  Both CanLII and LII are non-profit organizations which strive to make legal 
information freely available to the public via the Internet in their respective countries: Canada 
and the U.S.  
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Appendix A. 
 
The U.S.A. PATRIOT ACT of 2001: 
 
The following is a list of selected sections as referenced in this dissertation, with 
annotations courtesy of the Congressional Research Service Legislative Summaries: 
 
(Sec. 214) Prohibits use of a pen register or trap and trace devices in any investigation to protect 
against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities that is conducted solely on 
the basis of activities protected by the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
 
(Sec. 215) Authorizes the Director of the FBI (or designee) to apply for a court order requiring 
production of certain business records for foreign intelligence and international terrorism 
investigations. Requires the Attorney General to report to the House and Senate Intelligence and 
Judiciary Committees semi-annually. 
 
(Sec. 412) Provides for mandatory detention until removal from the United States (regardless of 
any relief from removal) of an alien certified by the Attorney General as a suspected terrorist or 
threat to national security. Requires release of such alien after seven days if removal proceedings 
have not commenced, or the alien has not been charged with a criminal offense. Authorizes 
detention for additional periods of up to six months of an alien not likely to be deported in the 
reasonably foreseeable future only if release will threaten U.S. national security or the safety of 
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the community or any person. Limits judicial review to habeas corpus proceedings in the U.S. 
Supreme Court, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, or any district court with 
jurisdiction to entertain a habeas corpus petition. Restricts to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
District of Columbia the right of appeal of any final order by a circuit or district judge. 
 
(Sec. 505) Allows the FBI to request telephone toll and transactional records, financial records, 
and consumer reports in any investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine 
intelligence activities only if the investigation is not conducted solely on the basis of activities 
protected by the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution. 
 
The Library of Congress Thomas. ―Bill Summary and Status-107th Congress (2001-2002) HR  
 3162 CRS Summary.‖ October 24, 2001.  
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d107:HR03162:@@@D&summ2=m&>. 
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Appendix B. 
 
The Protect America Act of 2007: 
 
The following legislative summary is courtesy of the Congressional Research Service 
Legislative Summaries: 
 
Amends the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) to state that nothing under its 
definition of "electronic surveillance" shall be construed to encompass surveillance directed at a 
person reasonably believed to be located outside the United States.  Allows the Director of 
National Intelligence (DNI) and the Attorney General (AG), for periods up to one year, to 
authorize the acquisition of foreign intelligence information concerning persons outside the 
United States if the DNI and AG determine that: (1) there are reasonable procedures in place for 
determining that such acquisition concerns persons outside the United States, and such 
procedures will be subject to review by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (Court); (2) 
the acquisition does not constitute electronic surveillance; (3) the acquisition involves obtaining 
foreign intelligence information from or with the assistance of a communication service provider 
or other person who has access to communications; (4) a significant purpose of the acquisition is 
to obtain foreign intelligence information; and (5) the minimization procedures (procedures to 
ensure the smallest level of privacy intrusion while obtaining such information) to be used meet 
the definition of minimization procedures under FISA. Requires such determination to be 
certified and submitted to the Court. 
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Requires the AG to report to: (1) the Court the procedures by which the Government determines 
that such acquisitions do not constitute electronic surveillance; and (2) the congressional 
intelligence and judiciary committees semiannually concerning acquisitions made during the 
previous six-month period.  Terminates this Act 180 days after its enactment. Makes 
authorizations for the acquisition of information made by this Act, and directives issued pursuant 
to such authorizations, effective until their expiration. 
 
The Library of Congress Thomas. ―Bill Summary and Status: 110th Congress (2007-2008)  
S.1927 CRS Summary.‖ August 5, 2007. 
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:SN01927:@@@D&summ2=m&>. 
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Appendix C. 
USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act of 2005 
The following is a list of selected sections courtesy of the Congressional Research Service 
Legislative Summaries: 
 
Title I: USA PATRIOT Improvement and Reauthorization Act - (Sec. 102) Repeals the 
sunset date for (thus making permanent) the surveillance provisions of the USA PATRIOT Act, 
with the following exceptions. Provides for a four-year extension (through December 31, 2009) 
of provisions: (1) granting roving surveillance authority under the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) where the Court finds that the actions of the target may thwart 
the identification of a specified person; and (2) authorizing the Director of the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI) to apply for a court order requiring production of tangible things (including 
books, records, papers, and documents) for foreign intelligence and international terrorism 
investigations. 
 
(Sec. 103) Amends the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 to: (1) extend 
for four years (through December 31, 2009) provisions revising the definition of an "agent of a 
foreign power" to include any non-U.S. person who engages in international terrorism or 
preparatory activities (thus permitting issuance of FISA orders targeting such persons without a 
showing that they are members or agents of a terrorist group or a foreign power ["lone wolf" 
provision]); and (2) repeal the sunset date for provisions setting forth additions to the offense of 
providing material support to terrorists. 
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(Sec. 105) Amends FISA to apply provisions governing the duration of an order for electronic 
surveillance or a physical search to surveillance targeted against a foreign power who is not a 
U.S. person. Limits to one year an order (or extension) for the use of pen registers and trap and 
trace devices where the applicant has certified that the information likely to be obtained is 
foreign intelligence information not concerning a U.S. person. 
 
(Sec. 106) Amends the FISA provisions governing orders for the production of tangible things to 
authorize the Director of the FBI to delegate to the Deputy Director or the Executive Assistant 
Director for National Security the authority to make an application for such an order involving 
library circulation records, library patron lists, book sales records, book customer lists, firearms 
sales records, tax return records, educational records, or medical records containing information 
that would identify a person. Requires an application for such an order to: (1) include a statement 
of facts showing that there are reasonable grounds to believe that the tangible things sought are 
relevant to an authorized investigation; (2) include an enumeration of minimization procedures 
adopted by the Attorney General that are applicable to the retention and dissemination by the 
FBI of any tangible things produced; and (3) describe the tangible things to be produced with 
sufficient particularity to permit them to be fairly identified.  Sets forth provisions concerning 
review by a panel of three judges of petitions filed by recipients challenging an order's legality.  
Requires the Attorney General to report to specified congressional committees annually on 
requests and order applications for the production of tangible things and semiannually on orders 
for the production of library circulation records, library patron lists, book sales records, book 
customer lists, firearms sales records, tax return records, educational records, and medical 
records that would identify a person. 
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(Sec. 106A) Directs the Inspector General of the Department of Justice (DOJ) to perform and 
report to Congress on a comprehensive audit of the effectiveness and use of the investigative 
authority provided to the FBI under FISA.  
 
(Sec. 107) Requires the Attorney General to submit to the House and Senate Judiciary 
Committees an annual report containing accounts from which DOJ has received voluntary 
disclosures of customer communications or records in emergencies involving immediate danger 
of death or serious physical injury. 
 
(Sec. 108) Requires applications for roving wiretaps to include specific facts. Requires an order 
approving electronic surveillance where the nature and location are unknown to direct the 
applicant to provide notice to the court, within 10 days after the surveillance begins, of: (1) the 
nature and location of each new facility or place at which the electronic surveillance is directed; 
(2) the facts and circumstances relied upon to justify the belief that such facility is or was being 
used by the target of the surveillance; (3) any proposed minimization procedures that may be 
necessitated by a change in the facility; and (4) the total number of electronic surveillances 
conducted under the authority of the order. Directs the Attorney General to inform the House and 
Senate Judiciary Committees semiannually concerning electronic surveillance under FISA, 
including regarding: (1) electronic surveillance orders where the nature and location of each 
targeted facility are unknown; (2) criminal cases in which information acquired has been 
authorized for use at trial; and (3) emergency employments of electronic surveillance. 
(Sec. 109) Requires the Attorney General to inform such Committees regarding: (1) emergency 
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physical searches authorized; and (2) pen registers and trap and trace devices authorized on an 
emergency basis.  Requires the Secretary of Homeland Security to report to the Judiciary 
Committees semiannually on internal affairs operations at U.S. Citizenship and Immigration 
Services, including regarding investigations conducted. 
 
(Sec. 110) Amends the federal criminal code to rewrite provisions prohibiting acts of destruction 
and violence against trains, railroad equipment and structures, and the mass transportation 
system to: (1) correspond with current prohibitions against acts of violence against the mass 
transportation system; (2) apply such provisions to acts committed knowingly (currently, 
willfully); (3) cover such acts against passenger vessels; and (4) add as an aggravated offense the 
commission of such prohibited act under circumstances in which the railroad on-track 
equipment, passenger vessel, or mass transportation vehicle was carrying high-level radioactive 
waste, spent nuclear fuel, or specified hazardous material. Prohibits surveilling, photographing, 
videotaping, diagramming, or otherwise collecting information with the intent to plan specified 
terrorist acts against mass transportation systems. Provides for the death penalty where the 
offense results in the death of any person.  
 
(Sec. 111) Provides for the civil forfeiture of any property traceable to proceeds obtained from, 
or used to facilitate, trafficking in nuclear, chemical, biological, or radiological weapons 
technology or material. 
 
(Sec. 112) Includes as a predicate offense to a "federal crime of terrorism" a crime related to: (1) 
military-type training from a foreign terrorist organization; or (2) narco-terrorism. 
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(Sec. 113) Expands the circumstances under which the interception of wire, oral, or electronic 
communications is authorized to cover offenses related to: (1) biological weapons; (2) violence 
at international airports; (3) animal enterprise terrorism; (4) nuclear and weapons of mass 
destruction threats; (5) explosive materials; (6) possession of weapons in federal facilities; (7) 
U.S. officers and employees; (8) protection of foreign officials; (9) terrorist attacks against mass 
transportation; (10) torture; (11) arson within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction; (12) 
conspiracy to harm persons or property overseas; (13) structuring financial transactions to evade 
reporting requirements; (14) aircraft piracy; (15) assault on a flight crew with a dangerous 
weapon; (16) explosive or incendiary devices, or endangerment of human life, by means of 
weapons on aircraft; (17) aggravated identity theft; and (18) certain antitrust criminal violations. 
 
(Sec. 114) Authorizes the delay of notice of the execution of a search warrant for a reasonable 
period not to exceed 30 days after execution or until a later date if the facts justify a longer delay. 
Requires the issuing or denying judge to report to the Administrative Office of the United States 
Courts regarding warrants authorizing delayed notice or denials of warrants and requires the 
Director of the Administrative Office to report annually to Congress.  
 
(Sec. 115) Authorizes the recipient of a request for records in connection with an authorized 
investigation concerning terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities, the Fair Credit Reporting 
Act (FCRA), the Right to Financial Privacy Act (RFPA), or the National Security Act of 1947 
(NSA) (a national security letter) to petition the U.S. district court for the district in which that 
person or entity does business or resides for an order modifying or setting aside the request. 
Permits the court to modify or set aside the request if compliance would be unreasonable or 
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oppressive.  Sets forth procedures for petitions for an order modifying or setting aside a 
nondisclosure requirement imposed in connection with such a request. Authorizes the court to 
modify or set aside the requirement if it finds that there is no reason to believe that disclosure 
may endanger U.S. national security, interfere with a criminal, counterterrorism, or 
counterintelligence investigation, interfere with diplomatic relations, or endanger the life or 
physical safety of any person. Treats a certification made by the Attorney General, the Director 
of the FBI, or the head of a federal department that disclosure may endanger national security or 
interfere with diplomatic relations as conclusive unless the court finds it was made in bad faith. 
Authorizes the Attorney General to invoke the aid of a U.S. court to compel compliance with a 
request for information.  
 
(Sec. 116) Prohibits disclosure of such a request if the Director of the FBI certifies that otherwise 
there may result a danger to U.S. national security, interference with a criminal, 
counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation, interference with diplomatic relations, or 
danger to the life or physical safety of any person. Requires a person, at the request of the 
Director of the FBI, to identify the person to whom a disclosure was or will be made. 
 
(Sec. 117) Sets penalties for knowing violations of nondisclosure provisions under the federal 
criminal code, FCRA, RFPA, or NSA. 
 
(Sec. 118) Directs that any report made to a congressional committee regarding national security 
letters also be made to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees. Requires the Attorney 
General to: (1) inform specified other committees semiannually regarding FCRA requests; and 
  
191 
 
 
(2) submit to Congress annually an aggregate report on the total number of DOJ requests made 
concerning U.S. persons. 
 
(Sec. 119) Directs the Inspector General of DOJ to audit and report to the Attorney General and 
the Director of National Intelligence (DNI) on the use of national security letters issued by DOJ. 
Directs the Attorney General and DNI to jointly submit to the Judiciary and Intelligence 
Committees a report on the feasibility of applying minimization procedures in the context of 
national security letters to ensure the protection of the constitutional rights of U.S. persons. 
 
(Sec. 120) Subjects to forfeiture any domestic or foreign assets of a person engaged in any 
federal crime of terrorism (currently, in any act of international or domestic terrorism) against 
the United States, U.S. citizens or residents, or their property.  
 
(Sec. 123) Prohibits interfering with or disabling anyone engaged in the authorized operation of 
an aircraft or air navigation facility with intent to endanger or with reckless disregard for human 
safety. 
 
(Sec. 124) Expresses the sense of Congress that government should not investigate an American 
citizen solely on the basis of the citizen being a member of a nonviolent political organization or 
engaging in other lawful political activity. 
 
(Sec. 126) Directs the Attorney General to submit to Congress a report on any DOJ initiative that 
uses or is intended to develop pattern-based data-mining technology. 
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(Sec. 127) Expresses the sense of Congress that victims of terrorist attacks should have access to 
forfeited assets. 
 
(Sec. 128) Requires: (1) an ex parte order for a pen register or trap or trace device for foreign 
intelligence purposes to direct that, upon the applicant's request, the service provider disclose 
specified information about the customer and the service provided; and (2) the Attorney General 
to fully inform the House and Senate Judiciary Committees regarding uses of such devices. 
 
The Library of Congress Thomas. ―Bill Summary and Status: 109th Congress (2005-2006) H.R. 
 3199. CRS Summary.‖ March 9, 2006. 
 <http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d109:HR03199:@@@D&summ2=m&>. 
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Appendix D. 
 
The FISA Amendments Act of 2008 
 
The following legislative summary is courtesy of the Congressional Research Service 
Legislative Summaries: 
 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Act of 2008 or FISA Amendments 
Act of 2008:  
Title I: Foreign Intelligence Surveillance - (Sec. 101) Amends the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA) to add a new title concerning additional procedures for 
acquiring the communications of certain persons outside the United States. 
Authorizes the Attorney General (AG) and Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to jointly 
authorize, for periods up to one year, the targeting (electronic surveillance) of persons located 
outside the United States in order to acquire foreign intelligence information, under specified 
limitations, including: (1) prohibiting an acquisition intentionally targeting a person reasonably 
believed to be outside the United States in order to acquire the communications of a specific 
person reasonably believed to be inside the United States; and (2) requiring the targeting to be 
conducted in a manner consistent with the fourth amendment to the Constitution. Requires: (1) 
certain targeting and minimization procedures to be followed; (2) the AG to adopt guidelines to 
ensure that such limitations and procedures are followed; (3) the AG to submit such guidelines to 
the congressional intelligence and judiciary committees and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance 
Court (Court) for review; and (4) prior to such targeting, a certification by the AG and DNI as to 
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the necessity of such targeting and that appropriate procedures and limitations will be followed. 
Allows the AG and DNI, if immediate targeting is determined to be required due to an 
emergency situation, to commence such targeting, but to submit the certification within seven 
days of such determination. Requires all certifications to be submitted to the Court for review. 
 
Authorizes the AG and DNI to direct an electronic communication service provider to: (1) 
immediately provide the government with all information, facilities, and assistance necessary to 
accomplish an acquisition; and (2) maintain under security procedures any records concerning 
such acquisition. Outlines legal procedures with respect to directive challenges, standards for 
review, enforcement, and appeals. Provides for: (1) judicial review of certifications and targeting 
and minimization procedures; and (2) review of Court rulings by the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Court of Review (with certiorari to the Supreme Court). Outlines conditions under 
which the AG and DNI may, through the Court: (1) replace a targeting acquisition already in 
effect before the enactment of this Act with an acquisition authorized under this Act; or (2) 
reauthorize a current acquisition under the procedures and guidelines of this Act. Requires Court 
maintenance and security of records and proceedings with respect to acquisition applications, 
orders, appeals, and determinations. 
 
Requires the AG and DNI, at least every six months, to: (1) assess compliance with required 
targeting and minimization procedures and related guidelines; and (2) submit assessment results 
to the Court and the intelligence and judiciary committees. Authorizes inspectors general of the 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and elements of the intelligence community (IC) authorized to 
acquire foreign intelligence information to review their agency or element's compliance with 
  
195 
 
 
such procedures and guidelines and provide review results to the AG, the DNI, and the 
intelligence and judiciary committees. Requires the head of any IC element conducting an 
acquisition of foreign intelligence information to annually review such acquisitions and report 
review results to the Court, the AG, the DNI, and the intelligence and judiciary committees. 
 
Provides Court jurisdiction for approving the targeting of a U.S. person located outside the 
United States when the acquisition of information is conducted inside the United States. Requires 
an application for such acquisition to be made by a federal officer (and approved by the AG), and 
to contain certain requirements, including that the target is believed to be a foreign power or 
agent, officer, or employee of a foreign power. Provides for judicial review of a Court order 
approving such an acquisition. Makes approval orders effective for 90 days, with authorized 90-
day renewals. Allows the AG to authorize an emergency acquisition of such a target under 
certain circumstances, including: (1) determining that an emergency exists; (2) informing a Court 
judge of such determination; and (3) applying within seven days for a Court order authorizing 
such surveillance. Provides similar Court jurisdiction and outlines similar procedures for the 
acquisition (and emergency acquisition) by an IC element of a physical search. 
 
Authorizes the: (1) joint applications and concurrent approvals of requests for acquisitions 
proposed to be conducted both inside and outside the United States; and (2) concurrent 
authorizations of electronic surveillance and physical searches. 
 
Directs the AG to report semiannually to the intelligence and judiciary committees concerning 
the implementation of acquisition requirements. 
  
196 
 
 
(Sec. 102) States that, other than by express statutory authorization, FISA and the procedures of 
chapters 119 (Wire and Electronic Communications Interception and Interception of Oral 
Communications), 121 (Stored Wire and Electronic Communications and Transactional Records 
Access), and 206 (Pen Registers and Trap and Trace Devices) of the federal criminal code shall 
be the exclusive means by which electronic surveillance and the interception of domestic wire, 
oral, or electronic communications may be conducted. 
 
(Sec. 103) Requires the AG to submit semiannually to the intelligence committees copies of any 
orders of the Court or the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review that include 
significant construction or interpretation of FISA, including any such orders issued during the 
five-year period before the enactment of this Act. Allows for the redaction of submitted materials 
for the protection of national security. 
 
(Sec. 104) Revises provisions concerning the application for, and issuance of, Court orders, 
including provisions concerning paperwork requirements and government officials who may 
authorize FISA actions. 
(Sec. 105) Allows the AG to authorize the emergency employment of electronic surveillance if 
the AG, among other things: (1) determines that an emergency exists; (2) informs a Court judge 
of such determination; and (3) applies for a Court order authorizing such surveillance. 
 
(Sec. 107) Provides similar revisions and outlines similar procedures as in sections 104 and 105 
above for the emergency employment of physical searches. 
(Sec. 108) Requires the AG, after authorizing the installation and use of a pen register or trap and 
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trace device on an emergency basis, to apply to the Court for an authorization order within seven 
days (current law requires 48 hours) after the emergency installation and use. 
 
(Sec. 109) Authorizes the Court to sit en banc when: (1) necessary to secure or maintain 
uniformity of Court decisions; or (2) the proceeding involves a question of exceptional 
importance. 
 
(Sec. 110) Authorizes the acquisition of foreign intelligence information from an entity not 
substantially composed of U.S. persons that is engaged in the international proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction, or in activities in preparation therefor on behalf of a foreign power. 
 
Title II: Protections for Electronic Communication Service Providers - (Sec. 201) Prohibits 
any federal or civil action against any person (including an electronic communication service 
provider or a landlord or custodian) providing surveillance assistance to an IC element if the AG 
certifies that such assistance was: (1) provided pursuant to an order or directive under FISA; (2) 
in connection with an intelligence activity authorized by the President during the period 
beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on January 17, 2007, and designed to detect or 
prevent a terrorist attack against the United States; (3) the subject of a written request from the 
AG or IC element head to the provider indicating that the activity was authorized by the 
President and determined to be lawful; or (4) not provided. Allows for the judicial review of such 
certifications. Limits certification disclosure for national security purposes. Prohibits state law 
preemption of the protections afforded assistance providers under this section. Requires 
semiannual reports from the AG to the intelligence and judiciary committees on the 
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implementation of this title. 
 
Title III: Review of Previous Actions - (Sec. 301) Directs the inspectors general of DOJ, the 
Office of the DNI, the National Security Agency (NSA), the Department of Defense (DOD), and 
any other IC element that participated in the President's Surveillance Program (a program 
authorized by the President during the period beginning on September 11, 2001, and ending on 
January 17, 2007, and including the program commonly known as the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program) to: (1) conduct a review of, among other things, the establishment, implementation, 
product, and use of the product of the Program; and (2) provide an interim and final review 
report to the intelligence and judiciary committees. Allows for, in conjunction with such reviews, 
expedited security clearances and the hiring of necessary additional personnel. 
 
Title IV: Other Provisions - (Sec. 401) Provides severability protections for this Act and its 
amendments. 
 
(Sec. 403) Repeals FISA provisions made inconsistent by provisions of this Act. 
 
(Sec. 404) Outlines transition procedures. 
The Library of Congress Thomas. ―Bill Summary and Status: 110th Congress (2007-2008)  
H.R.6304 CRS Summary.‖ July 10, 2008. 
<http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d110:HR06304:@@@D&summ2=m&>.  
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Appendix E. 
 
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103 
 
Case Summary Courtesy CanLII:  
Respondent was charged with unlawful possession of a narcotic for the purpose of trafficking, 
contrary to s. 4(2) of the Narcotic Control Act, but was convicted only of unlawful possession. After 
the trial judge made a finding that it was beyond a reasonable doubt that respondent was in 
possession of a narcotic, respondent brought a motion challenging the constitutional validity of s. 8 
of the Narcotic Control Act. That section provides that if the Court finds the accused in possession 
of a narcotic, the accused is presumed to be in possession for the purpose of trafficking and that, 
absent the accused's establishing the contrary, he must be convicted of trafficking. The Ontario 
Court of Appeal, on an appeal brought by the Crown, found that this provision constituted a 
"reverse onus" clause and held it to be unconstitutional because it violated the presumption of 
innocence now entrenched in s. 11(d) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. The Crown 
appealed and a constitutional question was stated as to whether s. 8 of the Narcotic Control Act 
violated s. 11(d) of the Charter and was therefore of no force and effect. Inherent in this question, 
given a finding that s. 11(d) of the Charter had been violated, was the issue of whether or not s. 8 of 
the Narcotic Control Act was a reasonable limit prescribed by law and demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society for the purpose of s. 1 of the Charter.  
  
Held: The appeal should be dismissed and the constitutional question answered in the affirmative. 
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Per Dickson C.J. and Chouinard, Lamer, Wilson and Le Dain JJ.: Pursuant to s. 8 of the Narcotic 
Control Act, the accused, upon a finding beyond a reasonable doubt of possession of a narcotic, has 
the legal burden of proving on a balance of probabilities that he was not in possession of the 
narcotic for the purpose of trafficking. On proof of possession, a mandatory presumption arises 
against the accused that he intended to traffic and the accused will be found guilty unless he can 
rebut this presumption on a balance of probabilities. 
  
The presumption of innocence lies at the very heart of the criminal law and is protected expressly by 
s. 11(d) of the Charter and inferentially by the s. 7 right to life, liberty and security of the person. 
This presumption has enjoyed longstanding recognition at common law and has gained widespread 
acceptance as evidenced from its inclusion in major international human rights documents. In light 
of these sources, the right to be presumed innocent until proven guilty requires, at a minimum, that: 
(1) an individual be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt; (2) the State must bear the burden of 
proof; and (3) criminal prosecutions must be carried out in accordance with lawful procedures and 
fairness. 
  
A provision which requires an accused to disprove on a balance of probabilities the existence of a 
presumed fact, which is an important element of the offence in question, violates the presumption of 
innocence in s. 11(d). The fact that the standard required on rebuttal is only a balance of 
probabilities does not render a reverse onus clause constitutional. 
  
Section 8 of the Narcotic Control Act infringes the presumption of innocence in s. 11(d) of the 
Charter by requiring the accused to prove he is not guilty of trafficking once the basic fact of 
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possession is proven. 
  
The rational connection test -- the potential for a rational connection between the basic fact and the 
presumed fact to justify a reverse onus provision -- does not apply to the interpretation of s. 11(d). A 
basic fact may rationally tend to prove a presumed fact, but still not prove its existence beyond a 
reasonable doubt, which is an important aspect of the presumption of innocence. The appropriate 
stage for invoking the rational connection test is under s. 1 of the Charter.  
  
Section 1 of the Charter has two functions: First, it guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in the 
provisions which follow it; and second, it states explicitly the exclusive justificatory criteria (outside 
of s. 33 of the Constitutional Act, 1982) against which limitations on those rights and freedoms may 
be measured. 
  
The onus of proving that a limitation on any Charter right is reasonable and demonstrably justified 
in a free and democratic society rests upon the party seeking to uphold the limitation. Limits on 
constitutionally guaranteed rights are clearly exceptions to the general guarantee. The presumption 
is that Charter rights are guaranteed unless the party invoking s. 1 can bring itself within the 
exceptional criteria justifying their being limited. 
  
The standard of proof under s. 1 is a preponderance of probabilities. Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt would be unduly onerous on the party seeking to limit the right because concepts such as 
"reasonableness", "justifiability", and "free and democratic society" are not amenable to such a 
standard. Nevertheless, the preponderance of probability test must be applied rigorously. 
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Two central criteria must be satisfied to establish that a limit is reasonable and demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society. First, the objective to be served by the measures limiting a 
Charter right must be sufficiently important to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right 
or freedom. The standard must be high to ensure that trivial objectives or those discordant with the 
principles of a free and democratic society do not gain protection. At a minimum, an objective must 
relate to societal concerns which are pressing and substantial in a free and democratic society before 
it can be characterized as sufficiently important. Second, the party invoking s. 1 must show the 
means to be reasonable and demonstrably justified. This involves a form of proportionality test 
involving three important components. To begin, the measures must be fair and not arbitrary, 
carefully designed to achieve the objective in question and rationally connected to that objective. In 
addition, the means should impair the right in question as little as possible. Lastly, there must be a 
proportionality between the effects of the limiting measure and the objective -- the more severe the 
deleterious effects of a measure, the more important the objective must be.  
  
Parliament's concern that drug trafficking be decreased was substantial and pressing. Its objective of 
protecting society from the grave ills of drug trafficking was self-evident, for the purposes of s. 1, 
and could potentially in certain cases warrant the overriding of a constitutionally protected right. 
There was, however, no rational connection between the basic fact of possession and the presumed 
fact of possession for the purpose of trafficking. The possession of a small or negligible quantity of 
narcotics would not support the inference of trafficking. 
  
Per Estey and McIntyre JJ.: Concurred in the reasons of Dickson C.J. with respect to the 
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relationship between s. 11(d) and s. 1 of the Charter but the reasons of Martin J.A. in the court 
below were adopted for the disposition of all other issues. 
 
R. v. Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, 26 D.L.R. (4th) 200. 
 <http://www.canlii.org/en/ca/scc/doc/1986/1986canlii46/1986canlii46.html>. 
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Appendix F.  
 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968) 
 
Case Summary Courtesy LII:  
A Cleveland detective (McFadden), on a downtown beat which he had been patrolling for many 
years, observed two strangers (petitioner and another man, Chilton) on a street corner. He saw 
them proceed alternately back and forth along an identical route, pausing to stare in the same 
store window, which they did for a total of about 24 times. Each completion of the route was 
followed by a conference between the two on a corner, at one of which they were joined by a 
third man (Katz) who left swiftly. Suspecting the two men of "casing a job, a stick-up," the 
officer followed them and saw them rejoin the third man a couple of blocks away in front of a 
store. The officer approached the three, identified himself as a policeman, and asked their names. 
The men "mumbled something," whereupon McFadden spun petitioner around, patted down his 
outside clothing, and found in his overcoat pocket, but was unable to remove, a pistol. The 
officer ordered the three into the store. He removed petitioner's overcoat, took out a revolver, and 
ordered the three to face the wall with their hands raised. He patted down the outer clothing of 
Chilton and Katz and seized a revolver from Chilton's outside overcoat pocket. He did not put his 
hands under the outer garments of Katz (since he discovered nothing in his pat-down which 
might have been a weapon), or under petitioner's or Chilton's outer garments until he felt the 
guns. The three were taken to the police station. Petitioner and Chilton were charged with 
carrying [p2] concealed weapons. The defense moved to suppress the weapons. Though the trial 
court rejected the prosecution theory that the guns had been seized during a search incident to a 
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lawful arrest, the court denied the motion to suppress and admitted the weapons into evidence on 
the ground that the officer had cause to believe that petitioner and Chilton were acting 
suspiciously, that their interrogation was warranted, and that the officer, for his own protection, 
had the right to pat down their outer clothing having reasonable cause to believe that they might 
be armed. The court distinguished between an investigatory "stop" and an arrest, and between a 
"frisk" of the outer clothing for weapons and a full-blown search for evidence of crime. 
Petitioner and Chilton were found guilty, an intermediate appellate court affirmed, and the State 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal on the ground that "no substantial constitutional question" 
was involved. 
 
Held:  
 
1. The Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures, made applicable to 
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, "protects people, not places," and therefore applies as 
much to the citizen on the streets as well as at home or elsewhere. 
 
2. The issue in this case is not the abstract propriety of the police conduct, but the admissibility 
against petitioner of the evidence uncovered by the search and seizure. 
 
3. The exclusionary rule cannot properly be invoked to exclude the products of legitimate and 
restrained police investigative techniques, and this Court's approval of such techniques should 
not discourage remedies other than the exclusionary rule to curtail police abuses for which that is 
not an effective sanction. 
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4. The Fourth Amendment applies to "stop and frisk" procedures such as those followed here. 
 
(a) Whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk away, he 
has "seized" that person within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.  
 
(b) A careful exploration of the outer surfaces of a person's clothing in an attempt to find 
weapons is a "search" under that Amendment. 
 
5. Where a reasonably prudent officer is warranted in the circumstances of a given case in 
believing that his safety or that of others is endangered, he may make a reasonable search for 
weapons of the person believed by him to be armed and dangerous [p3] regardless of whether he 
has probable cause to arrest that individual for crime or the absolute certainty that the individual 
is armed. 
 
(a) Though the police must, whenever practicable, secure a warrant to make a search and seizure, 
that procedure cannot be followed where swift action based upon on-the-spot observations of the 
officer on the beat is required. 
 
(b) The reasonableness of any particular search and seizure must be assessed in light of the 
particular circumstances against the standard of whether a man of reasonable caution is 
warranted in believing that the action taken was appropriate. 
 
(c) The officer here was performing a legitimate function of investigating suspicious conduct 
  
207 
 
 
when he decided to approach petitioner and his companions. 
 
(d) An officer justified in believing that an individual whose suspicious behavior he is 
investigating at close range is armed may, to neutralize the threat of physical harm, take 
necessary measures to determine whether that person is carrying a weapon.  
 
(e) A search for weapons in the absence of probable cause to arrest must be strictly 
circumscribed by the exigencies of the situation.  
 
(f) An officer may make an intrusion short of arrest where he has reasonable apprehension of 
danger before being possessed of information justifying arrest.  
 
6. The officer's protective seizure of petitioner and his companions and the limited search which 
he made were reasonable, both at their inception and as conducted.  
 
(a) The actions of petitioner and his companions were consistent with the officer's hypothesis 
that they were contemplating a daylight robbery and were armed.  
 
(b) The officer's search was confined to what was minimally necessary to determine whether the 
men were armed, and the intrusion, which was made for the sole purpose of protecting himself 
and others nearby, was confined to ascertaining the presence of weapons.  
 
7. The revolver seized from petitioner was properly admitted into evidence against him, since the 
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search which led to its seizure was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.  
Affirmed.  
 
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), Syllabus. 
<http://www.law.cornell.edu/supct/html/historics/USSC_CR_0392_0001_ZS.html>. 
 
